Es el momento de la política fiscal: repensar los estabilizadores automáticos contra la pandemia

Esteban Cruz Hidalgo, Francisco Manuel Parejo Moruno, Eduardo Garzón Espinosa, José Francisco Rangel Preciado

Resumen


A la Histéresis, el Estancamiento Secular y el Límite Inferior Cero se les ha unido un cuarto jinete, la pandemia por Coronavirus. Si la desconexión de la tradicional Política de Tipo de Interés para la gestión macroeconómica forzó a los Bancos Centrales de todo el mundo a realizar incursiones en terreno inexplorado; el shock del COVID-19 obliga a adentrarse más en lo desconocido y hacerlo rápido, porque los costes de no hacerlo provocarán daños amplios y persistentes. En este contexto, discutimos el papel de la política fiscal y cómo ideas emergentes aparecidas en momentos históricos similares deben reconsiderarse.


Palabras clave


Política Fiscal; COVID-19; Hacienda Funcional; Límite inferior Cero; Estabilizadores Automáticos.

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33776/rem.v0i56.4825

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