Public sector bureaucracies and economic growth

Resumen

Public sector bureaucracies are key players in modern advanced economies, in particular for the smooth functioning of the roles assigned to the government sector, such as the provision and organization of welfare state services, and the implementation of the (economic) institutional framework, including as regards the tax code and the guarantees of legal certainty for economic agents. From this perspective, a proper functioning of bureaucratic bodies is crucial for potential growth. Thus, cross-country differences in the quality of bureaucracies can explain, to a large extent, differences in economic growth among them. The operation of self-interested bureaucracies, insofar as their objective function differs from the one of the benevolent social planner (government), can lead to regulatory capture, damaging efficiency and economic incentives, labor market misallocation, and inefficient fiscal policies. In this paper, first, we engage in a thorough review of the extant literature, framing the discussion of the main channels by means of a small-scale dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium model. Second, we provide an empirical exercise that illustrates the links between bureaucratic/institutional quality and economic growth.