La calidad institucional como factor determinante del desarrollo económico basado en los recursos naturales

José Luis Medina-Bueno, José Guimón de Ros, Antonio Vázquez-Barquero

Resumen


La calidad institucional resulta fundamental para explicar las diferencias del progreso económico entre países ricos en recursos naturales. Sin embargo, más allá de la importancia atribuida a las instituciones, la literatura económica no aclara la forma en que influye la calidad institucional sobre los recursos naturales ni ofrece prescripciones claras con relación al tipo de instituciones necesarias para favorecer el desarrollo basado en un aprovechamiento sostenible de los recursos naturales. Este documento presenta una revisión sistemática de la literatura sobre la importancia de la calidad institucional en los efectos de los recursos naturales sobre el desarrollo económico. Se revisa críticamente el papel de las instituciones, tratando de aclarar lo que la literatura académica ha revelado con relación al tipo de instituciones, a cómo y dónde importan. Esta revisión permite concluir que la forma en que importan las instituciones es compleja, diversa y más difusa de lo que se cree. Otra contribución del artículo consiste en indicar algunos de los retos a los que se enfrentan las investigaciones futuras orientadas a aprovechar mejor los recursos naturales a partir de la mejora de las instituciones, particularmente en los países en desarrollo.


Palabras clave


calidad institucional; instituciones económicas y políticas; recursos naturales; desarrollo económico

Texto completo:

PDF           Cómo citar un elemento

Referencias


Acemoglu, D. y Johnson, S. (2005): “Unbundling Institutions”, Journal of Political Economy, 113 (5), 949-995.

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. y Robinson, J. (2001): “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation”, American Economic Review, 91 (5), 1369-1401.

Alexeev, M. y Conrad, R. (2009): “The Elusive Curse of Oil”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 91 (3), 586-598.

Amundsen, I. (2014): “Drowning in Oil: Angola’s Institutions and the Resource Curse”, Comparative Politics, 46 (2), 169-189.

Andersen, J. y Aslaksen, S. (2008): “Constitutions and the Resource Curse”, Journal of Development Economics, 87 (2), 227-146.

Antonakakis, N., Cunado, J., Filis, G. y Gracia, F. (2017): “Oil Dependence, Quality of Political Institutions and Economic Growth: A Panel VAR Approach”, Resources Policy, 53 (C), 147-163.

Apergis, N. y Payne, J. (2014): “The Oil Curse, Institutional Quality, and Growth in MENA Countries: Evidence from Time-Varying Cointegration”, Energy Economics, 46 (C), 1-9.

Arezki, R. y van Der Ploeg, F. (2010): “Trade Policies, Institutions and the Natural Resource Curse”, Applied Economics Letters, 17(15), 1443-1451.

Arndt, C. y Oman, C. (2006): Uses and Abuses of Governance Indicators, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris.

Atkinson, G. y Hamilton, K. (2003): “Savings, Growth and the Resource Curse Hypothesis”, World Development, 31 (11), 1793-1807.

Auty, R. M. (1993): Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis, Routledge, London.

Bhattacharyya, S. y Hodler, R. (2010): “Natural Resources, Democracy and Corruption”, European Economic Review, 54 (4), 608-621.

Bhattacharyya, S. y Hodler, R. (2014): “Do Natural Resource Revenues Hinder Financial Development? The Role of Political Institutions”, World Development, 57 (C), 101-113.

Bhattacharyya, S. y Collier, P. (2014): “Public Capital in Resource Rich Economies: Is there a curse?”, Oxford Economic Papers, 66 (1), 1-24.

Boschini, A., Pettersson, J. y Roine, J. (2007): “Resource Curse or Not: A Question of Appropriability”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 109 (3), 593-617.

Boschini, A., Pettersson, J. y Roine, J. (2008): “The Constitutional Channels of the Resource Curse”, Thematic Session, No. 8, 449-456.

Boschini, A., Pettersson, J. y Roine, J. (2013): “The Resource Curse and its Potential Reversal”, World Development, 43 (C), 19-41.

Botlhole, T., Asafu?Adjaye, J. y Carmignani, F. (2012): “Natural Resource Abundance, Institutions and Tax Revenue Mobilisation in Sub?Sahara Africa”, South African Journal of Economics, 80 (2), 135-156.

Brunnschweiler, C. N. (2008): “Cursing the Blessings? Natural Resource Abundance, Institutions, and Economic Growth”, World Development, 36 (3), 399-419.

Brunnschweiler, C. N. y Bulte, E. H. (2008): “The Resource Curse Revisited and Revised: A Tale of Paradoxes and Red Herrings”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 55 (3), 248-264.

Bulte, E., Damania, R. y Deacon, R. (2005): “Resource Intensity, Institutions, and Development”, World Development, 33 (7), 1029-1044.

Cabrales, A. y Hauk, E. (2011): “The Quality of Political Institutions and the Curse of Natural Resources”, The Economic Journal, 121 (5), 58-88.

Campbell, J. (2004): Institutional Change and Globalization, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Chang, H. J. (2011): “Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History”, Journal of Institutional Economics, 7 (4), 473-498.

Chang, H. J. (2007): State-owned Enterprise Reform, National Development Strategies Policy Notes, New York.

Collier, P. y Hoeffler, A. (2009): “Testing the Neocon Agenda: Democracy in Resource-Rich Societies”, European Economic Review, 53 (3), 293-308.

Corrigan, C. (2014): “Breaking the Resource Curse: Transparency in the Natural Resource Sector and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative”, Resources Policy, 40 (1), 17-30.

De Blasio, G. y Nuzzo, G. (2010): “Historical Traditions of Civicness and Local Economic Development”, Journal of Regional Science, 50 (4), 833-857.

De Soto, H. (2000): The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else, Basic Books, New York.

Dietsche, E. (2018): “Political Economy and Governance”; en Addison, T. y Alan, R. (2018): Extractive Industries: The Management of Resources as a Driver of Sustainable Development, Oxford University Press, London.

Dietz, S., Neumayer, E. y De Soysa, I. (2007): “Corruption, the Resource Curse and Genuine Saving”, Environment and Development Economics, 12 (1), 33-53.

El-Anshasy, A. y Katsaiti. M. (2013): “Natural Resources and Fiscal Performance: Does Good Governance Matter?”, Journal of Macroeconomics, 37 (C), 285-298.

Elbadawi, I. y Soto, R. (2015): “Resource Rents, Institutions, and Violent Civil Conflicts”, Defence and Peace Economics, 26 (1), 89-113.

Eregha, P. y Mesagan, E. (2016): “Oil Resource Abundance, Institutions and Growth: Evidence from Oil Producing African Countries”, Journal of Policy Modeling, 38 (3), 603-619.

Farhadi, M., Islam, M. y Moslehi, S. (2015): “Economic Freedom and Productivity Growth in Resource-rich Economies”, World Development, 72 (C), 109-126.

Glaeser, E., La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F. y Shleifer, A. (2004): “Do Institutions Cause Growth?”, Journal of Economic Growth, 9 (3), 271-303.

Hall, R. E. y Jones, C. I. (1999): “Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (1), 83-116.

Hartwell, C. (2016): “The Institutional Basis of Efficiency in Resource-rich Countries”, Economic Systems, 40 (4), 519-538.

Hinojosa, L. (2013): “Change in Rural Livelihoods in the Andes: Do Extractive Industries Make Any Difference?”, Community Development Journal, 48 (3), 421-436.

Hodgson, G. (2009): “On the Institutional Foundation of Law: The Insufficiency of Custom and Private Ordering”, Journal of Economic Issues, XLIII (1), 143-166.

Holden, S. (2013): “Avoiding the Resource Curse the Case Norway”, Energy Policy, 63 (C), 870-876.

Humphreys, M. y Sandbu, M. (2007): “The Political Economy of Natural Resource Funds”; en Humphreys, M., Sachs, J. y Stiglitz, J. (2007): Escaping the Resource Curse, Columbia University Press, Nueva York.

Iimi, A. (2007): “Escaping from the Resource Curse: Evidence from Botswana and the Rest of the World”, IMF Staff Papers, 54 (4), 663-699.

Ji, K., Magnus, J. y Wang. R. (2014): “Natural Resources, Institutional Quality, and Economic Growth in China”, Environmental and Resource Economics, 57 (3), 323-343.

Karl, T. L. (1997): The Paradox of the Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States, University of California Press, Berkeley.

Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. y Mastruzzi, M. (2005): “Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996–2004”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 9424.

Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. y Mastruzzi, M. (2003): Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996–2002, World Bank, Washington D.C.

Keefer P. y Shirley, M. (2000): “Formal versus Informal Institutions in Economic Development”; en Ménard, C. (2000): Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.

Keefer, P. y Knack, S. (2002): “Polarization, Politics, and Property Rights: Links between Inequality and Growth”, Public Choice, 111 (1-2), 127-154.

Kennedy, R. y Tiede, L. (2013): “Economic Development Assumptions and the Elusive Curse of Oil”, International Studies Quarterly, 57 (4), 760-771.

Khanna, A. (2017): “Revisiting the Oil Curse: Does Ownership Matter?”, World Development, 99 (C), 214-229.

Kim, C. S. y Lee, S. (2018): “Regime Types, Ideological Leanings, and the Natural Resource Curse”, Constitutional Political Economy, 29 (1), 1-19.

Kim, D. H. y Lin S. C. (2017): “Natural Resources and Economic Development: New Panel Evidence”, Environmental and Resource Economics, 66 (2), 363-391.

Kolstad, I. (2009): “The Resource Curse: Which Institutions Matter?”, Applied Economics Letters, 16 (4), 439-442.

Kolstad, I. y Wiig, A. (2009): “It’s the Rents, Stupid! The Political Economy of the Resource Curse”, Energy Policy, 37 (12), 5317-5325.

Kurtz, M. y Schrank, A. (2007): “Growth and Governance: Models, Measures, and Mechanisms”, Journal of Politics, 69 (2), 538-554.

La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. y Vishny, R. (1999): “The Quality of Government”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15 (1), 222-278.

Lawer, E. T., Lukas, M. C. y Jørgensen, S. H. (2017): “The Neglected Role of Local Institutions in the ‘Resource Curse’ Debate. Limestone Mining in the Krobo Region of Ghana”, Resources Policy, 54 (C), 43-52.

Leftwich, A. y Sen, K. (2011): “‘Don’t Mourn; Organize’ Institutions and Organizations in the Politics and Economics of Growth and Poverty- Reduction”, Journal of International Development, 23 (3), 319-337.

Libman, A. (2013): “Natural Resources and Sub-national Economic Performance: Does Sub-national Democracy Matter?”, Energy Economics, 37 (C), 82-99.

Mahoney, J. y Thelen, K. (2010): Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Mehlum, H., Moene, K. y Torvik, R. (2006a): “Institutions and the Resource Curse”, The Economic Journal, 116 (508), 1-20.

Mehlum, H., Moene, K., y Torvik, R. (2006b): “Cursed by Resources or Institutions?”, World Economy, 29 (8), 1117-1131.

Mohaddes, K. y Raissi, M. (2017): “Do Sovereign Wealth Funds Dampen the Negative Effects of Commodity Price Volatility?”, Journal of Commodity Markets, 8 (C), 18-27.

North, D. (1990): Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press, New York.

O’Reilly, C. y Murphy, R. (2017): “Do Institutions Mitigate the Risk of Natural Resource Conflicts?”, Contemporary Economic Policy, 35 (3), 532-541.

Orihuela, J. C. (2018): “Institutions and Place: Bringing Context Back into the Study of the Resource Curse”, Journal of Institutional Economics, 14 (1), 157-180.

Orihuela, J. C. (2013): “How do “Mineral-States” Learn? Path-Dependence, Networks, and Policy Change in the Development of Economic Institutions”, World Development, 43 (C), 138-148.

Ostrom, E. (2007): “Challenges and Growth: The Development of the Interdisciplinary Field of Institutional Analysis”, Journal of Institutional Economics, 3 (3), 239-164.

Ostrom, E. (2005): Understanding Institutional Diversity, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

Ostrom, E. (1990): Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge University Press, New York.

Persson, T. (2005): “Forms of Democracy, Policy and Economic Development”, NBER Working Paper, No. 11171.

Pierson, P. (2004): Politics in Time. History, Institutions and Social Analysis, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

Persson, T. y Tabellini, G. (2006): “Democracy and Development: The Devil in the Details”, American Economic Review, 96 (2), 319-324.

Persson, T. y Tabellini, G. (2004): “Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes”, American Economic Review, 94 (1), 25-45.

Persson, T. y Tabellini, G. (2003): The Economic Effects of Constitutions: What do the Data Say? The MIT Press, Massachusetts.

Putnam R. D. (1993): Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

Robinson, J., Torvik, R. y Verdier, T. (2006): “Political Foundations of the Resource Curse”, Journal of Development Economics, 79 (2), 447-468.

Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2013): “Do Institutions Matter for Regional Development?”, Regional Studies, 47 (7), 1034-1047.

Rodrigues, M. y Mendes, L. (2018): “Mapping of the Literature on Social Responsibility in the Mining Industry: A Systematic Literature Review”, Journal of Cleaner Production, 181 (1), 88-101.

Rodrik, D., Subramanian, F. y Trebbi, F. (2004): “Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development”, Journal of Economic Growth, 9 (2), 131-165.

Rostow, W. (1960): The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Sachs, J. y Warner, A. (1997): “Sources of Slow Growth in African Economies”, Journal of African Economies, 6 (3), 335-376.

Sachs, J. y Warner, A. (1995): “Natural Resources Abundance and economic growth”, NBER Working Paper No. 5398.

Sánchez, A., García, J. y Del Sur, A. (2015): “Comercio internacional, materias primas y enfermedad holandesa: estudio comparativo de los efectos estáticos en Noruega y Chile”, Revista de Economía Mundial, 39 (1), 179-200.

Sarmidi, T., Hook, S. y Jafari, Y. (2014): “Resource Curse: New Evidence on the Role of Institutions”, International Economic Journal, 28 (1), 191-206.

Shaw, P., Katsaiti, M. y Jurgilas, M. (2011): “Corruption and Growth Under Weak Identification”, Economic Inquiry, 4 (1), 264-275.

Sobel, R. (2017): “The Rise and Decline of Nations: The Dynamic Properties of Institutional Reform”, Journal of Institutional Economics, 13 (3), 549-574.

Storper, M. (1997): The Regional World: Territorial Development in a Global Economy, Guildford Press, New York.

Tabellini, G. (2010): “Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe”, Journal of the European Economic Association, 8 (4), 677-716.

Tolentino, J. y Singh, N. (2014): “Towards Post-neoliberal Resource Politics? The International Political Economy (IPE) of Oil and Copper in Brazil and Chile”, New Political Economy, 19 (3), 329-358.

Torvik, R. (2018): “Should Developing Countries Establish Petroleum Funds?”, The Energy Journal, 39 (4), 85-101.

Torvik, R. (2011): “The Political Economy of Reform in Resource Rich Countries”; en Arezki, R., Gylfason, T. y Sy, A. (2011): Beyond the Curse: Policies to Harness the Power of Natural Resources, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.

Tranfield, D., Denyer, D. y Smart, P. (2003): “Towards a Methodology for Developing Evidence?Informed Management Knowledge by Means of Systematic Review”, British Journal of Management, 14 (3), 207-222.

Vázquez-Barquero, A. (2018): “Constitución, desarrollo endógeno y dinámica de las instituciones”, Revista de Economía Mundial, 48 (1), 201-220.

Vázquez-Barquero, A. y Rodríguez-Cohard, J. (2016): “Endogenous Development and Institutions: Challenges for Local Development Initiatives”, Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space, 34 (6), 1135-1153.

Wiens, D. (2014): “Natural Resources and Institutional Development”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 26 (2), 197-221.

World Bank (2005): World Bank Governance Indicators 1996–2004, World Bank, Washington D.C.

Vijayaraghavan, M. y Ward, W. (2001): “Institutions and Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence from a Cross-National Analysis”, Working Paper, No. 001302.

Villa, M., Siller, D., Piersiak, M. y Teilmann-Ibsen, S. (2014): “Impulsando Buenas Prácticas de Minería Artesanal y de Pequeña Escala en el Contexto Latinoamericano: El Estándar de Minería Justa Fairmined”, ARM Serie sobre la MAPE Responsable, Vol. 6.

Williamson, C. (2009): “Informal Institutions Rule: Institutional Arrangements and Economic Performance”, Public Choice, 139 (3), 371-187.




DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33776/rem.v0i56.3823

Enlaces refback

  • No hay ningún enlace refback.




Copyright (c) 2020 Creative Commons (CC-BY)



e-ISSN:2340-4264   -   ISSN: 1576-0162

Entidad editoraUniversidad de Huelva. Servicio de Publicaciones.

Licencia de usoCreative Commons 4.0