

CLEANTHES SOCRATICVS I: THE TEXTUAL BACKGROUND TO *SVF* I.558-562 AND THEIR MEANING

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RESUMEN

Reexaminando *SVF* I.557-62 de Cleantes mediante el establecimiento de relaciones textuales de dichos fragmentos con sus fuentes, muestro que: (i) I.557-8, a diferencia de como los interpretó H. von Arnim, no tienen nada que ver con filosofía moral, sino que son simplemente dos versiones de exhortación a la “filosofía”, considerada esta como libertad de pensamiento y aplicación de la razón a la vida práctica, y (ii) los fr. I.558-62 remontan directa y textualmente al pensamiento moral de Sócrates conocido a través del *corpus Platonicum* y de Jenofonte (I.558) y a través de Platón (I.559-62), así como al *Protréptico* de Aristóteles (Düring B53).

PALABRAS CLAVE

Cleanthes; ética socrática; *exhortatio ad philosophiam*; estudio de fuentes.

SUMMARY

Re-examining Cleanthes' *SVF* I.557-62 by means of establishing textual relations of them to their sources, I show that: (i) I.557-8, unlike how H. von Arnim construed them, have nothing to do with moral philosophy, but are simply two versions of exhortation to “philosophy”, taken as freedom of thought and application of reason to practical life, and (ii) Fr. I.558-62 are directly and verbatim traceable back to Socrates' moral thought as known via the *corpus Platonicum* plus Xenophon (I.558) and via bare Plato (I.559-62) as well as to Aristotle's *Protrepticus* (Düring B53).

KEYWORDS

Cleanthes; Socratic ethics; *exhortatio ad philosophiam*; source mining.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Fragments I.557-62 in Hans von Arnim's *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*¹ belong to the moral unit of the Cleanthes (ca. 331-230 BC) section (Fr. 552-98). Fr. I.557-8 are taken by the editor as treating "de bono et honesto", and Fr. I.559-62 as treating "de indifferentibus". Restoring their point, I shall argue that fr. I.559 and I.560 have nothing to do with any branch or topic of moral philosophy, but are simply two versions of exhortation to "philosophy". Further, I shall show that fr. I.558-62 can be directly traced back to Socrates' thought as known via the *corpus Platonicum* plus Xenophon (I.558) and via bare Plato (I.559-62), as well as to Aristotle's *Protrepticus*. Moreover, based on the literary fact that Cleanthes depended on concrete passages from Plato and Xenophon and, as will be additionally revealed, on certain verses from Homer, Alcaeus, and Theognis, I shall elucidate the content of the fragments and draw certain related conclusions, both regarding each of the fragments and Cleanthes as an author and thinker.

Throughout the study, I establish textual relations in the strict sense of the term, namely I bring to light concrete dependence cases, and then draw conclusions about the content of the passages, precisely on the basis of their genetic relations. I accordingly re-translate and/or re-interpret certain of these passages or resolve scholarly disagreement, foremost focusing on the Cleanthean fragments mentioned above, and, when necessary, on certain other Cleanthean fragments, too. In order to establish textual relations, my research into sources is as exhaustive and accurate as technically possible in a printed study. Texts are written on the basis of (previous and contemporary) texts, and finding exclusive and highly concentrated common wording in a small number of passages —sometimes in the smallest possible quantity, i.e. two— that deal with the same topic can hardly be taken as coincidence *aequo animo* to pass by. In order to establish exclusivity, I sometimes quote and discuss passages which look similar to Cleanthes' but in fact, as demonstrated, are not. Although this is a methodological issue deserving an analysis on its own, it is quite useful to apply this general principle to particular cases such as those examined here in detail and see what the results are.

In order to facilitate the reader to follow the way in which I compare and genetically connect the texts, in the quotations I *italicize* each common word or phrase and use numbers (or letters) in [square brackets] for verbal similarities and numbers (or letters) in {braces} for similarities *quoad sensum*. Numbering starts anew at § 3.1 and at § 3.2.

¹ I. ab Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta. Volumen I: Zeno et Zenonis discipuli*, Leipzig 1905; *Volumen II: Chrysippi fragmenta logica et physica*, Leipzig 1905; *Volumen III: Chrysippi fragmenta moralia – Fragmenta successorum Chrysippi*, Leipzig 1905; *Volumen IV, quo indices continentur. Conscriptit M. Adler*, Leipzig 1924 (hereafter: *SVF*, followed by volume number in Latin and fragment number and/or page and line reference in Arabic). — Passages, Stoic or not, in the footnotes are not accompanied by translation, unless translation is necessary for my argument.

2. PHILOSOPHANDVM EST

I begin with I.559 and I.560. Closely connected to each other, they should actually be classified, as we shall see, as two succinct *exhortationes ad philosophiam*.

2.1. SVF I.559, OR SAPERE AVDE; INCIPE!

Μή [1a] πρὸς [1b] δόξαν [2] ὄρα {1c} {a}, ἐθέλων {3a} σοφὸς [3b]
 αἴψα γενέσθαι {3c},
 μηδὲ φοβοῦ [4] πολλῶν [5a] [e] ἄκριτον [6 e contrario] καὶ ἀναιδέα
 {7} δόξαν [5b].
 Οὐ [f1] γὰρ πλῆθος [8] {e} ἔχει [g] συνετήν [b] [f2] κρίσιν [6] οὔτε
 {c} δικαίαν [d]
 οὔτε καλήν [9], ὀλίγοις [10a] δὲ παρ' ἀνδράσι [10b] τοῦτο κεν
 εὔροις².

Look not to opinion, (absurdly) wishing to become wise as if in a twinkling of an eye,
 And fear not the uncritically formed and rash opinion of the many;
 For, it is not the multitude that has a sagacious, or just, or
 temperate judgment;
 It is only in few men that you will find this³.

The fragment is preserved in Clement of Alexandria's *Stromata* 5.3.17. Both its point and the largest part of its wording can be exclusively —and thereby safely— traced back to the following couple of Platonic passages:

² O. Stählin, L. Früchtel, U. Treu, *Clemens Alexandrinus. Zweiter Band: Stromata Buch I-VI*, Berlin 1985, 337.17-20; A. de Boulluec, *Clément d'Alexandrie. Les Stromates. Stromate V. Tome I: Introduction, texte critique et notes. Traduction de P. Voulet*, Paris 1981, 52.2.4-9. Numbering of words by means of letters facilitates comparison to the reception of the fragment by Clement of Alexandria in *Strom.* 5.4.19.1-2, quoted in Appendix.

³ P. Schaff (ausp.), *The Anti-Nicene Fathers. Volume 2: Fathers of the Second Century: Hermes, Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus, and Clement of Alexandria (Entire)*. Ed. A. Roberts, J. Donaldson. Revised and Chronologically Arranged with Brief Prefaces and Occasional Notes by A. Cleveland Coxe, New York 1885, 947. I emend the translation as regards “δόξαν”, the adjectives of “judgment”, and certain minor points. — P. Voulet's rendering of “ἐθέλων σοφὸς αἴψα γενέσθαι” as “si tu veux devenir sage promptement” (de Boulluec, *Clément d'Alexandrie. Les Stromates*, 53) is not sustainable; the *participium* “ἐθέλων” is not *conditionale* but *causale*. Cleanthes' point is that it is wrong to think one can become wise in short time (i.e. by simply swallowing received knowledge as, e.g., well-arranged in a teaching curriculum); instead, one should devote oneself to serious thought as long as it will take in order to get rid of the temerarious opinions of the *vulgus*, and only then embark upon searching for the truth. Cf. Pl. *Phdr.* 233E5-234A7: “[...] προσήκει [...] χαρίζεσθαι [...] οὐδὲ τοῖς ὀλίγον χρόνον σπουδάζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὁμοίως διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου φίλοις ἐσομένοις [...]”. To Cleanthes' rather unfrequent but quite acceptable *πρὸς δόξαν ὄραν* (v. 1), regarded as a feature of the multitude's mentality and as resulting in holding wrong beliefs, cf. Ps.-Isocrates' *Ad Demonicum* 17: “Ἐὐλαβοῦ τὰς διαβολάς, κἂν ψευδεῖς ᾖσιν· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν ἀγνοοῦσι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν δόξαν ἀποβλέπουσιν” (B.G. Mandilaras, *Isocrates. Opera omnia. Vol. II*, München-Leipzig 2003, 12).

(i) Pl. *Cri.* 46C3-48D6; 49C11-D2:

ΣΩ. [...] Οὐδ' ἂν πλείω τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἢ τῶν πολλῶν [5a] {8} δύναμις ὥσπερ παῖδας ἡμᾶς *μορμολύττηται* {4} [...]; Εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβοιμεν, ὃν σὺ λέγεις περὶ τῶν *δοξῶν* [2]. Πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο ἐκάστοτε ἢ οὐ, ὅτι ταῖς μὲν δεῖ τῶν *δοξῶν* [2] *προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν* [1b] {1c}, ταῖς δὲ οὐ [1a]; [...] Ἐλέγετο δὲ πως [...], ἐκάστοτε ὧδε ὑπὸ τῶν *οἰομένων τι λέγειν* {6}, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι τῶν *δοξῶν* [2] [5b] ἄς οἱ *ἄνθρωποι* {5a} {8} *δοξάζουσιν* [2] [5b] δεοὶ τὰς μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μὴ [1a]. [...] *Οὐ* [1a] πάσας χρὴ τὰς *δόξας* [2] [5b] *τῶν ἀνθρώπων* {5a} {10b} *τιμᾶν* {1c}, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν, τὰς δ' οὐ [1a] [...].

ΣΩ. [...] Τὰς μὲν *χρηστάς* {9} *τιμᾶν* {1c}, τὰς δὲ *πονηράς* {9} *e contrario* {1} μὴ [1a] [...].

ΣΩ. [...] Γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς {5a} {8} [10b] ἐπαίνω καὶ ψόγω καὶ *δόξῃ* [2] [5b] τὸν νοῦν *προσέχει* [1b] {1c}, ἢ ἐνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὢν;

KP. Ἐνὸς μόνου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν *φοβεῖσθαι* [4] χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάξασθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐκείνου ἀλλὰ μὴ [1a] τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν [5a]. [...]

ΣΩ. Ταῦτη ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον [...], ἢ ἂν τῷ ἐνὶ *δοκῇ* [2] [5b], τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαῖοντι, μᾶλλον ἢ ἢ *σύμψασι τοῖς ἄλλοις* {5a} {8}. [...]

ΣΩ. Ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ *ἀτιμάσας* (1c *e contrario*) αὐτοῦ τὴν *δόξαν* [2] [5b] καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους, *τιμήσας* {1c} δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν [5a] καὶ μὴδὲν ἐπαῖόντων, ἄρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται;

KP. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; [...]

ΣΩ. [...] Οὐκοῦν καὶ *τᾶλλα*, ὃ Κρίτων, οὕτως [...], καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχροῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν [...], πότερον *τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ* [5a-b] δεῖ ἡμᾶς *ἔπεσθαι* {11} καὶ *φοβεῖσθαι* [4 *e contrario*] αὐτὴν ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἐνός, εἴ τίς ἐστὶν ἐπαῖων, ὃν δεῖ καὶ *αἰσχύνεσθαι* {4} καὶ *φοβεῖσθαι* [4] μᾶλλον ἢ *σύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους* {5a} {8};

ΣΩ. [...] Ὅρα, ὃ Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν, ὅπως μὴ παρὰ *δόξαν* [2] [5b] ὁμολογῆς· οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι *ὀλίγοις* [10a] *τισι* {10b} ταῦτα καὶ *δοκεῖ* [5b] καὶ *δόξει* [5b].

Socr. [...] Not even if the power of the multitude frighten us with even more terrors than at present, as children are frightened with goblins [...] By taking up first what you say about opinions and asking whether we were right when we always used to say that we ought to pay attention to some opinions and not to others? [...] It used to be said [...] by those who thought they were speaking sensibly, just as I was saying now, that of the opinions held by men some ought to be highly esteemed and others not. [...]

Socr. [...] We ought to esteem the good opinions and not the bad ones [...].

Socr. [...] If a man is an athlete and makes that his business, does he pay attention to every man's praise and blame and opinion or to those of one man only who is a physician or a trainer?

Cri. To those of one man only.

Socr. Then he ought to fear the blame and welcome the praise of that one man and not of the multitude.

[...]

Socr. And he must act [...] as the one man who is his director and who knows the business thinks best rather than as all the others think.

[...]

Socr. [...] If he disobeys the one man and disregards his opinion and his praise, but regards the words of the many who have no special knowledge, will he not come to harm?

Cri. Of course he will.

Socr. [...] Then in other matters [...], particularly in questions of right and wrong and disgraceful and noble and good and bad [...], ought we to follow and fear the opinion of the many or that of the one, if there is anyone who knows about them, whom we ought to revere and fear more than all the others?

Socr. [...] Be careful, Crito, that you do not, in agreeing to this, agree to something you do not believe; for I know that there are few who believe or ever will believe this⁴.

(ii) Pl. La. 184D5-E9:

ΣΩ. Τί δέ, ὦ Λυσίμαχε; Ὅποτερ' ἂν οἱ πλείους [5a] ἐπαινῶσιν ἡμῶν, τούτοις μέλλεις χρῆσθαι; Ἢ και σὺ, ὦ Μελησία [...]; [...] ἼΑρα

⁴ Tr. W.R.M. Lamb, *Plato in Twelve Volumes. I: Euthyphro – Apology – Crito – Phaedo – Phaedrus*, Cambridge, MA-London 1914, 161-9 and 173. Cf. Pl. *Ap.* 25B1-4: “[...] Εἷς μὲν τις ὁ βελτίους οἷός τ' ὢν ποιεῖν ἢ πάνυ ὀλίγοι [10] [...], οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ [5] [...] διαφθεύουσιν [...]”; *Cra.* 386B3-6: “ΣΩ. Τί δέ; Πάνυ χρηστοὶ {9} οὕτω σοὶ ἔδοξαν εἶναι; *EPM.* Καὶ μάλα ὀλίγοι [10]”; *Smp.* 194B7-8: “[...] νοῦν ἔχοντι ὀλίγοι [10] ἔμφρονες πολλῶν [5a] ἀφρόνων φοβερῶτεροι [4 *e contrario*] [...]”; *Euthd* 307A3-5: “[...] οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι πολλοὶ [5a] καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι, οἱ δὲ σπουδαῖοι ὀλίγοι [10]; “[...] ἔφησθα καλεῖν τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς [5a] ἄφρονας, τοὺς δ' ὀλίγους [10] φρονίμους [...]”; *R.* 4.428E9-429A3: “[...] τοῦτο [...] φύσει ὀλίγιστον [10] γίγνεται γένος, ὃ προσήκει ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης μεταλαγχάνειν ἢν μόνην δεῖ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ‘σοφίαν’ καλεῖσθαι”; 6.491A9-B2: “[...] τοιαύτην φύσιν καὶ πάντα ἔχουσαν ὅσα προσετάξαμεν νυνδὴ, εἰ τελέως μέλλοι φιλόσοφος γενέσθαι, ὀλιγάκις [10] ἐν ἀνθρώποις {10b} φύεσθαι καὶ ὀλίγοις [10a]”; 6.499B4-5: “[...] τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τούτοις τοῖς ὀλίγοις [10a] καὶ οὐ πονηροῖς {9} [...]”; 6.500A6-B2: “[...] ἐν ὀλίγοις [10a] τισὶν {10b} ἡγοῦμαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ πλήθει [8], χαλεπὴν οὕτω φύσιν γίνεσθαι. [...] τοῦ χαλεπῶς πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν τοὺς πολλοὺς [5a] διακεῖσθαι [...]”; *Prt.* 353A7-8: “[...] δεῖ ἡμᾶς σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν τῶν πολλῶν [5a] ὀξάν [5b] ἀνθρώπων, οἱ ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃσι τοῦτο λέγουσιν;”; *Ps.-Pl., Alc.* 2, 145A8-9 and 146C8-9: “[...] τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς [5a] ἄφρονας, τοὺς δ' ὀλίγους [10] φρονίμους [...]”. The above passages cannot account for the diction of I.559; my numbering is simply meant to facilitate comparison.

τοῖς πλείοσιν [5a] ἂν ἡμῶν πείθιοι, ἢ ‘κείνῳ ὅστις τυγχάνει ὑπὸ παιδοτριβῆ ἀγαθῷ πεπαιδευμένος καὶ ἡσκηκός; [...] Αὐτῷ ἄρ’ ἂν μᾶλλον πείθιοι ἢ τέτταρσιν οὖσιν {5a} ἡμῖν; [...] Ἐπιστήμη⁵ γὰρ οἶμαι δεῖ κρίνεσθαι [6] ἀλλ’ οὐ πλῆθει [8] {5a} τὸ μέλλον καλῶς [9] κριθήσεσθαι [6].

Socr. What, Lysimachus? Are you going to join the side which gets the approval of the majority of us? [...] And you too, Melesias, would do the same? [...] [...] Would you be guided by the majority of us, or by the one who happened to have trained and exercised under a good master? [...] \Would you be guided by him alone rather than the four of us? [...] For a question must be decided by knowledge, and not by numbers, if it is to have a right decision.⁶

[6] and [8] occur only in the passage from *Laches*⁷. In addition, it is only in the passage from *Laches* that Cleanthes’ combination of [6] with [9] (“κρίσιν [...] καλῆν”) occurs. This suggests that, although the content of passage (ii) does not essentially differ from, or say anything additional to, the content of passage (i), Cleanthes used that, too⁸.

Socrates’ point is this. Everyone, even the so far unwise and never-to-become-wise man, easily admits that the opinion held by the (never numerous) specialists is more reliable than the opinion of the mass, however big the mass be. According to Clement, Cleanthes applied this, taken as a general rule, to the issue of the qualities of the divine. Presumably, to Cleanthes (and Socrates), the advantage of the few who deserve attention by the truth-seeker consists in their being seriously and meticulously engaged in their task. This stance enables them to free their souls from the fear of censorship or opposition by the multitude and their minds from *δόξα* and thereby to reach *ἐπιστήμη*; subsequently, this intellectual freedom helps their followers to do the same.

What about one’s absurd “wish to quickly acquire wisdom” mentioned in v. 1? It is probable that Cleanthes refers to the practice of promptly becoming disciple of some of those teachers, who, according to Plato, simply complied themselves to the views of the multitude, which, according both to (Plato’s) Socrates and Cleanthes, one ought to critically scrutinize. This is the closest parallel from the *corpus Platonicum*:

⁵ On *ἐπιστήμη* vs. *δόξα*, see Plato, *Rep.* 5.477B4-9, 477E5-478A5 and 478A9-B2; 6.506C6-7; 7.533D5-6, 534A4-5 and 534C5-6.

⁶ Tr. W.R.M. Lamb, *Plato. II: Laches – Protagoras – Meno – Euthydemus*, London-Cambridge, MA, 1924, 25-27.

⁷ On [8], i.e. *πλήθος*, see also the passage from Plato’s *Republic* 6 discussed *infra*, which relates to *SVF* I.559.

⁸ Did Cleanthes spot passages (i) and (ii) while studying Plato’s *œuvre* or use some Platonic anthology, or a section from some anthology, relevant to the issue of these passages? In § 5.2, I shall briefly address the issue in light of all the Cleanthean passages examined here.

(iii) Pl. R. 6.493A6-9:

ΣΩ. Ἐκαστος τῶν μισθαρνούτων ιδιωτῶν, οὓς δὴ οὗτοι ‘σοφιστὰς’ [3b] καλοῦσι [...], μὴ ἄλλα παιδεύειν ἢ ταῦτα τὰ τῶν πολλῶν [5a] δόγματα [2] [5b], ἃ δοξάζουσιν [5b] ὅταν ἀθροισθῶσιν {5a} {8}, καὶ ‘σοφίαν’ [3b] ταύτην καλεῖν.

Socr. Each of those private individuals who work for a living, whom these people call ‘sophists’ [...], teaches nothing but the ordinary beliefs of the majority of people which they promulgate whenever they meet together, and which he calls ‘wisdom’⁹.

This passage forms part of Plato’s exploration (491D1 sqq.) into how a person philosophically predisposed by nature (*ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου φύσις*) should be educated (*τροφή* or *παιδαγωγία*); according to Plato, the talented young man should by all means and purposes be kept away from the sophists, who corrupt the souls of their students (*διαφθείρεσθαι*). Who are the sophists, and why does their teaching corrupt? To answer this, the *persona* of Socrates likens the views, the wishes and the wrath of the soul of the mass, taken as the arch-sophist or the worst educator of all, to the desires of a very strong beast, and the “sophist”, in the literal meaning of the word, to someone who has carefully studied the beast’s behaviour and transfers this knowledge (called by him *σοφία* and conveyed by him as such) to his students. Sophists teach them, in an absurd, pervert way (*ἄτοπος παιδευτής*), that the criterion of truth is what the beast thinks (*αἰ τοῦ μεγάλου ζῴου δόξει*), that the definition of good is what it wishes, whereas the definition of bad is what it does not want. Such a teacher, Socrates argues, mistakes the nature (*φύσις*) of the just (*δίκαιον*) and the good (*καλόν* or *ἀγαθόν*) for the nature of compulsion (*ἀναγκαῖον*), i.e. for what the beast forces the individual to think and do¹⁰. This crosses with *ἀνελεύθερος* from Callicles’ speech in *Gorgias*, which is to be discussed below (§ 2.2.1), and in Cleanthes’ I.560, v. 1, which reproduces it; *ἀνελεύθερος* is the same personality as he who wants “σοφὸς αἴψα γενέσθαι” from I.559, v. 1, and his lack of freedom consists in the fact that he from the outset aligns his thought and morality to that of the all-powerful multitude, to the thoughts and wishes of which he is initiated by the professionals called “sophists”, who provide him with false wisdom, i.e. false beliefs and bad wishes (cf. “σοφίαν τε καλέσειεν” vs. “τῆ ἀληθείᾳ” in 493B6-7; cf. 493D2). And one can find in Socrates’ speech, at 493D5, an explicit description of this submission to the multitude as slavery (“[...] κυρίουσ αὐτοῦ ποιῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς”), which is tantamount to one not being a truly free man, regardless of one’s nominal or official status in a city.

⁹ Tr. C. Emlyn-Jones, W. Preddy, *Plato. Republic. Volume II: Books 6-10*, Cambridge, MA-London 2013, 37.

¹⁰ Pl. R. 6.493B6-C8.

Socrates escalates his description of the slavery imposed by the multitude on the gifted individual by adding that there are some even stronger means of compulsion (*ἡ μεγίστη ἀνάγκη*) used by the many ungifted, namely official penalties such as exile, fees and even death (“Ἦν ἔργω προστιθέασι λόγῳ μὴ πείθοντες οὗτοι οἱ παιδευταί τε καὶ σοφισταί. [...] Τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον ἀτιμίαις τε καὶ χρήμασι καὶ θανάτοις κολάζουσι [...]”; 492D2-8). This crosses with Cleanthes’ already discussed “μηδὲ φοβοῦ” (I.559, v. 2); for one to dare use one’s own mind and thereby hold views and having conducts laying beyond the comfort zone of the mass, one should realize that reputation (ruined by *ἀτιμίαι*), wealth (ruined by penalties regarding *χρήματα*, i.e. private property and money) and even life itself (exterminated by various kinds of death penalty) are, Stoically speaking, not “good”, but “indifferent”.

Still, one should not fail to see that Cleanthes’ *noli timere*, or preaching of philosophical courage, goes against what Plato says in *Republic*, Bk. VI. Plato stresses the almightiness of the multitude in order to argue that one would in vain try to upbringing a philosophical character in a rotten city, for example in a democratic one; it is only in an ideal city that this would be feasible¹¹. Cleanthes, by contrast, does not place his philosopher in some ideal state; he exhorts his addressee here and now to throw away the irrational beliefs of the multitude and build up his own way of thinking and living. This is much closer to the portrait of Socrates as a figure who contempered glory and riches, exhorted people to challenge all beliefs (see above the passage from Plato’s *Crito*) and eventually endured the death penalty as the price for his behaving in the way he thought it was the only proper one and for exhorting the others to do the same, i.e. to examine their lives. As will be seen (§ 3.1), Cleanthes did not imply that one should revolt against the legal entity called city or state; quite the contrary, just like Socrates, he argued that laws ought to be obeyed by philosophers, too. Still, Cleanthes does raise claim on the individual’s spiritual freedom, and it is on account of philosophical arguments that he proclaims law-abiding behaviour as proper — which is, yet once again, Socratic in spirit.

A further difference from Plato consists in the fact that, in mid-3rd century BC, when Cleanthes produced I.559, there were no Sophists in Athens anymore. Hence, his implicit reference to teaching activities conformed with the views of the multitude may concern Epicureanism or Aristotelianism. The former’s

¹¹ See, e.g., J. Adam’s succinct note on 492E3 sqq. (*The Republic of Plato. Volume II: Books VI-X and Indexes Second Edition, with an Introduction by D.A. Rees*, Cambridge 1963, 21). R.C. Cross and A.D. Woozley (*Plato’s Republic. A Philosophical Commentary*, New York 1964, 221) parallel the passage from the *Republic* to *Theaetetus* 173A3-B1, where it is argued that *φόβος* depresses *τὸ ἐλεύθερον* and establishes *δουλεία* in the youngsters’ souls (cf. M. Burneyat and M.J. Levett (tr.), *The Theaetetus of Plato. Revised by M. Burneyat*, Indianapolis-Cambridge 1990, 300). A similar passage from the *Laws*, Bk. VIII depicts, with heroic colours, the wise lawgiver as an exceptionally brave man who would —yet once more, in an ideal situation— stand up alone and try to convince, solely on rational grounds, the erring mass about the truth (835C3-8).

acceptance of “pleasure” as the ultimate end in life presumably seemed to him as complying with what the ordinary, unphilosophical man believed about pleasure, whereas Aristotle’s view that possessing a considerable or sufficient amount of wealth is prerequisite for one to be happy, seemed similar as well. SVF I.558 clearly opposed the former, and I.560 (see below, § 2.2) clearly opposed the latter. Given that the Epicureans’ view of Socrates was unambiguously negative (see below, § 3.1), Cleanthes’ recognizably positive reception of Socratic moral ideas *de facto* turned against them.

The last sentence from Cleanthes’ I.559 quite probably derives from Theognis:

(iii) Thgn. I.150:

[...] ἀρετῆς δ’ ὀλίγοισ’ [10a] ἀνδράσι [10b] μοῖρ’ ἔπεται.

[...] Excellence is allotted to few as their companion¹².

The diction of the verse is exclusively similar to Cleanthes’ sentence, and its point is in tune with what one might call Socrates’ egalitarian elitism: both of them avert people from endorsing the mass opinions on the one hand, and in principle address their exhortation for liberally using one’s own mind to everyone on the other.

I.559, v. 1 (“Μὴ πρὸς δόξαν ὄρα”) is related to I.619, which reads:

Παράδοξα {1a} [2] [5b] μὲν ἴσως φασὶν οἱ φιλόσοφοι {3a} [3b] {3c}, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ Κλεάνθης ἔλεγεν, οὐ μὴν παράλογα.

Possibly the philosophers say what is contrary to opinion, but assuredly not what is contrary to reason¹³.

What is actually wrong, Cleanthes declares, is not disloyalty to the multitude, but discarding reason. And reason is what Socrates declared to be his own criterion of truth in the section from *Crito* which, as already shown, Cleanthes used in order to produce SVF I.559, being completely indifferent to the fact that the beliefs he eventually held sounded strange to the ordinary people (49D1-2: “παρὰ δόξαν”; see above § 2.1, i):

¹² D. Young post E. Diehl, *Theognis. Ps.-Pythagoras. Ps.-Phocylides. Chares. Anonymi Aulodia. Fragmentum Teliambicum*, Leipzig 1971², 10; tr. D.E. Gerber, *Greek Elegiac Poetry from the Seventh to Fifth Centuries BC*, Cambridge, MA-London 1999, 195. This verse must have been the source of Pl. R. 491A8-B2 quoted *supra*, n. 5.

¹³ Tr. W.A. Oldfather, *Epictetus. With an English Translation. The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, The Manual, and Fragments. Volume 2: Books III and IV, The Manual, and Fragments*, Cambridge, MA-London 1928, 305. Cf. Plato’s “κατὰ λόγον” *infra*, n. 21.

Pl. *Cri.* 46B4-6:

[...] Ἐγὼ [...] ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ ὃς ἂν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνεται [...].

I am [...] a man who follows nothing but the reasoning which on consideration seems to me best¹⁴.

Let us focus on the qualities of *κρίσις*, i.e. its being *συνετή*, *δικαία* and *καλή*. This is a paronymy or personification: what Cleanthes refers to is *κρίσις* produced by a person with *σύνεσις*, *δικαιοσύνη* and *τὸ καλόν*. Evidently, these qualities roughly coincide with three of the four cardinal virtues as grouped by Plato (and Aristotle): the first with the discerning aspect of the virtue of the rational part of the human soul, that is *φρόνησις*, the second with justice, and the third with the virtue of the appetitive part of the human soul, i.e. with temperance¹⁵. *Appetitus* itself is neither bad nor good; it becomes bad if lacking, or unregulated by, *τὸ καλόν*, which is secured only by *φρόνησις*¹⁶.

¹⁴ Tr. Lamb, *Plato in Twelve Volumes*. 161. Cf. Pl. *Phd.* 85C8-9: “[...] τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσσεξελεγκτότατον [...]”. Why is Socrates’ and Cleanthes’ declaration of the individual’s judgment as criterion of truth less arrogant or less “impious” than Protagoras’ *homo mensura maxim* (see *infra*, § 3.1)? Because, unlike Protagoras, they admit that some criterion exists which is objective and superior to the individual and that man ought to conform his mind and life with it (see *infra*, § 3.1, n. 75).

¹⁵ Cf. Chrysippus, *SVF* III.295 (73.5-6): “Ἐπονται δὲ τῇ μὲν φρονήσει εὐβουλία καὶ σύνεσις, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ εὐταξία καὶ κοσμιότης [...]”. See also Arist. *EN* 6.1142b34-1143a8.

¹⁶ See *SVF* I.556: “Κλεάνθης ἔλεγε, εἰ τέλος ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονή, πρὸς κακοῦ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὴν φρόνησιν δεδόσθαι”. This implies that *φρόνησις* enjoys moral autonomy and it is because of its presence or absence that desire and pleasure become moral or immoral. Cf. Pl. *Euthd.* 281D2-E5: “[...] σύμπαντα ἃ τὸ πρῶτον ἔφαμεν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι [...]· ἐὰν μὲν αὐτῶν ἡγήται ἀμαθία, μείζω κακὰ εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων [...], ἐὰν δὲ φρόνησις τε καὶ σοφία, μείζω ἀγαθὰ, αὐτὰ δὲ καθ’ αὐτὰ οὐδέτερα αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς ἄξια εἶναι. [...] Τῶν μὲν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ὄν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν, τούτοις δὲ δυοῖν ὄντοις ἡ μὲν σοφία ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ ἀμαθία κακόν [...]” (parallel noted by G. Verbeke, *Cleanthes van Assos*, Bruxelles 1949, 215 n. 3; cf. A.A. Long, “Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy”, *Classical Quarterly* 38, 1988, 150-71, at 156); *Men.* 88C4-89A2: “Εἰ ἄρα ἀρετὴ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τί ἐστὶν καὶ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὠφελίμῳ εἶναι, φρόνησιν αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ περ πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὰ μὲν καθ’ αὐτὰ οὔτε ὠφέλιμα οὔτε βλαβερὰ ἐστὶν, προσγενομένης δὲ φρονήσεως ἡ ἀφροσύνης βλαβερὰ τε καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίνονται. [...] πλοῦτόν τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὰ τοτὲ δὲ βλαβερὰ εἶναι, [...] ἡ φρόνησις ἡγουμένη ὠφέλιμα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐποίει, ἡ δὲ ἀφροσύνη βλαβερὰ [...]. [...] Τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνηρητῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς εἰς φρόνησιν, εἰ μέλλει ἀγαθὰ εἶναι” (passage noted by E. Grumach, *Physis und Agathon in der alten Stoa*, Berlin 1932, 28 n. 1, who has also pointed out *Ly.* 216D at 22 n. 1); *Cra.* 416C10-11 and D8-10: “[...] ὅσα μὲν ἂν νοῦς τε καὶ διάνοια ἐργάσθῃται, ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ ἐπαινετά, ἃ δὲ μὴ, ψεκτά [...]. [...] Φρονήσεως αὐτῆς ἡ ἐπωνυμία ἐστὶν τὸ ‘καλόν’ τῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπεργαζομένης, ἃ δὲ κατὰ φάσκοντες εἶναι ἀσπαζόμεθα”. See also Plato, *Laws* 4.705D2-706A4. The idea occurs, in a way particularly close to the passage from Plato’s *Euthydemus* just quoted, in fr. 2-4 (according to I. Düring’s numbering: *Aristotle’s Protrepticus: an Attempt at Reconstruction*, Stockholm 1961, 46-8) from Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*, too: “[...] νομίζειν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἐν τῷ πολλὰ κεκτησθαι γίνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ πῶς τὴν ψυχὴν διακεῖσθαι [...]. [...] Ψυχὴν ἐὰν ἢ πεπαιδευμένη, τὴν τοιαύτην καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀνθρώπον εὐδαίμονα προσαγορευτέον ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἢ λαμπρῶς κεχορηγημένους,

This is what Cleanthes says in a passage from his *Hymn to Zeus*, where he castigates immoral human desire, ramified into vainglory, greed, and luxury or lust:

[...] αὐτοὶ (sc. the vicious men) δ' αὐθ' ὀρμῶσιν ἄνευ καλοῦ ἄλλος
 ἐπ' ἄλλα,
 οἱ μὲν ὑπὲρ δόξης σπουδῆν δυσέριστον ἔχοντες,
 οἱ δ' ἐπὶ κερδοσύνας τετραμμένοι οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ,
 ἄλλοι δ' εἰς ἄνεσιν καὶ σώματος ἡδέα ἔργα [...].

But they on the contrary rush without regard to the good, each after different things, some with a belligerent eagerness for glory, others dishonestly making use of wangles for the sake of profit, others yet on indulgence and the pleasurable actions of the body¹⁷.

Unlike construing “ἄνευ καλοῦ” as meaning “without regard to the good”¹⁸ (this is not about ἀγαθόν, but about καλόν), I think it means “immorally”, “unfairly”, “with no honour”, “with no dignity”. The phrase occurs already in this

αὐτὸς μηδενὸς ἄξιος ὢν. [...] Τοῖς γὰρ διακειμένοις τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κακῶς οὔτε πλοῦτος οὔτ' ἰσχυρὸς οὔτε κάλλος τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅσῳ περ ἂν αὐταὶ μᾶλλον αἰ διαθέσεις καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ὑπάρξωσι, τοσοῦτ' αὖ μείζω καὶ πλείω τὸν κεκτημένον βλάπτουσιν, εἰς ἄνευ φρονήσεως παραγέγονται· τὸ γὰρ ‘μὴ παιδὶ μάχαιραν’ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ, τὸ μὴ τοῖς φαύλοις τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἐχειρίζειν” (D.S. Hutchinson, M.R. Johnson, *Aristotle. Protrepticus or Exhortation to Philosophy (Citations, Fragments, Paraphrases, and Other Evidence)*, 2017, 6-7, available at www.protrepticus.info/protr2017x20.pdf). As will be seen (§ 2.2.2), Cleanthes exploited this work. Out of the three core words used in I.556, φρόνησις and κακόν are traceable back to the above Platonic passages, whereas on ἡδονή see *infra*, § 2.2.1.

¹⁷ Cleanth. *Hymn to Zeus* 26-29 (SVF I.537, 122.22-23); J.C. Thom, *Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus. Text, Translation, and Commentary*, Tübingen 2005, 38; 41; tr. *ibid.*, modified (cf. Thom, *Cleanthes' Hymn*, 130-5). As far as greed is concerned, the almost exclusively Homeric κερδοσύνη (II. 22.247; Od. 4.251; 14.31) is not a full synonym of κέρδος (profit) (as taken by N. Hopkinson, *A Hellenistic Anthology. Selected and Edited*, Cambridge 1988, 135 *ad loc.*; cf. Thom, *Cleanthes' Hymn*, 135); it primarily means ‘cunning, craft’ (see R.J. Cunliffe, *A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect. Expanded Edition*, Oklahoma 2012, 225 s.v.). Hence, *τρέπεσθαι ἐπὶ cum acc.* does not mean “intent on profits” (Thom, *Cleanthes' Hymn*, 41), but ‘resorting to’, ‘making use of (wangles)’. A passage apparently close to Cleanthes’ is P. P. 3.54-5: “Ἀλλὰ κέρδει καὶ σοφίᾳ δέδεται. / Ἐτραπεν καὶ κείνον [...] / χρυσὸς ἐν χερσὶν φανείς [...]” (J. Duchemin, *Pindare. Pythiques (III, IX, IV, V). Édition, introduction et commentaire*, Paris 1967, 49). Yet, the point in Pindar’s lines is that the temptation of riches is so strong that it made even Centaurus Chiron commit for their sake a medical act against the laws of nature; Cleanthes, by contrast, deplores the lives of those enslaved to greed, who unceasingly use all sorts of tricks in order to get richer and richer; for them, riches are not a circumstantial temptation, but the permanent target in their lives. Besides, to Cleanthes, the wise man (unlike Centaurus Chiron) cannot slip into the state of immorality (SVF I.568-569, 129.24-9). As far as licentiousness is concerned, in the Greek literature prior to Cleanthes, a combination of the lexemes ἡδουσι/ἡδονή with the lexemes ἀνέσθαι/ἀνεσις occurs only in Plato’s description of the emergence of the tyrannical personality in *R.* (9.573A4-6): “[...] ὅταν δὴ περὶ αὐτὸν βομβουσα αἰ ἄλλα ἐπιθυμία, θυμιαμάτων τε γέμουσα καὶ μύρον καὶ στεφάνων καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις συνουσίαις ἡδονῶν ἀνεμμένων [...]”. Thom (*Cleanthes' Hymn*, 38 *ad loc.*) parallels Cleanthes’ “ἄνεσιν καὶ σώματος ἡδέα ἔργα” (v. 29) with “πᾶσα ἀνεσις τῶν ἡδέων” from Arist. *Rh.* 1.1371b34. Yet, the passage from Aristotle in fact reads: “[...] ἡ παιδιὰ τῶν ἡδέων καὶ πᾶσα ἀνεσις, καὶ ὁ γέλως τῶν ἡδέων [...]”, and its context differs from Cleanthes’. The issue discussed by Aristotle is not moral, but psychological; pleasure is presented neither with positive nor with negative connotation at all.

¹⁸ As rendered, e.g., by Thom (*Cleanthes' Hymn*, 41; cf. *op. cit.*, 128-30).

passage from Plato's *Charmides*: “[...] ποίημα μὲν γίγνεσθαι ὄνειδος ἐνίστε, ὅταν μὴ μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ γίγνηται, ἔργον δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν ὄνειδος: τὰ γὰρ καλῶς τε καὶ ὀφελίμως ποιούμενα ἔργα [Hesiod] ἐκάλει, καὶ ἔργασίας τε καὶ ἑράξεις τὰς τοιαύτας ποιήσεις” (163C1-3; “[...] if it had no connection with the honourable [...]”)¹⁹. It also occurs in several authors in the same sense²⁰.

Likewise, “οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ”, which has practically the same meaning, must have been yet another borrowing from Plato, in certain writings of whose the phrase occurs and *κόσμος* is described as the virtue of the *pars concupiscibilis*, its opposite being *ἀκολασία*²¹.

What I have demonstrated so far enables us to assess A. Meineke's inventively and confidently suggested *emendatio* of “δόξαν” (v. 2) to ‘βάζιν’ (rumour). To him, “δόξαν” is problematic, “[...] quod neque potuit mutata significatione repeti (v. 1) neque cum ἀναιδέα coniungi, quia ἀναιδέα non nisi in factis dictisve conspicitur”²². Meineke was followed by a number of scholars, including H. von Arnim²³. Yet, in point

¹⁹ Prodic. fr. A18 (H. Diels, W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Griechisch und Deutsch. Zweiter Band*, Berlin 1959, 312.2-5); tr. W.R.M. Lamb, *Plato. With an English Translation. VIII: Charmides – Alcibiades I and II – Hipparchus – The Lovers – Theages – Minos – Epinomis*, London-Cambridge, MA, 1927, 43.

²⁰ See, e.g., Plu. *Sert.* 23.7: “Γενναῖοι γὰρ ἀνδρὶ μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ νικᾶν αἰρετόν” (R. Flacelière, É. Chambry, *Plutarque. Vies. Tome VIII: Sertorius – Eumène. Agésilas – Pompée*, Paris 1973, 39); *Brut.* 46. 3: “[...] διὰ δόξαν ἀρετῆς οὐτε νικᾶν οὔτε σφίζεσθαι συνεχωρεῖτο παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἢ μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου [...]” (R. Flacelière, É. Chambry, *Plutarque. Vies. Tome XIV: Dion – Brutus*, Paris 1978, 143-4); *Septem sapientium convivium* 147D9-10: “[...] τὴν δ’ ἀσφάλειαν ἀγαπῶντας ἄνευ τοῦ καλοῦ” (J. Defradas, J. Hani, R. Klaerr, *Plutarque. Œuvres morales. Traités 10-14: Consolation à Apollonios – Préceptes de santé – Préceptes de mariage – Le banquet des sept sages – De la superstition*, Paris 1985, 199; “[...] rulers that are content with safety without honour [...]”]; tr. F.C. Babbitt, *Plutarch's Moralia in Fifteen Volumes. II: 86B-171F.*, London-Cambridge, MA, 1928, 355); *De Stoicorum repugnantis* 1040D9: “[...] μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ [...]” (“[...] along with the fair pleasure [...]”]; H. Cherniss, *Plutarch. Moralia. Volume XIII - Part II*, Cambridge, MA-London 1976, 472); D.H. 15.3.6: “[...] τῶν συμφερόντων σφίσιν ἀποφαινόντες ἄνευ τοῦ καλοῦ” (K. Jacoby, *Dionysii Halicarnasei Antiquitatum Romanarum quae supersunt*, vol. IV, Leipzig 1905, 262.18-20; “[...] to advise them of their interests regardless of the honourable course [...]”]; *The Roman Antiquities of Dionysius of Halicarnassus*. With an English Translation by E. Gary on the Basis of the Version of E. Spelman, in *Seven Volumes. Volume VII: Books 11-20*, London-Cambridge, MA, 1950, 289).

²¹ See Pl. *Smp.* 223B5-6: “[...] ἐν κόσμῳ οὐδενὶ [...]”]; *Grg.* 494A4-5: “[...] τὸν κόσμιον βίον τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀμείνω εἶναι [...]”]; 508A3-4: “[...] ‘κόσμον’ καλοῦσιν, [...] οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ ἀκολασίαν”]; *R.* 4.430E4-5: “Κόσμος πού τις [...] ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τινῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια [...]”]; 6.486B6-7: “Ὁ κόσμος καὶ μὴ φιλοχρήματος μηδ’ ἀνελεύθερος μηδ’ ἀλαζῶν [...]”]; 500C4-5: “[...] οὗτ’ ἀδικοῦντα οὗτ’ ἀδικούμενα ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα [...]”]. These passages offer a stronger consolidation of the correction “καλοῦ” than the one offered by J.D. Meerwaldt (“Cleanthes II”, *Mnemosyne* 5, 1952, 1-12, at 6). — By referring to Plato's tripartite distinction of the human soul, I do not imply that Cleanthes shared this doctrine. Cleanthes' distinct reference to the cardinal virtues in the passages discussed here does not necessarily imply that he posited distinct seats in the human soul for each of them. See my forthcoming “*Cleanthes Socraticus II: The Textual Background to SVF I.570 and Its Meaning*” in *QUCC*.

²² A. Meineke, *Historia critica Comicorum Graecorum*, Berlin 1839, XI-XII (“Cuius poemati secundo versu inepte δόξα vocatur ἄκριτος καὶ ἀναιδής. Scribendum haud dubie [...] βάζιν”).

²³ See, e.g., C. Wachsmuth, *Commentatio II de Zenone Citiensi et Cleanthe Assio*, Gottingae

of fact, ἄκριτος δόξα does occur, in various forms, in Greek literature²⁴. And Plato, in passage (i) (from *Crito*) quoted above, in distinguishing between what the wise and what the unwise man holds, uses δοκεῖν for the latter as well: “[...] ὀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει” (49D12). Likewise, δόξα refers both to true and false belief in Ps.-Pl. *Min.* 314E7-315A2: “Ἄλλὰ μὴν δόξα γέ τις καὶ αὐτῷ μοι καταφαίνεται ὁ νόμος εἶναι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐχ ἡ πονηρὰ δόξα, ἄρα οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο κατάδηλον, ὡς ἡ χρηστή, εἴπερ δόξα νόμος ἐστὶ [...]. Δόξα δὲ χρηστὴ τίς ἐστίν; Οὐχ ἡ ἀληθής; [...] Οὐκοῦν ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶν ἐξεύρεσις [...]”²⁵. And the fact that, as already shown, I.559 derives directly from two Platonic passages in the one of which (*Cri.* 47C-48D) δόξα is found, clearly and safely disambiguates the meaning of the particular word and of the point of the fragment, so that the emendation βᾶξις can be conclusively ruled out.

2.2. VITA INCONSIDERATA RESPVENDA EST

So far so good with I.559 — except for its “ἐθέλων σοφὸς αἴψα γενέσθαι”, which still remains to be accounted for as regards its textual source. To do so, one should turn to the sources of I.560, whose core, as will be demonstrated, coincides with the point of I.559. It reads:

Ἀνελεύθερος [12] πᾶς ὅστις {13} εἰς {1b} δόξαν [2] [5b] βλέπει
 {1c},
 ὡς {14} δὴ παρ’ ἐκείνης τευζόμενος {15} καλοῦ [16] τινος {17}.

Lacks (spiritual) freedom everyone who looks to opinion

With the vain hope that he will obtain something good from it²⁶.

1875, 8; I. ab Arnim, *ad loc.*; J.U. Powell, *Collectanea Alexandrina: Reliquiae minores poetarum Graecorum aetatis Ptolemaicae 323-146 A.C. epicorum, elegiacorum, lyricorum, ethicorum*, Oxonii 1925, 230; M. Isnardi Parente, *Stoici antichi*, Torino 1989, 229 n. 106; D.C.N. Andrade Leite, *Cleanthes de Asos. Uma introdução com tradução e notas. Versão corrigida* (PhD thesis, Universidade de São Paulo), 2020, 132.

²⁴ See, e.g., Plu. *Alc.* 16.6: “ἄκριτος ἦν ἡ δόξα περὶ αὐτοῦ” (R. Flacelière, É. Chambry, *Plutarque. Vies. Tome III: Périclès-Fabius Maximus. Alcibiade-Coriolan*, Paris 1964, 134); (Ps.-?) Athenagoras, *De resurrectione* 2.1-2: “προχείρως καὶ κατὰ τινα δόξαν ἄκριτον”; “πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν αὐτοῖς ἀκρίτως” (W.R. Schoedel, *Athenagoras. Legatio and De Resurrectione. Edited and Translated*, Oxford 1972, 90; cf. N. Kiel, *Ps-Athenagoras ‘De Resurrectione’. Datierung und Kontextualisierung der dem Apologeten Athenagoras zugeschriebenen Auferstehungsschrift*, Leiden-Boston 2015, 79-80; 83); Lib. *Decl.* 16.14: “ἀκρίτω δόξῃ πεπιστευκός” (R. Foerster, *Libanii opera. Vol. VI: Declamationes XIII-XXX*, Leipzig 1911, 153.22).

²⁵ A.C. Pearson had already objected to Meineke’s correction that “surely the words may mean ‘undiscriminating opinion’, as explained by the next line” (*The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, with Introduction and Explanatory Comments*, London 1891, 320). Pearson also argued that “δόξαν” “is confirmed by Marcus Aurelius 4.3: ‘τὸ εὐμετάβολον καὶ ἄκριτον τῶν εὐφημεῖν δοκούτων’” (*ibid.*). Yet, this passage from *Ad seipsum* is not about one’s opinions, but about one’s reputation; the same holds for *Ad seipsum* 2.17.1 (“[...] ἡ δὲ φήμη ἄκριτον”).

²⁶ *SVF* I.128.3-7; translation Schaff (ausp.), *The Ante-Nicene*, 994-5, modified. Cf. G.W. Butterworth’s translation: “Slavish the man who vain opinion heeds, / in hope to light on any good from that” (*Clement of Alexandria. The Exhortation to the Greeks, The Rich Man’s Salvation, and*

This evidently is a verbally close abridgment of I.559 (see above, § 2.1). “Εἰς δόξαν βλέπει”²⁷ clearly corresponds to “πρὸς δόξαν ὄρα”, and “καλοῦ” echoes “καλήν” (on the latter, see *infra*, § 2.2.3).

Fr. I.560 is preserved in Clem. Al. *Protr.* 6.72.2²⁸ and *Strom.* 5.14.111.2 as the concluding part of an eleven-verse long passage from some Cleanthean poem. In the former work, it is prefaced as follows: “Κλεάνθης [...], ὃς οὐ θεογονίαν ποιητικὴν, θεολογίαν δὲ ἀληθινήν ἐνδείκνυται, οὐκ ἀπεκρύψατο τοῦ θεοῦ πέρι ὃ τί περ εἶχεν φρονῶν” (“Cleanthes [...] sets forth no genealogy of the gods, after the manner of poets, but a true theology. He did not conceal what thoughts he had about God”)²⁹. In the latter, it is introduced as follows: “Ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς [sc. Cleanthes] κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον τὴν τῶν πολλῶν διαβάλλων εἰδωλολατρίαν ἐπιφέρει [...].” (“And the same, tacitly vilifying the idolatry of the multitude, adds [...]”)³⁰. H. von Arnim thought that Clement “hos versus adjungit versibus de bono fr. 557, a quibus alieni sunt”, and he accordingly classified it under the same unit as I.561 (to be quoted and discussed in § 4) on account of its (allegedly) considering reputation (δόξα) as a vain thing and I.562 on account of its declaring wealth vain, both reputation (or glory) and wealth contrasted to “bonum et honestum”, which is supposed to be the topic of the precedent small unit in *SVF*, that is of I.557-8 (“De bono et honesto”). Denying—in opposition to how Clement quotes from the poem—that I.560 is the continuation of I.557 is a corollary of von Arnim’s estimation that Clement mistook a passage on theology (*SVF* I.557, p. 127,1: “...θεολογίαν... ἐνδείκνυται”; “...τοῦ θεοῦ πέρι...”) for a passage on ethics: “Errat Clemens, cum ad deum refert, quae de honesto dicuntur”³¹. But is this assumption valid?

the Fragment of an Address Entitled “To the Newly Baptized”, Cambridge, MA-London 1919, 163).

²⁷ On this meaning of βλέπειν εἰς + acc., see, e.g., Pl. *Lg.* 12.942B2-3: “[...] πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντα ἀεὶ βλέποντα καὶ συνεπόμενον ζῆν [...]” (“[...] with his eyes fixed constantly on his commander and following his lead [...]”); tr. R.G. Bury, *Plato. Laws. II*, Cambridge, MA-London 1926, 477).

²⁸ M. Marcovich, *Clementis Alexandrini Protrepticus*, Leiden-New York-Köln 1995, 108.13-14.

²⁹ Clem. Al. *Protr.* 6.72.1 (Marcovich, *Clementis*, 108.1-3; tr. G.W. Butterworth, *Clement*, 161).

³⁰ Clem. Al. *Strom.* 5.14.111.1 (Stählin et al., *Clemens*, 401.1-2; de Boulluec, *Clément d’Alexandrie*, 208.1-2; tr. Schaff, *The Anti-Nicene Fathers. Volume 2*, 994). Cf. Epicur., *Ep ad Menoecium* 123.10-12: “Ἀσεβῆς [...] οὐχ ὁ τοῦ τῶν πολλῶν θεοῦ ἀναίρων, ἀλλ’ ὁ τῶν πολλῶν δόξας θεοῦ προσάπτων” (C. Bailey, *Epicurus. The Extant Fragments*, Oxford 1926, 82).

³¹ *SVF* III.127, ad l. 1. Pearson (*The Fragments*, 320) had classified the passages as ethical, too (“In Clem. Alex. *Protrept.* vi. 72 [...] the same two lines are cited as the conclusion of frag. 75, but they are obviously distinct”) and declared that, in so doing, he follows A.B. Krische (“Clement’s mistake in referring these lines to Cleanthes’ conception of the deity, when they really refer to the ethical *summum bonum*, is obvious, and has been pointed out by Krische, p. 420 f. Krische thinks that they may have formed a poetical appendix to the prose work, which is either the Περὶ τέλους or the Περὶ καλοῦ” (see A.B. Krische, *Die theologischen Lehren der Griechischen Denker. Eine Prüfung der Darstellung Cicero’s*, Göttingen 1840, 420-1). Most scholars follow this interpretation; see, e.g., A.A. Long, D.N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers. Volume I: Translations of the Principal Sources*, London-New York-New Rochelle-Melbourne-Sydney 1987, 60; Thom, *Cleanthes’ Hymn*, 121-2; W. Johncock, *Stoic Philosophy and Social Theory*, Cham 2020, 282. Cf. *infra*, n. 34. See, however, M. Herrero de Jáuregui’s view that these Cleanthean verses refer to the “supreme Good” but, because of their “hymnic style”, “Cleanthes’ philosophical poem is easily adapted as theology”

Further scrutiny is in order here. Clement does not speak of *honestum*, i.e. of *καλόν*³², but of *ἀγαθόν*, i.e. *bonum*³³. Cleanthes, in a thematically different context but nevertheless in a terminologically consistent way, called God “ἀρίστη φύσις” (“the absolutely good nature”), this use of *ἀγαθός* in superlative referring to the coexistence of all good things within a single being called God³⁴. In I.557, the question “what sort of being the Good is (“Τἀγαθόν [...] οἷόν ἐστ’;”)³⁵ is not about the *nature* of Good or God (e.g., whether it is material or spiritual or consists of this or that natural element), which falls under the first of the four Chrysippean Categories, but about its *ποιά* (qualities), which fall under the second Chrysippean Category³⁶. This probably implies that Cleanthes’ rich list of the *nomina divina* (cf. his “πάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς συμπεπληρωμένον”; above, n. 34) should be foremost construed as predicated *ad intra* rather than *ad extra* — even if certain of them look pretty well falling under the third Chrysippean Category (*πρός τι*). To be sure, Chrysippus’ fourfold Category system postdates Cleanthes and thereby is not a safe guide to Cleanthes’ thought, and it is not impossible that Cleanthes’ “οἷόν ἐστ’” comprises relative predicaments, too. Be that as it may, I would be inclined to think that a discussion of the nature of the divine preceded Cleanthes’ analysis of *ἀγαθόν* as it came down to us in I.557, which discussion had concluded that the divine —unlike the vicious deeds attributed to the Olympian gods in vulgar theology as expressed in Homeric and Hesiodic poetry and castigated at this section from the *Stromata* by means of Xenophanes’ and Bacchylides’ anti-anthropomorphism³⁷— is good³⁸. This conclusion then called for an enumeration of the properties of good — at which point the citation of Cleanthes’ verses enters the stage.

(The “*Protrepticus*” of Clement of Alexandria: a Commentary [PhD thesis, University of Bologna, 2008], 207 *ad loc.*), who seems to elaborate on M. Pohlenz’s ambivalent account in *La Stoa. Storia di un movimento spirituale. Presentazione di G. Reale. Traduzione di O. De Gregorio. Note e apparati di B. Proto*, Milano 2005, 245.

³² See SVF IV, 171b, s.v. ‘honestus’.

³³ See SVF IV, 2a, s.v. Cf. von Arnim’s own phrase (“de bono”) in the statement quoted above.

³⁴ “Τὸ δὲ τέλειον καὶ ἄριστον [...] ἂν ὑπάρχοι [...] πάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς συμπεπληρωμένον καὶ παντὸς κακοῦ ἀνεπίδεκτον· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ διοίσει θεοῦ”; “But that which is perfect and best will be [...] fulfilled with all the virtues and not receptive of any evil; and this living being will not differ from God” (SVF I.529, 120.15-18; tr. R.G. Bury, *Sextus Empiricus, with an English Translation, in Four Volumes. III: Against the Physicists – Against the Ethicists*, Cambridge, MA-London 1936, 51, slightly modified). SVF III.87 (22.3-10), which regards Chrysippus’ thought, presents *καλόν* as one of the various aspects of *ἀγαθόν*, not as identical or coextensive to it (“[...] πᾶν [...] ἀγαθόν [...] εἶναι [...] καλόν [...], ὅτι συμμέτρως ἔχει πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χρεῖαν”) (“All good [...] is useful, because it is commensurate to the need it is used to satisfy”).

³⁵ SVF I.557 (127.3).

³⁶ See SVF II.369-404 (124-33).

³⁷ Clem. Al. *Strom.* 5.14.109.1-110.1 (Stählin et al., *Clemens*, 400.6-401.6; de Boulluec, *Clément d’Alexandrie. Stromate V*, 204-6). Cf. H. Maehler *post* B. Snell, *Bacchylidis carmina cum fragmentis*, Stuttgart-Leipzig 1992, 106.

³⁸ Cf. Pl. *Phdr.* 246D8-E1: “Τὸ δὲ θεῖον καλόν, σοφόν, ἀγαθόν, καὶ πᾶν ὃ τι τοιοῦτον”; *Ti.* 29E3-4: “[...] ἀγαθὸς ἦν” etc.

The passage was misconstrued as regarding virtue ethics by the majority of the subsequent scholars, too³⁹. Presumably, it was taken as averting people from aspiring for good reputation (which is “indifferent”) on account of the fact that the views formed by the average people are basically erroneous, and one ought not to subject oneself to what people, who mostly err about what this or that person (truly or apparently) is, think about him or her⁴⁰. In fact, as we shall see below, I.560 is an Aristotle-triggered adaptation of a particular Platonic passage, which amply sheds light on its meaning. Further, in light of its textual background, which is to be pointed out, I.560 is moral in nature only inasmuch as it deplores unphilosophic life and, indirectly, exhorts to philosophy. Last, I.560 can be plausibly construed as an *epimythion* or “finis ipse et clausula”⁴¹ (vv. 10-11 out of the eleven ones) to the lofty description of the divine in *SVF* I.557, in the sense that Cleanthes exhorts people to philosophy, taken as the opposite to, or the medicament for, their rehashing traditional or trendy beliefs such as the mean, unworthy of the divine, theological mass beliefs, however sanctioned by authorities such as Homer and

³⁹ A.T. Watanabe, *Cleanthes. Fragments. Text and Commentary* (PhD thesis, University of Illinois), 1978, 200-1 (F81); Andrade Leite, *Cleantes*, 129-30 (where even “εις δόξαν βλέπει” is mistranslated as “mira a fama”). See also J.C. Thom’s misrendering of the point of the fragment: “[...] a consideration of one’s reputation makes one dependent on others for one’s well-being. [...] Being intent on fame and glory therefore curtails the wise person’s moral independence and self-sufficiency” (*Cleanthes’ Hymn*, 134); this, although undoubtedly Stoic in tenor, is not what I.560 says. Likewise, R. Radice’s translation looks like trying at any, even grammatical, cost to bestow the fragment a meaning on the presumption that Cleanthes speaks about striving for fame: “Chi mira alla fama non è libero, neanche se da essa potesse venirci qualcosa di bono” (*Stoici antichi. Tutti i frammenti raccolti da H. von Arnim*, Milano 1998, 251). To be sure, Thom remarks that “δόξα could here also mean ‘opinion’ (as already noted by M. Isnardi Parente, *Gli stoici. Opere e testimonianze. Volume primo*, Milano 1989, 256), but the context in Clement is too vague to make a definite determination” (*Cleanthes’ Hymn*, 134 n. 424). In fact, contextualizing the word in light of I.559 as well as of the Platonic passages which, as already shown, are Cleanthes’ direct sources, safely disambiguates it. Cf. J. Dalfen’s proper rendering of the point Cleanthes makes at I.559: “In einen hexametrischen Vierzeiler hat Kleanthes die Mahnung gefasst, sich nicht um die Meinung und das Gerede der Menge zu ktimmer” (“Das Gebet des Kleanthes an Zeus und das Schicksal”, *Hermes* 99, 1971, 174-83, at 177).

⁴⁰ Cf. J.C. Thom’s misleading interpretation of I.559 *supra*, n. 39. Mistaking “δόξαν” as ‘glory’ or ‘fame’ or ‘reputation’ is a drawback in view of the earliest translations of the verses, e.g., that by G. Hervetus: “Est sordidus et illiberalis, quisquis respicit ad opinionem, / tanquam ab illa quid boni consecuturus”; “Servilis est qui opinionem respicit, / ut consecuturus aliquid per hanc boni” (*T. Flavii Clementis Alexandrini [...] opera omnia [...]*, Parisiis 1590, 70.58-59; 604.37-38). See also J. Potter’s translations: “Illiberalis quisquis intentus stupet / opinionem, vel bonum ex illa petit”; “Opinionem qui sequitur, haud liber est; / frustra inde quicquam stultus expectet boni” (*Κλήμεντος Ἀλεξανδρέως τὰ εὐρισκόμενα. Clementis Alexandrini opera quae extant, recognita et illustrata*, vol. I, Venetiis 1715, col. 62a7-8 = PG 8: 179A1-2; vol. II, Venetiis 1715, col. 715a25-26 = PG 9: 167B5-6). See also J. Lipsius’ translation: “Ah vilis ille, opinionem qui adspicit / tanquam duce hac venturus ad veri scopum” (*Physiologiae Stoicorum libri tres*, Parisiis 1604, fol. 21v; translation reproduced in J.J. Brucker’s *Historia critica philosophiae a mundi incunabilis ad nostram usque aetatem deducta. Tomus primus*, Leipzig 1742, 925). Presumably, Lipsius construed the “good” at this passage as the good of the mind, i.e. the truth.

⁴¹ See Lipsius, *Physiologiae Stoicorum*, *ibid.*

Hesiod they may look or even be. In other words, Cleanthes' verses stand as a general warning against the wrong way of forming beliefs, which warning, as shown, is applicable, among others, to the issue of the divine.

2.2.1. The Source: Plato's *Gorgias* 485C

Besides the above horizontal contextualization of I.560, a vertical one points to the same interpretive direction. In the Greek literature available in the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* data base⁴², the lexeme *ἀνελεύθερος* occurs with reference to how one forms one's opinions only once, i.e. in Plato's *Gorgias*. Far from coincidentally, besides this exclusive similarity, this Platonic passage exhibits further similarities to I.560. At that point of the Platonic dialogue, the *persona* of the Sophist Callicles was speaking about philosophy itself (from 484C5 on: “Φιλοσοφία γάρ τοι ἐστίν, ὃ Σώκρατες” etc.; cf. 485A4: “Φιλοσοφίας μὲν” etc.) and arguing as follows:

(i) Pl. *Grg.* 485C3-8:

Παρὰ νέφ μὲν γὰρ μειρακίῳ ὁρῶν φιλοσοφίαν {3a} [3b] {3c} [18] ἄγαμαι, καὶ πρέπει μοι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ἐλεύθερόν [12 *e contrario*] τίνα εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον {13}, τὸν δὲ μὴ φιλοσοφοῦντα {3a} [3b] {3c} [18] ἀνελεύθερον [12 *e contrario*] καὶ οὐδέποτε {4} {14} οὐδενός {17} ἀξιώσοντα ἑαυτὸν {15} οὔτε {14} καλοῦ [16] οὔτε {14} γενναίου {16} πράγματος {17}.

For when I see philosophy in a young man I approve of it; I consider it suitable, and I regard him as a person of liberal mind: whereas a non-philosophizer I account as unfree, as someone who will never enable himself to do anything fine or noble⁴³.

Callicles goes on by saying that, by contrast, overdoing this, namely keeping philosophizing throughout one's life, is deplorable⁴⁴. Still, Callicles' main point was not what Cleanthes was interested in (or, perhaps, something Cleanthes would agree with). What Callicles approved of is what Socrates did with young persons, i.e. to awake their mind in order to scrutinise their own unfounded beliefs—mainly, if not exclusively, borrowed from their social environment—so as to clear the soil of their souls and implant in it true and certain convictions. Cleanthes

⁴² <http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu> (last access: 12.4.2022).

⁴³ This is an adaptation and combination of the translation by W.R.M. Lamb (*Plato in Twelve Volumes. III: Lysis – Symposium – Gorgias*, Cambridge, MA-London 1925, 486) and T. Irwine (*Plato. Gorgias*, Oxford 1979, 59). See also Pl. *R.* 6.486B3-4: “Δειλῆ δὴ καὶ ἀνελευθέρω φύσει φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἂν μετείη”.

⁴⁴ Cf. Pl. *Grg.* 484C4-8: “Φιλοσοφία γάρ τοι ἐστίν, ὃ Σώκρατες, χαρίεν, ἂν τις αὐτοῦ μετρίως ἄψηται ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ· ἐὰν δὲ περαιτέρω τοῦ δέοντος ἐνδιατρίψῃ, διαφορὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων”.

confines himself to what Callicles agreed upon with Socrates. And the fact that Callicles' central point was explicitly anti-Socratic suggests that Cleanthes simply used these particular lines from Callicles' speech as a *testimonium Socraticum*, and one of vital importance, as he regards critique of traditional, popular ideas, for example, of the features of the divine as what distinguishes philosophers from non-philosophers⁴⁵.

The passage from *Gorgias* accounts for “ἐθέλων σοφὸς [...] γενέσθαι” from I.559, v. 1, too (see *supra*, § 2.1). “Ἐθέλων [...] γενέσθαι” evidently corresponds to “ἀξιώσοντα ἑαυτὸν [...] καλοῦ [...] τε γενναίου πράγματος” (cf. the “ὡς [...] τευξόμενος” from I.560, v. 2), as they both refer to (presumably good) personal ambitions and expectations; and “σοφὸς [...] γενέσθαι” (I.559, v. 1) stands as the result expected out of love for wisdom (“φιλοσοφίαν”) and by means of actually pursuing philosophy (“τὸν [...] φιλοσοφοῦντα”).

This crosses with Socrates' rejection of the education offered by the Sophists and encompassed in their books as reported in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, Bk. IV (which, as will be seen in § 3, is the main source of *SVF* I.558). This well-known report regards how Socrates treated the young Euthydemus after his completion of some Sophistic courses and alleged acquisition of “wisdom”:

Τοῖς δὲ νομίζουσι παιδείας τε τῆς ἀρίστης τετυχηκέναι καὶ μέγα φρονοῦσιν {13} ἐπὶ σοφία [3b] ὡς προσεφέρετο νῦν διγηγήσομαι. Καταμαθῶν γὰρ Εὐθύδημον τὸν καλὸν γράμματα πολλὰ συνειλεγμένον ποιητῶν τε καὶ σοφιστῶν τῶν εὐδοκιμωτάτων καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἤδη τε νομίζοντα {13} διαφέρειν τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν ἐν σοφία [3b] καὶ μεγάλας ἐλπίδας ἔχοντα πάντων διοίσειν τῷ δύνασθαι λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν [...].

I shall now describe how he [sc. Socrates] approached those who held that they had obtained the best education and were proud on account of their wisdom. For he learned that Euthydemus the beautiful had collected many writings of the poets and of the sophists who were held in the highest repute, and due to these held himself to be already superior to his contemporaries on account of wisdom and had great hopes of surpassing everyone in being able to speak and take action⁴⁶.

⁴⁵ Cf. Pl. *Phd.* 114E5-115A1: “[...] σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἐλευθερία καὶ ἀληθεία [...]”; R. 3.395C5-6: “[...] ἀνδρείους, σώφρονας, ὀσίους, ἐλευθέρους, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα [...]”; *Phdr* 256E5-6: “[...] ἀνελευθερίαν ὑπὸ πλήθους ἐπαινουμένην ὡς ἀρετὴν [...]”.

⁴⁶ X. *Mem.* 4.2.1 (M. Bandini (ed.), L.-A. Dorion (tr.), *Xenophon. Mémoires. Tome II, 2e partie: Livre IV*, Paris 2011, 4.1-8); A.L. Bonnette (tr.), *Xenophon. Memorabilia, with an Introduction by C. Bruell*, Ithaca-London 1994, 113. Cf. L. Strauss, *Xenophon's Socrates*, Ithaca-London 1972, 94-6; 98. Strauss' distinction between Euthydemus' possession and study of celebrated books (*Xenophon's Socrates*, 108), to the effect that the latter be quite questionable, or at least should not be taken for granted, seems strange to me; Euthydemus is not depicted as boastful for his riches, including precious books, but as self-confident on account of his “wisdom”, which implies that he had read a

The content of the passage is evidently close both to I.559 and I.560. Euthydemus is depicted as passing himself for “wise” because of having swallowed the rich content of certain celebrated writings by poets and Sophists (presumably as an attendant of certain Sophistic courses). “Νομίζοντα” clearly corresponds to “ὡς” from I.560, v. 2, which denotes the subjective—in fact, naive—nature of one’s ambition to surpass one’s citizens, which is doomed to frustration. Likewise, “ἤδη” corresponds to “αἴψα” from I.559, v. 1 (*supra*, § 2.1). Both words refer to the absurdly short time span one may optimistically assign oneself for actually becoming “wise” (“σοφὸς [...] γενέσθαι”) and thereby superior to the others in skills and life; “αἴψα” refers to this before one’s getting involved in such an education process, whereas “ἤδη” refers to the time span of the education process after its completion. As already seen (§ 2.1, n. 3), to (Plato’s) Socrates, one ought to cultivate one’s mind as long as it takes; there is no standard time span for this, because it all depends on the actual state of mind of each individual upon starting thinking seriously about one’s own beliefs.

2.2.2. *The Mediation: Aristotle’s Protrepticus*

How did it historically turn out that Cleanthes adapted Callicles’ words from Plato’s *Gorgias* quoted above (§ 2.2.1) into a succinct *exhortatio ad philosophiam*? The clue seems to be this fragment from Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*:

Οὐ δὴ δεῖ φεύγειν φιλοσοφίαν {3a} [3b] {3c} [18], εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν φιλοσοφία {3a} {3b} [18] [...] κτήσις τε καὶ χρήσις σοφίας [3b], ἡ δὲ σοφία [3b] τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν. Οὐδὲ δεῖ [...] διὰ [...] φρόνησιν μηδὲν πονεῖν [...]. Ἡ μὴν ἀνδραποδῶδες [12] γε [...] ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν [5a] αὐτὸν ἀκολουθεῖν {11} δόξαις [2] [5b] ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς [5a] ἀξιοῦν ταῖς αὐτοῦ [...], τῶν δὲ καλῶν [16] μηδεμίαν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι τὸ παράπαν.

So one must not flee from philosophy, since philosophy is [...] the possession and use of wisdom, and wisdom is among the greatest goods. Nor should one [...] not work hard [...] for the purpose of prudence. Indeed, it would be servile [...] to attend to the opinions of the majority rather than to find what the majority has worth in terms of one’s own opinions, and [...] not to show any concern whatsoever for things honest⁴⁷.

lot — at least as much as one could consume as a reader in a non-advanced age.

⁴⁷ Hutchinson and Johnson, *Aristotle. Protrepticus*, 22 (translation modified). Cf. Düring, *Aristotle’s Protrepticus*, 70 (No B53); V. Rose, *Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta*, Leipzig 1896, fr. I.52, 62.7-16. In the phrases I omit, Aristotle contrasts striving for making fortune (*χρήματα*), which is quite common, to neglect for acquiring wisdom through education (*παιδείας*); on the contrast, see Ps.-Pl. *Clit.* (or *Protrepticus*) 407B1-C7 (parallel noted by Hutchinson and Johnson, *ibid.*). Cf. the individual vs. multitude conflict in Plutarch of Chaeronea’s depiction of Cicero as the Roman Socrates in *Cic.* 5.1, where raising oneself above the vulgar opinions in one’s environment is presented as fulfilment of one’s divine in origin philosophical vocation: “[...] προσέταξεν ἡ Πυθία

As Cleanthes' mentor, Zeno, had read Aristotle's *Protrepticus*⁴⁸ and Cleanthes had written a work entitled *Προτρεπτικός*⁴⁹, it is highly probable that the disciple had read this Aristotelian work.

Besides the evident content similarity of this fragment from Aristotle's *Protrepticus* to the passage from *Gorgias*, the diction is very close, too. Both passages explicitly speak of φιλοσοφία. He who does not philosophise is called by Callicles ἀνελεύθερος, and Aristotle, by using a synonym, calls lack of philosophical spirit “ἀνδραποδῶδες”⁵⁰. Last, to Callicles, the unphilosophic man is never to achieve anything good (“οὐδενός [...] καλοῦ [...] πράγματος”), and Aristotle says that he who does not philosophise does not strive for any good thing at all (“τῶν [...] καλῶν μηδεμίαν ἐπιμέλειαν

τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν ἡγεμόνα ποιῆσθαι τοῦ βίου” (É. Chambry, R. Flacelière, *Plutarque. Vies. Tome XII: Démosthène – Cicéron*, Paris 1976, 70; cf. G. Daux, *Delphes au IIe et au Ier siècle, depuis l'abaissement de l'Étolie jusqu'à la paix romaine, 191-31 av. J.-C.*, Paris 1936, 592). *Διὰ φρόνησιν πονεῖν* matches with “ἀγαθὸν ὁ πόνος ἐστίν” and “ἔγγιον εἶναι νομίζειν τὸν πόνον τῆς τάραθοῦ φύσεως ἢ τῆς τοῦ κακοῦ” from Cleanthes' *SVF* I.611 (136.23-5), preserved by Musonius Rufus. The point is not, of course, that pain is “good” *per se*, but that decisively taking pains in acquiring wisdom is definitely so. Even Rufus' continuation matches with Cleanthes' exhortation to the young people not to be afraid of the negative reactions of the un-philosophical average man (I.559; see *supra*, § 2.1): “Πῶς οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος [sc. a determined seeker of wisdom] οὐ ραδίως ἐπέισθη ἂν μήτε πένιαν μήτε θάνατον δεδιέναι {4} μῆτ' ἄλλο μηδὲν τῶν δοκούντων φοβερῶν [4], μῆδ' αὐτὸ διώκειν πλουτοῦν ἢ ζωὴν ἢ ἡδονήν;” (Musonius Rufus, *Dissertationum a Lucio digestarum reliquiae* I; C.E. Lutz, “Musonius Rufus: ‘The Roman Socrates’”, *Yale Classical Studies* 10, 1947, 34.24-33).

⁴⁸ *SVF* I.273 (62.31-3). Cf. Hutchinson and Johnson, *Aristotle. Protrepticus*, 3; F.H. Sandbach, *Aristotle and the Stoics*, Cambridge 1985, 13.

⁴⁹ *SVF* I.481 (107.13); I.567 (129.22-3).

⁵⁰ This could have derived from the Pythagorean tradition; Pythagoras is attested to have said this: “[...] ἐν τῷ βίῳ οἱ μὲν ἀνδραποδῶδεις [11] [...] φύονται δόξης καὶ πλεονεξίας θηραταί, οἱ δὲ φιλόσοφοι {3a} {3b} {3c} [18] τῆς ἀληθείας” (D.L. 8.8.6-8; M. Marcovich, *Diogenes Laertii Vitae philosophorum. Vol. I: Libri I-X*, Stuttgart-Leipzig 1999, 577; T. Dorandi, *Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, Cambridge 2013, 605), provided that this dictum is genuine or, if spurious, was produced by some of his followers prior to Aristotle's *Protrepticus*. Possibly anachronistically speaking, this dictum regards two of the three principal vices of the *pars consumpiscibilis*, namely vainglory and greed, as leaving no room for seeking wisdom or truth. This seems to be reflected on this Socratic teaching as reported by Xenophon: “[...] περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο σκοπῶν τί εὐσεβές, τί ἀσεβές, τί καλόν, τί αἰσχρόν, τί δίκαιον, τί ἄδικον, τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία, τί ἀνδρεία, τί δευλία, τί πόλις, τί πολιτικός, τί ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότες ἠγεῖτο καλοὺς κάγαθοὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἀγνοοῦντας ἀνδραποδῶδεις ἂν δικαίως κεκλήσθαι” (X. *Mem.* 1.1.16; M. Bandini (ed.), L.-A. Dorion (tr.), *Xenophon. Memorables. Tome I: Introduction générale; Livre I*, Paris 2000, 7; cf. *op. cit.* 4.2.22: “Ὅτιςθα δὲ τνας ἀνδραποδῶδεις καλουμένους [...] δι' ἀμαθίαν [...]”; *Xenophon. Memorables. Tome II, 2e partie*, 12). And Plato seems to develop this so as to include the four cardinal virtues: “[...] ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν [...], φρόνησις, καὶ μετὰ τούτου τῷ ὄντι ἢ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ συλλήβδην ἀληθῆς ἀρετῆ, μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων: χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως [...] σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετῆ καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδραποδῶδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιές οὐδ' ἀληθές ἔχη, τὸ δ' ἀληθές τῷ ὄντι ἢ κάθαρσις τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις [...] καθαρμός τις ἢ” (Pl. *Phd.* 69A9-C3).

ποιεῖσθαι τὸ παράπαν”). Thus, it is quite probable that Aristotle’s lines are partly an adaptation of the passage from Plato’s *Gorgias*.

What is even more interesting is that Cleanthes had quite probably noticed Aristotle’s use of Plato pointed out above. I.560 (see above, § 2.2) restores Aristotle’s “ἀνδραποδῶδες” to Plato’s (Socratic via Callicles) ἀνελεύθερος (v. 2) as well as Aristotle’s τὰ καλά (in plural) to Plato’s καλόν (πράγμα) (in singular) (v. 2). And in I.559, v. 2 (see above, § 2.1), Cleanthes uses the phrase πολλῶν δόξα (cf. δόξα in I.560, v. 1), which, in the form αἱ τῶν πολλῶν δόξαι, Aristotle (“ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν [...] ἀκολουθεῖν δόξαις”) had clearly borrowed from the section from Plato’s *Crito* quoted above (§ 2.1) (“τῆ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ [...] ἔπεσθαι”), thus *de facto* suggesting Cleanthes to read it as exhortatory in tenor, too.

2.2.3. Καλόν, Alias Virtues

Having unfolded all the (extant) sources of I.559 and I.560⁵¹, we can elucidate the meaning of “καλοῦ τινος” in I.560, v. 2. In Callicles’ speech, “καλοῦ [...]τε γενναίου πράγματος” means “something fine or noble”, presumably in the sense of something remarkable in public life; besides, this is the meaning of the flagrantly close passage from Plato’s *Republic*, Bk. VI⁵². At first sight, this does not look particularly relevant to I.560. In Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*, however, this phrase from the passage from *Gorgias* changed to τῶν καλῶν ἐπιμέλεια. This may not be irrelevant to the fact that, in several Platonic dialogues, the *persona* of Socrates calls this or that cardinal virtue “καλόν”⁵³ and that, as already seen (§ 2.2), Cleanthes construes the presence or absence of τὸ καλόν (depending on the presence or absence of φρόνησις) in one’s deeds as what morally qualifies or disqualifies them, as it is its presence that secures the existence of the remaining cardinal virtues⁵⁴ in one’s soul. And

⁵¹ To be sure, a considerable number of pieces that fall under the literary genre of protreptic have been lost (see a list in D. Markovich, *Promoting a New Kind of Education: Greek and Roman Philosophical Protreptic*, Leiden 2021, 261-2); so, establishing links by comparing the extant items to one another cannot result in reconstructing the whole picture. Yet, between Aristotle and Cleanthes, no other protreptic piece is recorded, and the time span is quite short to let us plausibly assume that some missing link interfered for the production of I.560.

⁵² Pl. *R.* 6.487C6-D5: “[...] ὅσοι ἂν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν ὀρμήσαντες μὴ τοῦ πεπαιδευθῆαι ἔνεκα ἀνάμενοι νέοι ὄντες ἀπαλλάττωνται, ἀλλὰ μακρότερον ἐνδιατρίψωσιν, τοὺς μὲν πλείστους καὶ πάνυ ἀλλοκότους γιγνομένους [...], τοὺς δ’ ἐπεικεστάτους δοκοῦντας ὁμως τοῦτο γε ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος οὗ σὺ ἐπαινεῖς [sc. philosophy] πάσχοντας, ἀχρήστους ταῖς πόλεσι γιγνομένους”.

⁵³ Pl. *Chrm.* 159D8: “Ἡ δὲ γε σωφροσύνη καλόν τι ἦν [...]”; *Grg.* 492C1: “[...] ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τοῦ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης [...]”; *La.* 192D8-9: “[...] ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία καλόν ἐστίν”; *Phd.* 114C7-9: “[...] πᾶν ποιεῖν ὥστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἄθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπίς μεγάλη”. Cf. the contrast καλόν vs. λωσιτελές in *R.* 2.364A-B, to be discussed below (§ 3.1). The general or cardinal virtues are opposed to what Chrysippus was to call γενικά or γενικώτατα πάθη (*SVF* III.386, 391, 445 and 463; 94.6-7, 108.40-43 and 115.27), which can be traced back to Pl. *La.* 191D (see, e.g., Pohlenz, *La Stoa*, 299 n. 14).

⁵⁴ Incidentally, I.556 has been construed as combating Epicurus’ subordination of the cardinal virtues to pleasure (*Epicur. Sent.* 5; Bailey, *Epicurus*, 94; *Ep. ad Menoeceum* 132.7-13; Bailey,

φρόνησις is what one acquires by philosophizing, to which Socrates, Aristotle, and Cleanthes exhorted people. This relates to the fragments to be discussed in § 3, which are directly relevant to these virtues.

What happened to the social or even political dimension of the Platonic Callicles' *καλόν*, which is the opposite to the qualities of the Platonic Socrates' *ἄχρηστοι ταῖς πόλεσι*? Aristotle's adaptation of the relevant phrase could be interpreted both as pursuing noble activities which secure good reputation in society and as cultivating the cardinal virtues for one's own sake. After all, to Aristotle—whose ethics regards societal life indispensable for happy life—the latter is a prerequisite for one to achieve good things for the sake of one's city. Cleanthes, for his part, views this in a personal perspective; cultivating *καλόν* is tantamount to acquiring and exerting virtue in its various forms for the sake of one's happiness. If virtue is more profitable than vice, this is primarily, if not exclusively, so for the very person who exerts virtue. Of course, the virtuous person's activities can be profitable for the city, too; still, this is not what one ought to strive for. And, yet once more, Cleanthes could find this strictly personal relation to the virtues, taken as *καλά*, in what the *persona* of Socrates argued in certain Platonic works. To Socrates, observing the law is not dictated by the need of sustaining the community and fostering its prosperity; it is dictated by the proper evaluation of the (true and apparent) goods, which radically differs from how those who feel at ease with transgressing the laws think about what 'good' consists in.

2.3. CONCLUSION

What we learn from the analyses of these passages is that neither the longer extract from Cleanthes' unknown poem (i.e. I.557) nor its last two verses (rather unjustifiably extracted and numbered in *SVF* as a separate item) have to do with ethics. Both I.559 and I.560 stand as cases of closely and meticulously extracting certain Socratic ideas from four passages from four Platonic writings and putting these ideas into verses, in which Cleanthes reproduces Socrates' *exhortatio ad philosophiam* in the context of his elitism⁵⁵. The former fragment clearly exhorts people in principle to distrust all current beliefs, despite their integration into the teaching curricula and, based on their own mind, determine what is worth embracing and what not; whereas the latter depicts the same theme the other way round, namely it deplors those who pay homage to current beliefs as

Epicurus, 90; cf. D.L. 10.138: “Διὰ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς αἰρεῖσθαι, οὐ δι’ αὐτάς”; Marcovich, *Diogenes*, 801.14-15; Dorandi, *Diogenes*, 814; parallel noted by Watanabe, *Cleanthes*, 195). In view of Cleanthes' knowledge of Plato's *Gorgias*, the fragment would rather be taken as combating Callicles' celebrated ideal of licentiousness as reported in *Grg.* 491E6-492A3. Cf. the use of the lexeme (“ἡδὺ”) in the passage from *Republic* quoted *infra*, § 3.1, where the thought of another Sophist, Thrasymachus, is presumably reflected. On pleasant feelings as by far inferior to virtue, cf. Chrysippus, *SVF* III.76 (19.27-33).

⁵⁵ Apparently, the reason why H. von Arnim included I.560 to the moral section of his Cleanthes part was that he did so with I.558, whose I.560 forms part, and which, because it enumerates the features of “good”, he regarded as pertaining to ethics.

lacking freedom and doomed to fail in their lives. I.559 was composed of the vocabulary of two passages from Plato's *Crito* and *Lysis*, where Socrates exhorts his interlocutors to courageously discard the beliefs of the ignorant multitude, pay attention to what the few wise persons have to say on this or that matter and finally shape their own views — embellished with the vocabulary of a verse from Theognis where “virtue” is described as possessed only by few. Even Cleanthes' reference to one's frivolous belief that current education can make one a wise man occurs in a passage from Plato's *Republic*, Bk. VI, where it is argued that the ideal philosopher should not subject himself to the current knowledge. The diction of I.560 clearly shows that the fragment is an elaboration of Callicles' succinct description of how Socrates exhorted young men to seriously engage themselves in philosophy in Plato's *Gorgias*. Further, its diction shows that Cleanthes had taken into account Aristotle's so far unnoticed elaboration of the same Platonic passage in his *Protrepticus*. Finally, Cleanthes' *καλόν* in both fragments is tantamount to acting virtuously, which results from following *φρόνησις* in life. This, too, can be clearly traced back to a small number of passages where the Platonic Socrates describes the cardinal virtues (secured by *φρόνησις*) as *καλά*.

3. BEHOLD THE *VITIA PRINCIPALIA*

3.1. JUSTICE, I.E. LAW-ABIDING ATTITUDE, VS. SELFISHNESS (SVF I.558)

The two fragments (I.559 and I.560) examined in § 2 stand as cases of Cleanthes' tacit reception of a salient element of Socrates' thought. I.558 stands as the only extant case of Cleanthes' explicit reception of Socrates. In I.560, it is the quite rare use of *ἀνελεύθερος* that mainly betrays Cleanthes' source (see above, § 2.2.1). In I.558, the key in this direction seems to be the phrase “τὸν Σωκράτην [...] παρ' ἕκαστα διδάσκειν”. The phrase suggests that what Cleanthes reports about Socrates occurred repeatedly in his sources, which indicates that one should trace this back to Plato's Socratic dialogues and Xenophon's reports about Socrates, or, perhaps, that Cleanthes reproduced some source which reported that Socrates taught the view at stake repeatedly:

[...] Κλεάνθης ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ *Περὶ ἡδονῆς* [1] τὸν Σωκράτην [2] φησὶ παρ' ἕκαστα {3} διδάσκειν {4} ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς [5] δίκαιός [6] τε καὶ εὐδαίμων [7] ἀνὴρ, καὶ τῷ πρώτῳ διελόντι {8} τὸ δίκαιον [6] ἀπὸ τοῦ συμφέροντος [9] καταρᾶσθαι ὡς ἀσεβές [10] τι πρᾶγμα δεδρακότι ἀσεβεῖς [11] γὰρ τῷ ὄντι οἱ τὸ συμφέρον [9] ἀπὸ τοῦ δίκαιου [6] τοῦ κατὰ νόμον [11a-b] χωρίζοντες [8].

[...] Cleanthes, in Book II of his *On Pleasure*, says that Socrates time and again taught that the just man and the happy are one and the same, and execrated the first man who separated the just from the useful, as having done an impious thing. For, those are in truth impious who separate the useful from that which is right according to the moral law⁵⁶.

⁵⁶ Clem. Al. *Strom.* 2.22.131.3 (Stählin et al., *Clemens*, 185.13-18; tr. Schaff (ausp.), *The Anti-*

N. Festa, appealing to *SVF* III.314-26, contends that “secondo la legge” va inteso con riferimento alla legge naturale, identica al *Διὸς λόγος*, alla *ratio recta summi Jovis*⁵⁷. Yet, the set of fragments he refers to consists of testimonies about Chrysippus (c. 280-207 BC), not about Cleanthes (or even Zeno). Further, no verbal similarities of I.558 to those fragments are found. An exception is *SVF* III.323⁵⁸, where *συμφέρειν* occurs: “[...] οὐκ ἄρκεσθέντες τοῖς τῆς φύσεως θεσμοῖς τὰ δόξαντα συμφέρειν κοινῇ τοῖς ὁμογνώμοσιν ὁμίλοις, ταῦτα ‘νόμους’ ἐπεφήμισαν”; still, the meaning of the passage is partly irrelevant and partly contrary (on account of its repudiation of positive law) to what Socrates says. As will be seen, what Cleanthes (rightly) ascribes to Socrates is the idea that one ought to obey the laws of one’s city and that the implementation of this duty should not be compromised for the sake of what one might construe as personal interest, however plausible defending one’s own interests may seem to be, especially in certain circumstances. What Chrysippus, for his part, discusses is not the relation of the individual with the city one lives in, but the relation of the various positive law systems, which vary according to place, time, and peoples, with the natural law, which ideally ought to be enacted in the universal city, i.e. across humans all over the globe. Strictly speaking, Chrysippus’ point goes against what Socrates says; although they both appeal to a higher, objective moral criterion for regulating one’s life and judging one’s acts regardless of current morality, Socrates’ discussion is confined to one’s own city, whereas Chrysippus criticizes the variety of local positive laws as additions to the only truly valid law (i.e. natural law), which cause an undesirable tension between man as a citizen of the world and man as a citizen of this or that state⁵⁹. Admittedly, both Socrates and Chrysippus ascribe the deviation of the part (i.e. of the individual and the particular city respectively) from the whole (i.e. the city and the natural or world-city respectively) to the moral defects of the former (avarice etc.); this, however, does not cancel the fact that the very topic each of them discusses is not the same.

In the direction of detecting the actual sources and meaning of I.558, there follow hopefully all the passages from the extant writings prior to Cleanthes in which the contradistinction ‘justice’ – ‘self-interest’ occurs, compared to Cleanthes’ fragment

Nicene Fathers. Volume 2, 802, slightly modified. The passage by Cleanthes, along with one of its sources, i.e. *Pl. R.* 364A-B, is echoed in *Plu. Mor.* 662B11-12: “[...] τῇ Σωκράτους ἐνέχεσθαι κατὰρ [...] τοῦς τὸ λωσιτελεῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ χωρίζοντας [...]” (F. Fuhrmann, *Plutarque. Œuvres morales. Tome IX. Deuxième partie: Propos de Table: Livres IV-VI*, Paris 1978, 19; cf. G. Giannantoni, *Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae*, vol. I, Napoli 1990, 178-9, Nos I C 480-2; Clement’s report cannot be traced back to Plutarch’s). The editor remarks that “cette imprecation était rapportée par Cléanthe” (Fuhrmann, *Plutarque*, 130). Yet, as will be seen in this paragraph, I.558 can be traced back to a group of passages from Plato’s *œuvre*; therefore, it does not stand as an independent source about Socrates or the Socratic tradition.

⁵⁷ N. Festa, *I frammenti degli Stoici antichi, ordinati, tradotti e annotati. II: Aristone – Apollofane – Erillo – Dionigi d’Eraclea – Persèo – Cleante – Sfero*, Bari 1935, 171.

⁵⁸ *SVF* III, 80.9. Cf. *SVF* III.324 (80.17-19).

⁵⁹ *SVF* III.323 (80.11-13); cf., *inter alia*, R. Bees, *Zenons Politeia*, Leiden-Boston 2011, 93-4.

in detail. In a nutshell, from the textual point of view, {3}, {4} and [5] occur only in passage (i), [7] occurs only in passage (vii), and the exact form of [10] as well as the exact form of [11] occur only in passage (iv). [6], opposed to [9], occurs in passages (i), (ii), (iii), (v) and (vii). This, in combination with the fact that passages (i), (iv) and (vii) were definitely among the sources of I.558, suggests that [6] was drawn upon passages (i) and (vii). Last, {8} corresponds only to a couple of phrases from passage (iii), which thereby should be included to the sources of I.558.

Let us amplify this both from the textual and doctrinal point of view, duly beginning with a passage already noticed by scholarship as Cleanthes' source. M. Isnardi Parente has rightly pointed out a specific part from Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, 4.4 as parallel to I.558⁶⁰. I expand her reference to paragraphs 4 sqq. to Ch. 4 in its entirety, so as to include two crucial phrases from paragraph 1—that is “περὶ τοῦ δικαίου”, which announces the very topic of discussion⁶¹, and “πολλάκις”, which accounts for Cleanthes' “παρ' ἕκαστα”—as well as comprise Socrates' description of laws as “divine” in origin, which accounts for Cleanthes' report that, according to Socrates, transgressing civic law is “an impious act”:

(i) X. *Mem.* 4.4:

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου [6] γε (Socrates) [2] οὐκ ἀπεκρύπτετο ἦν εἶχε γνώμην [...]. [...] Καὶ ἔλεγε {4} δὲ οὕτως καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους μὲν πολλάκις {3}, οἶδα δὲ ποτε αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς Ἰππίαν τὸν Ἡλείου περὶ τοῦ δικαίου [6] τοιάδε διαλεχθέντα {4}. [...] Καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἰππίας [...]

- “Ἐτι γὰρ σύ”, ἔφη, “ὦ Σώκρατες [2], ἐκεῖνα τὰ αὐτὰ {3a} λέγεις {4} ἃ ἐγὼ πάλαι ποτέ σου ἤκουσα” {3b};
Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης,
- “Ὁ δέ γε τούτου δεινότερον”, ἔφη, “ὦ Ἰππία, οὐ μόνον ἀεὶ ταῦτα {3a} λέγω {4}, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν⁶² {3b} [...]. [...] Φημί {4} γὰρ ἐγὼ τὸν νόμιμον [11b] δίκαιον [6] εἶναι”.
- “Ἄρα τὸ αὐτὸ {8 e contrario} λέγεις {4}, ὦ Σώκρατες [2], νόμιμον [11b] τε καὶ δίκαιον [6] εἶναι;”

⁶⁰ M. Isnardi Parente, *Stoici antichi*, Torino 1989, II, 223 n. 37.

⁶¹ Cf. X. *Mem.* 4.4.7 (Bandini and Dorion, *Xenophon. Memorables. II, 2e partie*, 29.1).

⁶² *Prima facie*, ‘saying the same thing’ definitely implies ‘about a given issue’. However, by putting this explicitly, Socrates is improving Hippias' description of the stability of mind of his interlocutor; it is more proper, Socrates in fact remarks, to put it like this: ‘Given a certain issue I was talking about, I still make the same point about it’, because, he implies, ‘I truly know what I have been talking about, unlike you, who still add things to what you hold about moral issues such as justice’. Cf. the very similar point he makes in his discussion with Euthydemus: “*Socr.*: [...] ὅς ἂν βουλόμενος τᾶληθῆ λέγειν μηδέποτε ταῦτα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγη, ἀλλ' ὁδόν τε φράζων τὴν αὐτὴν τοτὲ μὲν πρὸς ἔω, τοτὲ δὲ πρὸς ἑσπέραν φράζῃ, καὶ λογισμὸν ἀποφαινόμενος τὸν αὐτὸν τοτὲ μὲν πλεῖω, τοτὲ δ' ἐλάττω ἀποφαινεῖται, τί σοι δοκεῖ ὁ τοιοῦτος; - *Euth.*: Δηλὸς νῆ Δί' εἶναι ὅτι ἄφρο οὐκ οἶδεν” (X. *Mem.* 4.2.21; Bandini and Dorion, *Xenophon. Memorables. II, 2e partie*, 12.16-22).

- “Ἐγωγε”, ἔφη.
- “Οὐκ ἄρα αἰσθάνομαί σου ὅποιον νόμιμον [11] ἢ ποῖον δίκαιον [6] λέγεις”.
- “Νόμους [11b] δὲ πόλεως”, ἔφη, “γινώσκεις;”
- “Ἐγωγ’”, ἔφη.
- [...] “Οὐκοῦν”, ἔφη, “νόμιμος [11b] μὲν ἂν εἴη ὁ κατὰ [11a] ταῦτα πολιτευόμενος, ἄνομος [11b *e contrario*] δὲ ὁ ταῦτα παραβαίνων [...]. Οὐκοῦν καὶ δίκαια [6] μὲν ἂν πράττοι ὁ τούτοις πειθόμενος [...]. [...] Ὁ μὲν ἄρα νόμιμος [11] δίκαιός [6] ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ ἄνομος [11 *e contrario*] ἀδίκος [6 *e contrario*]”.
- [...] “Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὧ Ἰππία, τὸ αὐτὸ [3a] ἀποδείκνυμαι {4} νόμιμον [11b] τε καὶ δίκαιον [6] εἶναι [...]”.
- [...] “Ἐγὼ μὲν”, ἔφη, “θεοὺς {10 *e contrario*} οἶμαι τοὺς νόμους [11b] τούτους τοῖς ἀνθρώποις θεῖναι [...]. [...] Καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς {10 *e contrario*} ἄρα, ὧ Ἰππία, τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιόν [6] τε καὶ νόμιμον [11b] εἶναι ἀρέσκει”.

Furthermore, he [sc. Socrates] did not hide the judgment he had concerning justice at any rate [...]. And while he often spoke in this manner with others too, I know that he once also had a conversation of the following sort about justice with Hippias the Elean [...]. And [...] Hippias said [...]:

- “Are you, Socrates, still saying the same things that I myself once heard from you a long time ago?”

And Socrates said,

- “And what is even more terrible than this, Hippias — I not only say always the same things but even say them about the same things. [...] For I say that the lawful is just.”
- “Are you saying, Socrates, that the same thing is both lawful and just?”
- “I am, for my part,” he said. [...]
- “If so, then I do not perceive what sort of thing you are saying is lawful and what sort is just.”
- “Do you know the laws of a city?”, he said.
- “I certainly do,” he said.
- “The one, then,” he said, “who partakes of political life according to these is lawful, and one who transgresses them is lawless [...]. Then the lawful one is just, and the lawless one is unjust.” [...]
- “For my part, then, Hippias, I show the same thing to be both lawful and just [...]”.
- “I, for my part,” he said, “think that gods set down these laws for human beings. For indeed among all human beings the first thing held as law is to revere gods”⁶³.

⁶³ Bandini and Dorion, *Xenophon. Mémoires. II, 2e partie*, 26.17-36.7; tr. Bonnette, *Xenophon*.

Evidently, Socrates' point as reported by Xenophon is particularly close to what Cleanthes attributes to Socrates. In addition, Xenophon's "πολλάκις" clearly lurks behind Cleanthes' "παρ' ἕκαστα".

Further, how is Cleanthes' diction as regards the opposite of τὸ νόμιμον or τὸ δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ νόμον, that is τὸ συμφέρον, to be accounted for? Taking Cleanthes' explicit attribution of the idea he talks about to Socrates in its literal meaning and looking for formulations of the idea in the *corpus Platonicum* (in most of whose dialogues Socrates is the main interlocutor), the following crop of passages emerges, where Sophistic conventionalism and relativism in social ethics and political philosophy are reported and combated:

(ii) Pl. *Th.* 172A1-B7:

ΣΩ. [2] Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν, καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχυρὰ καὶ δίκαια [6] καὶ ἄδικοι [6 *e contrario*] καὶ ὅσα {10} καὶ μὴ {10 *e contrario*}, οἷα ἂν ἐκάστη πόλις οἰηθεῖσα θῆται νόμιμα [10] αὐτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐκάστη [...]. ἐν δὲ τῷ συμφέροντα [9] εἰσὶν ἢ μὴ συμφέροντα [9 *e contrario*] τίθεσθαι, ἐνταῦθ', εἴπερ που, αὐτὸ ὁμολογήσει σύμβουλόν τε συμβούλου διαφέρειν καὶ πόλεως δόξαν ἑτέραν ἑτέρας πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν πάνυ τολμήσειε φῆσαι, ἂν θῆται πόλις συμφέροντα [9] οἰηθεῖσα αὐτῇ, παντὸς μᾶλλον ταῦτα καὶ συνοίσειν [9]. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ οὐ λέγω, ἐν τοῖς δίκαιοις [6] καὶ ἀδικοῖς [6 *e contrario*] καὶ ὀσίοις {10} καὶ ἀνοσίοις {10 *e contrario*}, ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἔστι φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν τοῦτο γίγνεται ἀληθὲς τότε, ὅταν δόξη καὶ ὅσον ἂν δοκῇ χρόνον. Καὶ ὅσοι γε ἂν μὴ παντάπασι τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον [sc. the *homo mensura maxim*] λέγωσιν, ὧδέ πως τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι.

Socr. Then consider political questions. Some of these are questions of what may or may not fittingly be done, of just and unjust, of what is sanctioned by religion and what is not; and here the theory may be prepared to maintain that whatever view a city takes on these matters and establishes as its law or convention, is truth and fact for that city [...]. But when it is a question of laying down what is to the interest of the state and what is not, the matter is different. The theory will again admit that here, if anywhere, one counsellor is better than another; here the decision of one city may be more in conformity with the truth than that of another. It will certainly have not the hardihood to affirm that when a city decides that a certain thing is to its own interest, that thing will undoubtedly turn to be to its interest. It is in those other questions I am talking about—just and unjust, religious and unreligious—that men are ready to insist

Memorabilia, 128-33 (slightly changed so as to accord with the text as established by Bandini).

that no one of these things has by nature any being of its own; in respect of these, they say, what seems to people collectively to be so is true, at the time when it seems that way and for just as long as it so seems. And even those who are not prepared to go all the way with Protagoras take some such view of wisdom⁶⁴.

(iii) Ps.-Pl. *Alc. I* 113D1-E2; 116D3; 116E1:

Al. Οἶμαι μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες [2], ὀλιγάκις Ἀθηναίους βουλευέσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλληνας πότερα δικαιοτέρα [6] ἢ ἀδίκωτερα [5 *e contrario*]: τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἠγοῦνται δῆλα εἶναι· ἐάσαντες οὖν περὶ αὐτῶν σκοποῦσιν ὁπότερα συνοίσει [9] πράξασιν. Οὐ γὰρ ταῦτά, οἶμαι, ἐστὶν {8 *e contrario*} τὰ τε δίκαια [6] καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα [9], ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς δὴ ἐλυσιτέλησεν {9} ἀδίκησασι [6 *e contrario*] μεγάλα ἀδικήματα [6 *e contrario*], καὶ ἐτέροις γε, οἶμαι, δίκαια [6] ἐργασασμένοις οὐ συνήνεγκεν [9].

ΣΩ. [2] Τί οὖν; Εἰ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἔτερα μὲν {8a} τὰ δίκαια [8] τυγχάνει ὄντα, ἔτερα δὲ {8b} τὰ συμφέροντα [9], οὐ τί που αὖ σὺ οἶε ταῦτ' εἰδέναι ἃ συμφέρει [9] τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ δι' ὅ τι;

[...]

ΣΩ. [2] Τὰ δίκαια [6] ἄρα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, συμφέροντά [9] ἐστὶν {8 *e contrario*}.

[...]

ΣΩ. [2] [...] ταῦτά {8 *e contrario*} ἐστὶ δίκαιά [6] τε καὶ συμφέροντα [9] [...].

Alc. I think, Socrates, that the Athenians and the rest of the Greeks rarely deliberate as to which is the more just or unjust course: for they regard questions of this sort as obvious; and so they pass them over and consider which course will prove more expedient in the result. For the just and the expedient, I take it, are not the same, but many people have profited by great wrongs that they have committed, whilst others, I imagine, have had no advantage from doing what was right.

Socr. What then? Granting that the just and the expedient are in fact as different as they can be, you surely do not still suppose you know what is expedient for mankind, and why it is so? [...]

Socr. Hence just things, Alcibiades, are expedient. [...]

Socr. [...] Just and expedient are the same [...]⁶⁵.

Passage (iii) looks like a re-elaboration of passage (ii). It says that the members of this or that city, regardless of what they regard just, in a more or less unanimous way, always put this aside and do their best so as to conceive of the most efficient

⁶⁴ Tr. Burneyat, *The Theaetetus*, 299.

⁶⁵ Tr. Lamb, *Plato. XII*, 135-7; 148.

way to attain the highest profit in any given circumstances, as if considering the most profitable option the right thing, so to speak, to do. “Just” options are explicitly rejected on account of their often being unprofitable, and wrong-doing is regarded good on account of its often being profitable. In passage (ii), this is explicitly connected to Protagoras’ relativism⁶⁶.

Furthermore, we have to account for Cleanthes’ description of immorally equating justice to personal interest as “impiety”⁶⁷. *Ἀσεβεια/ἀσεβής* occurs in the same context in a passage from Plato’s *Laws* which is close to passage (ii) (from *Theaetetus*) and refutes some Sophists’ relativization of theological beliefs, which was based on their being held “by convention” (“κατὰ νόμον”):

(iv) Pl. *Lg.* 10.889E3-890A9:

ΑΘ. {2} “Θεούς, ὃ μακάριε, εἶναι πρῶτόν φασι οὔτοι [sc. the relativist Sophists] τέχνη, οὐ φύσει ἀλλά τισιν νόμοις, καὶ τούτους ἄλλους ἄλλη, ὅπη ἕκαστοι ἑαυτοῖσι συνωμολόγησαν νομοθετούμενοι· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ καλὰ φύσει μὲν ἄλλα εἶναι, νόμῳ δὲ ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ δὴ δίκαια [6] οὐδ’ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν φύσει, ἀλλ’ ἀμφισβητοῦντας διατελεῖν ἀλλήλοισ καὶ μετατιθεμένους αἰε ταῦτα, ἃ δ’ ἂν μετὰθωνται καὶ ὅταν, τότε κύρια ἕκαστα εἶναι, γιγνόμενα τέχνη καὶ τοῖς νόμοις ἀλλ’ οὐ δὴ τινι φύσει. Ταῦτ’ ἐστίν, ὃ φίλοι, ἅπαντα ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν παρὰ νέοις ἀνθρώποις, ἰδιωτῶν τε καὶ ποιητῶν⁶⁸, φασκόντων εἶναι τὸ δίκαιότατον [6], ὃ τι τις ἂν νικᾷ {9}

⁶⁶ *Δίκαιον* vs. *συμφέρων* holds pride of place in the celebrated Sophistic in spirit discussion (*λόγους ποιῆσθαι*; 5.84.3) between Athenians attacking and Melians defending as reported (in fact, quite freely reconstructed, if not entirely fabricated) by Thucydides: “ΜΗΛ. ‘[...] Ὑμεῖς [sc. the Athenians] οὐτὼ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον [3 *e contrario*] τὸ ζυμφέρων [4] λέγειν ὑπέθεσθε [...]’. ΜΗΛ. ‘[...] Ὑμεῖς τῶν δίκαιον [3] λόγων ἡμᾶς ἐκβιβᾶσαντες τῷ ὑμετέρῳ ζυμφόρῳ [4] ὑπακούειν πείθετε [...]’. ΜΗΛ. ‘[...] Ὅσοι {5 *e contrario*] πρὸς οὐ δίκαιους [3 *e contrario*] ἰστάμεθα [...]’. ΑΘ. ‘[...] Ἐπιφανέστατα ὧν ἴσμεν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα καλὰ νομίζουσι (cf. Plato’s contrast *καλὸν - ἡδὴ* in *Republic* 364A), τὰ δὲ ζυμφέροντα [4] δίκαια [3]’. ΑΘ. ‘Οὐκ οὐκ οἶσθε τὸ ζυμφέρων [4] μὲν μετ’ ἀσφαλείας εἶναι, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον [3] καὶ καλὸν μετὰ κινδύνου δρᾶσθαι [...]’” (5.90; 98; 104.2; 105.4; 107; H.S. Jones, J.E. Powell, *Thucydides Historiae. Tomus posterior*, Oxonii 1942). My numbering of the salient words does not imply that the passage was one of Cleanthes’ sources; it simply aims at facilitating the reader to discern the similarities and see that Cleanthes did not use it.

⁶⁷ F. Alesse (*La Stoa e la tradizione socratica*, Napoli 1990, 161-2) parallels Cleanthes’ “ἀσεβής” to “σεμνότερον καὶ ἀριώτερον” and “σέβεσθαι” from Plato’s *Crito* 51A2-C3 and Aeschines of Sphettus’ report of Alcibiades’ celebrated impiety (*Alcibiades*, fr. 5; H. Dittmar, *Aeschines von Sphettos. Studien zur Literaturgeschichte der Sokratiker. Untersuchungen und Fragmente*, Berlin 1912, 267). In fact, Cleanthes’ true sources are those pointed out in this paragraph.

⁶⁸ The phrase is clearly an adaptation of Pl. *R.* 2.363E6-7: “[...] ἰδία τε λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν [...]”, which is usually translated as “both in ordinary conversation and in the poets” (C. Emlyn-Jones, W. Preddy, *Plato. Republic. Volume I: Books 1-5*, Cambridge, MA-London 2013, 143), or —which is the same— “kind of language about justice and injustice employed by both laymen and poets” (tr. P. Shorey, *Plato. The Republic*, Cambridge, MA-London 1937, 131). In *LSJ* (s.v. “ἴδιος”, III), the meaning of the word in the *Republic* passage is rendered as “ordinary private conversation” as “opposed” to “ποίησις”, but it is not clear whether what distinguishes “private conversation” from poetry is the former’s prose style or its very privacy. The adaptation of 363E in the *Laws* sheds light

βιαζόμενος· ὅθεν ἀσέβειαί [10] τε ἀνθρώποις ἐμπίπτουσιν νέοις, ὡς οὐκ ὄντων θεῶν οἴους ὁ νόμος προστάττει διανοεῖσθαι δεῖν, στάσεις τε διὰ ταῦτα ἐλκόντων πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν ὀρθὸν βίον, ὅς ἐστιν τῆ ἀληθείᾳ κρατοῦντα ζῆν τῶν ἄλλων καὶ μὴ δουλεύοντα ἐτέροισι κατὰ νόμον [11a-b)].

Ath.: “The first statement, my dear sir, which these people make about the gods is that they exist by art and not by nature,—by certain legal conventions which differ from place to place, according as each tribe agreed when forming their laws. They assert, moreover, that there is one class of things beautiful by nature, and another class beautiful by convention; while as to things just, they do not exist at all by nature, but men are constantly in dispute about them and continually altering them, and whatever alteration they make at any time is at that time authoritative, though it owes its existence to art and the laws, and not in any way to nature. All these, my friends, are views which young people imbibe from men of science, both private teachers and poets, who maintain that the height of justice is to succeed by force; whence it comes that the young people are afflicted with a plague of impiety, as though the gods were not such as the law commands us to conceive them; and, because of this, factions also arise, when these teachers attract them towards the life that is right ‘according to nature’, which consists in being master over the rest in reality, instead of being a slave to others according to legal convention”⁶⁹.

Yet another passage quite close to Cleanthes’, which is quite known as a testimony to Protagoras’ relativism, reads in Plato’s *Laws*:

on the meaning of the vague “ἰδίᾳ” from the passage adapted. The persons subdivided in the *Laws* to *ἰδιῶται* and *ποιηταί* are called *σοφοί*. Therefore, *ἰδιῶται* cannot refer to ordinary people. So, it can but refer to those who, unlike poets, whose speech is public—presumably in the sense that their products in principle address, and eventually are accessible to, everybody, e.g. by means of public performance in the feasts of the city—, “speak” (*λέγουσι*), in the sense of producing authoritative speech (i.e. teaching; cf. “παρὰ νέοις ἀνθρώποις”) privately, namely to the Sophists. I revise Bury’s translation accordingly. (Incidentally, Bury rendered *ἰδιῶται* as prose-authors, presumably on account of its contradistinction to *ποιηταί*. Even if it happens that *ἰδιῶται* has this meaning in some text I am unaware of, the passage from the *Laws* where the passage from the *Republic* is adapted safely reveals the meaning of the word.) Regardless, from the philosophical point of view, according to Plato in the *Republic* (see *supra*, § 2.1), the Sophists simply integrated into their curriculum and handbooks the ideas of the mass. Thus, in the last resort, regarding what is just as different from, or even contrary to, what is profitable or expedient is part of the (rotten) ordinary knowledge. Cf. Pl. *Lg.* 12.964C4-5: “[...] ἢ ποιητὴν τινα ἐλθόντα εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἢ παιδευτὴν νέων [...]” and Xenophon’s “γράμματα [...] ποιητῶν τε καὶ σοφιστῶν” quoted *supra*, § 2.2.1. On *παιδευτής* as equivalent to *σοφιστής*, cf. the hendyadys “οἱ παιδευταί τε καὶ σοφισταί” in the passage from *Republic* 6 quoted above.

⁶⁹ Tr. Bury, *Plato. Laws. II*, 315. In the passage from Thucydides, too, quoted above (n. 66) wrongdoers are opposed to “ὄσιοι”.

(v) Pl. *Lg.* 4.716C1-D4:

ΑΘ. {2} Τίς οὖν δὴ πρᾶξις [12] φίλη καὶ ἀκόλουθος θεῶ [10 *e contrario*]; [...] Ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἡμῖν ‘πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον’ ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ πού τις, ὡς φασιν, ‘ἄνθρωπος’⁷⁰. τὸν οὖν τῷ τοιοῦτω προσφιλεῖ γενησόμενον, εἰς δύναμιν ὃ τι μάλιστα καὶ αὐτὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίγνεσθαι, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ὁ μὲν σώφρων [13] ἡμῶν θεῶ φίλος [10 *e contrario*] (ὅμοιος γάρ), ὁ δὲ μὴ σώφρων [13 *e contrario*] ἀνόμοιός τε καὶ διάφορος καὶ ὁ ἄδικος [6 *e contrario*], καὶ τὰ ἄλλ’ οὕτως κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἔχει.

Ath.: What conduct, then, is dear to God and in his steps? [...] In our eyes God will be “the measure of all things” in the highest degree — a degree much higher than is any “man” they talk of. He, then, that is to become dear to such an one must needs become, so far as he possibly can, of a like character; and, according to the present argument, he amongst us. that is temperate is dear to God, since he is like him, while he that is not temperate is unlike and at enmity,—as is also he who is unjust, and so likewise with the rest, by parity of reasoning⁷¹.

Plato firmly opposes Protagoras’ moral relativism, which he denounces as going against the morality prescribed by gods, and argues for identifying pious, just and wise behaviour. To be sure, the *persona* of the “Athenian” in the *Laws* is not Socrates; so, one can *prima facie* doubt that Cleanthes could take it as an instance of Socrates’ repeated declaration of the identity of what is profitable with what is just. Yet, passage (v) formed the basis for the following passage from *Alcibiades I*, where it is the *persona* of Socrates that presents justice and piety as inextricably interwoven — which means that Cleanthes felt free to conflate what the “Athenian” said to what (Ps.-Plato’s) Socrates had said:

(vi) Ps.-Pl., *Alc. I* 134D1-2 and E4-5:

ΣΩ. [2] [...] Δικαίως [6] μὲν γὰρ πράττοντες [12] καὶ σωφρόνως [13] σύ τε καὶ ἡ πόλις θεοφιλῶς {10 *e contrario*} πράξετε [12]. [...] Καὶ [...] εἰς τὸ θεῖον {10 *e contra*} καὶ λαμπρὸν ὀρῶντες πράξετε [12]. [...] Ἀδίκως [6 *e contrario*] δέ γε πράττοντες [12], εἰς τὸ ἄθεον {10} καὶ σκοτεινὸν βλέποντες [...].

⁷⁰ See Diels and Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Zweiter Band*, 425.16. Cf. next footnote.

⁷¹ Tr. R.G. Bury, *Plato. Laws. I*, Cambridge, MA-London 1926, 295-7. Bury (*Plato. Laws. I*, 295 n. 2) mentions Pl. *Cra.* 386A-B and *Th.* 152A as passages parallel to the reference to Protagoras’ relativism in the *Laws*.

Socr.: For you and the state, if you act justly and temperately, will act so as to please God. [...] And [...] you will act with your eyes turned on what is divine and bright. [...] But if you act unjustly, with your eyes on the godless and dark [...] ⁷².

“Θεοφιλῶς πράξετε” clearly derives from “πρᾶξις φίλη [...] θεῶ” and “προσφιλή” (to god). Likewise, “σώφρων” is patently reflected on “σωφρόνως”. It seems therefore that Cleanthes could construe passage (v) as reflecting Socratic ethics. Indeed, what the *persona* says is evidently consonant with what Xenophon reports about what Socrates held in passage (i). And what Cleanthes probably drew upon the passage from the *Laws* is the word *ἀσέβεια* and its silent but easily recognisable application to those who, like Protagoras and other Sophists, argued that just and profitable are clearly two different, if not opposite, things. In this context, being *ἀσεβής* means boastfully introducing oneself as allegedly standing above what the humble human condition, with its limited powers and rights, truly allows⁷³ and establishing some sort of morality accounted for only in terms of one’s own thought.

Last, we have to account for Cleanthes’ “εὐδαίμων”. Another Platonic passage, which reports the Sophistic separation of justice from happiness and whose diction crosses with certain of the above passages, adequately accounts for this:

(vii) Pl. *R.* 2.364A1-B2:

⁷² Tr. Lamb, *Plato. XII*, 217. ‘Unjustly and impiously’ and ‘unjustly and godlessly’ occur as *synekphorae*, as it were, in the following 5th- and 4th-c. BC texts, too: Pl. *Grg.* 481A4-5: “[...] χρυσίον ἢ ἥρπακὸς πολὺ, [...] ἀναλίσκη καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως [...]”; 523B1-2: “[...] τὸν βίον διελθόντα [...] ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως”; Antiphon, 2.2.13: “[...] ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως διαφθαρέντα με ὑπ’ αὐτῶν” (M.R. Dilts, D.J. Murphy, *Antiphontis et Andocidis Orationes*, Oxford 2018, 23.13). See also *ἀδικος* (*τε*) *ἄθεος* in Gorgias’ fr. 11a D-K, in E. *Ba.* 995 and 1015, *Hel.* 1148 and *HF*s 433 as well as in Ar. *Th.* 671. None of them exhibits any close similarities to *SVF* I.558.

⁷³ Cf. Pl. *Lg* 4: “[...] ὁ μὲν δὴ θεὸς [...] εὐθεία περαίνει κατὰ φύσιν περιπορευόμενος· τῷ δὲ αἰεὶ συνέπεται δίκη τῶν ἀπολειπομένων τοῦ θείου νόμου τιμωρός, ἧς ὁ μὲν εὐδαιμονήσῃν μέλλων ἐχόμενος συνέπεται ταπεινός καὶ κεκοσμημένος, ὁ δὲ τις ἐξαρθεῖς ὑπὸ μεγαλαυχίας [...] νεότητι καὶ ἀνοίᾳ φλέγεται τὴν ψυχὴν μεθ’ ὕβρεως, ὡς οὔτε ἄρχοντας οὔτε τινὸς ἡγεμόνος δεόμενος [...]” (715E7-716E8). Cf. Ph. *De posteritate Caini* 35: “Τίς οὖν ἐστὶν ἀσεβοῦς δόξα; Μέτρον εἶναι πάντων χρημάτων τὸν ἀνθρώπινον νοῦν· ἢ καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν τινα σοφιστῶν ὄνομα Πρωταγόραν φασι χηρίσασθαι [...]” (L. Cohn, P. Wendland, *Philonis Alexandrini opera*, II, Berlin 1897, 8.25-9.1). R. Nickel (*Stoa und Stoiker. Griechisch-lateinisch-deutsch. Auswahl der Fragmente und Zeugnisse, Übersetzung und Erläuterungen. Band II*, Düsseldorf 2008, 965), commenting on Panaetius’ fr. 62 (M. van Straaten, *Panaetii Rhodii fragmenta*, Leiden 1952, 18.1-11; cf. F. Alesse, *Panezio di Rodi. Testimonianze. Edizione, traduzione e commento*, Napoli 1997, 55, No 105), plausibly traces it back to Cleanthes’ *SVF* I.558. In view of the fact that Cleanthes’ reference to Socrates can be traced back to the Platonic *persona* of Socrates, Nickel’s description of it as “Sokrates-Anekdote” should be revised.

Πάντες γὰρ ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος ὑμνοῦσιν ὡς καλὸν μὲν ἢ *σωφροσύνη* [13] τε καὶ *δικαιοσύνη* [6], χαλεπὸν μέντοι καὶ ἐπίπονον, ἀκολασία {12 *e contrario*} δὲ καὶ ἀδικία {5 *e contrario*} ἡδὺ [1] μὲν καὶ εὐπετὲς κτήσασθαι, δόξη δὲ μόνον καὶ νόμῳ αἰσχρόν. *Λυσιτελέστερα* {9} δὲ τῶν *δικαίων* [6] τὰ *ἄδικα* {6 *e contrario*} ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος λέγουσι, καὶ πονηροὺς πλουσίους καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἔχοντας *εὐδαιμονίζειν* [7] καὶ τιμᾶν εὐχερῶς ἐθέλουσιν δημοσίᾳ τε καὶ ἰδίᾳ· τοὺς δὲ ἀτιμάζειν καὶ ὑπερορᾶν, οἳ ἂν πη ἀσθενεῖς τε καὶ πένητες ὦσιν, ὁμολογοῦντες αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους εἶναι τῶν ἐτέρων.

All with one voice harp on about moderation and justice as fine things, but hard and laborious, while licentiousness and injustice are pleasant, easily acquired and regarded as shameful only by common repute. They say that unjust deeds are for the most part more profitable than just, and they readily call the wicked happy and honor them in public and in private, provided that they are wealthy or have other resources. Whereas those who are in any way weak and poor they dishonor and despise, even while admitting that they are better than the others⁷⁴.

At this point of the dialogue, the *persona* of Adimantus reports part of what Thrasymachus (459 – late 5th c. BC) had said about justice. Cleanthes' explicit identification of the “just person” with the “happy person” clearly objects Thrasymachus' (true or apparent) position that these are two clearly distinct, if not opposing, things. Likewise, regarding injustice merely as “νόμῳ αἰσχρόν” clearly corresponds to Cleanthes' τὸ δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ νόμον; at this phrase, passages (i) and (vii) cross⁷⁵.

Further, the very title of Cleanthes' lost work to which I.558 belongs, that is *Περὶ ἡδονῆς*, crosses with “ἡδὺ” from passage (vii), where Thrasymachus' idea is reported that injustice serves pleasure and thereby happiness.

Finally, a few lines (363E6-7) before passage (vii), Thrasymachus is reported to attribute the view that it is injustice (and the remaining vices) rather than justice (and the remaining virtues) that serve happiness to private teachers and certain poets (“ἰδίᾳ τε λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν”⁷⁶), namely, in this or that form, to current beliefs. As has already been seen (§ 2.1), Cleanthes, like Socrates, regarded current beliefs (δόξαι) wrong (or, in the best case, right only by coincidence, i.e. right in an unfounded way), and, as is already known⁷⁷ (and will be further demonstrated in § 4), Cleanthes regarded not only ordinary views but also poetic “wisdom” as standing in need of corrections.

⁷⁴ Tr. Emlyn-Jones and Preddy, *Plato. Republic*, I, 143.

⁷⁵ Socrates, in execrating the *earliest* thinker who separated the just from the useful, does not seem to refer to the oldest Sophist who did so (who seems to have been Protagoras); he rather referred in an indefinite way to the first person whose mind was ever crossed by that impious idea.

⁷⁶ On the meaning of “ἰδίᾳ” in the passage, see *supra*, n. 68.

⁷⁷ On poetry as a partial deformation of ancient wisdom according to the founders of Stoicism (deformation calling partly for allegoric interpretation and partly for emendation), see, e.g., Tieleman, *Galen and Chrysippus*, 220-8.

Two more Platonic passages express the same point with roughly the same diction:

(viii) Pl. R. 3.392C3-4:

[...] ὅταν εὕρωμεν οἷόν ἐστιν *δικαιοσύνη* [6] καὶ ὡς φύσει *λυσιτελοῦν* {9} τῷ ἔχοντι [...].

[...] when we have discovered the nature of justice and the proof that it is profitable to its possessor [...]⁷⁸.

Passage (viii) does not shed any further light on Cleanthes' lines. The following one, however, does so. In *Lg* 2.660E2-663D5, the Athenian interlocutor argues that, unlike what most people (*οἱ πολλοί*) think, happiness should not be identified with apparent goods (such as health, beauty, wealth and power) and pleasant life but with practising justice and conducting a virtuous life in general. In the course of the Athenian's argument against taking pleasure as the goal of life, a large amount of Cleanthes' vocabulary occurs:

(ix) Pl. *Lg*. 2.661E7-663D5:

AΘ. {2} [...] Ἄνδρες ἴσως γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ καλὸς καὶ πλούσιος, καὶ ποιῶν ὅτι περ ἐπιθυμοῖ τὸν βίον ἅπαντα, οὐχ ὑμῖν δοκεῖ, εἴπερ *ἄδικος* [6 *e contrario*] εἶη καὶ ὑβριστής, ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἰσχυρῶς ἂν ζῆν; Ἥ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἂν συγχωρήσαίτε, τό γε αἰσχυρῶς; [...]

AΘ. {2} Τί δέ; Τὸ καὶ κακῶς; [...]

AΘ. {2} Τί δέ; Τὸ καὶ ἀηδῶς [1 *e contrario*] καὶ μὴ *συμπερόντως* [9 *e contrario*] αὐτῷ; [...]

AΘ. {2} [...] τοὺς ποιητὰς ἀναγκάζετε λέγειν ὡς ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ *σώφρων* [13] ὢν καὶ *δίκαιος* [6] *εὐδαίμων* [7] ἐστὶ [...].

[...] Ζημίαν [...] ὀλίγου μεγίστην ἐπιτιθείην ἂν, εἴ τις ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ φθέγγεται ὡς εἰσὶν τινες ἀνθρωποὶ ποτε πονηροὶ μὲν, *ἡδέως* [1] δὲ ζῶντες, ἢ *λυσιτελοῦντα* {9} μὲν *ἄλλα* {8a} ἐστὶ καὶ *κερδαλέα* {9}, *δικαιότερα* [6] δὲ *ἄλλα* {8b} [...].

[...] Ἄρ' ὁ *δικαιότατός* [6] ἐστὶν βίος *ἡδιστος* [1], ἢ δὴ ἐστὸν τινε βίω, οἷν ὁ μὲν {8a} *ἡδιστος* [1] ὢν τυγχάνει, *δικαιότατος* [6] δ' ἔτερος {8b};, εἰ δὴ 'δύο' φαῖεν, ἐροίμεθ' ἂν ἴσως αὐτοὺς πάλιν [...] 'Ποτέρους δὲ *εὐδαιμονεστέρους* [7] χρῆ λέγειν, τοὺς τὸν *δικαιότατον* [6] ἢ τοὺς τὸν *ἡδιστον* [1] διαβιούντας βίον;', εἰ μὲν δὴ φαῖεν 'τοὺς τὸν *ἡδιστον* [1]', ἄτοπος αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος ἂν γίνοιτο. [...] Εἰ δ' αὖ τὸν *δικαιότατον* [6] *εὐδαιμονέστατον* [7] ἀποφαίνοντο βίον εἶναι, ζητοῖ που πᾶς ἂν ὁ ἀκούων, οἴμαι, τί ποτ' ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ τῆς *ἡδονῆς* [1] κρεῖττον ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ καλὸν ὁ νόμος ἐνὸν ἐπαινεῖ. Τί γὰρ δὴ *δικαίῳ χωριζόμενον* [8] *ἡδονῆς* [1] ἀγαθὸν ἂν γίνοιτο; [...]

⁷⁸ Tr. Shorey, *Plato. The Republic. I*, 225.

Οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν μὴ χωρίζων [8 *e contrario*] λόγος ἡδὺ [1] τε καὶ δίκαιον [6] καὶ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλὸν πιθανὸς [...] πρὸς τό τινα ἐθέλειν ζῆν τὸν ὄσιον {10} καὶ δίκαιον [6] βίον [...]. [...] Τὰ μὲν ἄδικα [6 *e contrario*] τῷ τοῦ δικαίου [6] ἐναντίως φαινόμενα, ἐκ μὲν ἀδίκου [6 *e contrario*] καὶ κακοῦ ἑαυτοῦ θεωρούμενα ἡδέα [1], τὰ δὲ δίκαια [6] ἀηδέστατα [1 *e contrario*], ἐκ δὲ δικαίου [6] πάντα τὰναντία παντὶ πρὸς ἀμφοτέρω. [...] Ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὸν ἄδικον [6 *e contrario*] βίον οὐ μόνον αἰσχίω καὶ μοχθηρότερον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀηδέστερον [1] τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τοῦ δικαίου [6] τε εἶναι καὶ ὀσίω {10} βίου.

Ath. Do you not think that if a man who is courageous, strong, beautiful, and rich, and who does exactly as he likes all his life long, is really unjust and insolent, he must necessarily be living a base life? Probably you will agree at any rate to call it ‘base’? [...]

Ath. And also a bad life? [...]

Ath. Well, would you agree with the descriptions ‘with no pleasure’ and ‘with no profit to himself’?

Ath. [...] You oblige the poets to teach that the good man, since he is temperate and just, is happy [...].

[...] I should impose all but the heaviest of penalties on anyone in the land who should declare that any wicked men lead pleasant lives, or that things profitable and lucrative are different from things just [...].

[...] ‘Is the most just life the most pleasant; or are there two lives, of which the one is most pleasant, the other most just?’ If they replied that there were two, we might well ask them further [...]: ‘Which of the two ought one to describe as the happier, those that live the most just or those that live the most pleasant life?’ If they replied, ‘Those that live the most pleasant life,’ that would be a monstrous statement in their mouths. [...] But if, on the other hand, he were to declare the most just life to be the happiest, everyone who heard him would, I suppose, enquire what is the good and charm it contains which is superior to pleasure, and for which the lawgiver praises it. For, apart from pleasure, what good could accrue to a just man?

So then the teaching which refuses to separate the pleasant from the just helps, if nothing else, to induce a man to live the holy and just life [...]. [...] Their notions of justice and injustice are illusory pictures, unjust objects appearing pleasant and just objects most unpleasant to him who is opposed to justice, through being viewed from his own unjust and evil standpoint, but when seen from the standpoint of justice, both of them appear in all ways entirely the opposite. [...] Undoubtedly, then, the unjust life is not only more base and ignoble, but also in very truth more unpleasant, than the just and holy life⁷⁹.

⁷⁹ Tr. Bury, *Plato. The Laws. I*, 115; 119; 121; 121-3; 123; 123-5; 125 (slightly modified).

Χωρίζειν does not occur in any of the passages from Xenophon and Plato quoted above; applied to the just vs. unjust life, it occurs only in passage (ix). This establishes dependence. Moreover, the central place of *ἡδονή* in passage (ix) —which occurs in passage (vii), too (from the *Republic*, Bk. II)— explains why the issue of sharply distinguishing between justice (*τὸ δίκαιον*) and profit (*τὸ συμφέρον*) —the latter popularly but wrongly taken as equivalent to *ἡδονή*— was discussed by Cleanthes in a writing of his entitled *Περὶ ἡδονῆς*. How did Cleanthes take what the persona of the “Athenian” argued for in the *Laws* as what Socrates held on the issue? He did so in the same way as already seen above: if we assume, on the basis of his meticulous exploitation of the passages from the *corpus Platonicum* quoted in this paragraph, that Cleanthes had noticed the dependence of the (Ps.-) Platonic Socrates in *Alcibiades I* on *Laws*, conflating the Athenian with Socrates was in principle quite reasonable for him. After all, what the Athenian argues for in *Laws* II, 660E2-663D5 is objectively quite close to what both the Platonic Socrates and the Ps.-Platonic one (directly depending, as seen, on the Platonic) argued in passages (i)-(viii), both regarding doctrine and diction.

Whom did Cleanthes oppose when rejecting pleasure as the essence of happiness? *SVF* I.556 (126.32-4) reads: “Κλεάνθης ἔλεγεν, εἰ τέλος ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονή, πρὸς κακοῦ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὴν φρόνησιν δεδόσθαι”⁸⁰ (“If the end or purpose of our lives consists in pleasure, then it is in vain that man has been bestowed with prudence”). A.T. Watanabe⁸¹ suggested that this argument “is directed against the Epicureans”, namely that Cleanthes combats the Epicureans’ subordination of the cardinal virtues to the moral ideal of “pleasure”⁸². In view of Cleanthes’ quite probable knowledge of Plato’s *Gorgias* (see *supra*, § 2.2.1), the fragment would rather be taken as combating Callicles’ exposition of licentiousness as the only true moral ideal⁸³. So, if it can be plausibly surmised that Cleanthes combated a philosophical trend of his time, Watanabe’s opinion looks probable; still, if so, Cleanthes, as his diction shows, formulated his moral anti-Epicureanism in anti-Sophistic and Socratic terms. Indeed, I.556 implies that, to Cleanthes, *φρόνησις* enjoys moral autonomy and it is because of its presence or absence that desire and pleasure become moral or immoral. This clearly reflects Socrates’ contrast

⁸⁰ On pleasant feelings as by far inferior to virtue, cf. Chrysippus, *SVF* III.76 (19.27-33).

⁸¹ Watanabe, *Cleanthes*, 195.

⁸² Epicur. *Sent.* 5 (Bailey, *Epicurus*, 1926, 94); *Ep. ad Menoecum* 132.7-13 (Bailey, *op. cit.*, 90). Cf. D.L. 10.138: “Διὰ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς αἰρεῖσθαι, οὐ δὲ αὐτάς” (Marcovich, *Diogenis*, 801.14-15; Dorandi, *Diogenes*, 814; parallel noted by Watanabe, *ibid.*).

⁸³ Pl. *Grg.* 491E6-492A3: “[...] πῶς ἂν εὐδαίμων γένοιτο ἄνθρωπος δουλεύων ὄψοι; Ἀλλὰ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ὃ ἐγὼ σοι νῦν παρρησιαζόμενος λέγω, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ὀρθῶς βιωσόμενον τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἐαυτοῦ εἶναι ὡς μεγίστας εἶναι καὶ μὴ κολάζειν, ταύτας δὲ ὡς μεγίσταις οὐσίας ἰκανὸν εἶναι ὑπηρετεῖν δι’ ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν, καὶ ἀποπιπλάναει ὧν ἂν αἰεὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία γίγνηται”. Cf. the use of the lexeme (“ἡδὺ”) in the passage from *Republic* 2 quoted *supra* (§ 3.1), where the thought of another Sophist, Thrasymachus, is presumably reported or reflected.

of *φρόνησις* to all the things that are commonly regarded “good”, including pleasure, in several passages from the *corpus Platonicum*, some of which have already been paralleled to I.556⁸⁴.

In point of fact, it was quite reasonable for Cleanthes to do so. By combating the Epicureans through Socratic morality, Cleanthes implied two things:

(i) That the Epicureans were fundamentally wrong in being the only philosophical school which discredited Socrates as a philosophical figure⁸⁵. It was shortly before, or roughly during, the time of Cleanthes’ philosophical activity that one of Epicurus’ disciples, Colotes of Lampsacus (born probably in 320 BC), wrote *Against Plato’s “Lysis”* and *Against Plato’s “Euthydemus”*⁸⁶, making Socrates his main target. To be sure, Colotes focused on the Socratic method, which, as he argued, fatally opened the way for Scepticism⁸⁷. Still,

⁸⁴ Pl. *Euthd.* 281D2-E5: “[...] σύμπαντα ἃ τὸ πρῶτον ἔραμεν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, οὐ περὶ τούτου ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ὅπως αὐτὰ γε καθ’ αὐτὰ πέφυκεν ἀγαθὰ, ἀλλ’ ὡς εἴκειν ὧδ’ ἔχει· ἐὰν μὲν αὐτῶν ἡγήται ἀμαθία, μείζω κακὰ εἶναι τῶν ἐναντιῶν, ὅσω δυνατότερα ὑπηρετεῖν τῷ ἡγουμένῳ κακῷ ὄντι, ἐὰν δὲ φρόνησις τε καὶ σοφία, μείζω ἀγαθὰ, αὐτὰ δὲ καθ’ αὐτὰ οὐδέτερα αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς ἄξια εἶναι. [...] Τῶν μὲν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ὄν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν, τούτοις δὲ δυοῖν ὄντων ἢ μὲν σοφία ἀγαθόν, ἢ δὲ ἀμαθία κακόν [...]” (parallel noted by Verbeke, *Kleanthes van Assos*, 215 n. 3); *Men.* 88C4-89A2: “Εἰ ἄρα ἀρετὴ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τί ἐστίν καὶ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὠφελίμῳ εἶναι, φρόνησιν αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ περ πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὰ μὲν καθ’ αὐτὰ οὐτε ὠφέλιμα οὐτε βλαβερὰ ἐστίν, προσγενομένης δὲ φρονήσεως ἡ ἀφροσύνης βλαβερὰ τε καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίνονται. [...] Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ [...] πλοῦτόν τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὰ τοτὲ δὲ βλαβερὰ εἶναι, ἄρα οὐχ ὡς περ τῇ ἄλλῃ ψυχῇ ἢ φρόνησις ἡγουμένη ὠφέλιμα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐποίει, ἢ δὲ ἀφροσύνη βλαβερὰ, οὕτως αὖ καὶ τούτοις ἢ ψυχῇ ὀρθῶς μὲν χρωμένη καὶ ἡγουμένη ὠφέλιμα αὐτὰ ποιεῖ, μὴ ὀρθῶς δὲ βλαβερὰ [...]. [...] Τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνηρτηθῆσαι, τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς εἰς φρόνησιν, εἰ μέλλει ἀγαθὰ εἶναι” (passage noted as parallel to SVF I.556 by Grumach, *Physis und Agathon*, 28 n. 1, who has also pointed out *Ly.* 216D at 22 n. 1); *Cra.* 416C10-11 and D8-10: “[...] ὅσα μὲν ἂν νοῦς τε καὶ διάνοια ἐργάσθαι, ταῦτα ἐστὶ τὰ ἐπαινετὰ, ἃ δὲ μὴ, ψεκτὰ [...]. [...] Φρονήσεως αὕτη ἡ ἐπωνυμία ἐστίν τὸ ‘καλόν’ τῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπεργαζομένης, ἃ δὴ καλὰ φάσκοντες εἶναι ἀσπασζόμεθα”. See also *Lg.* 4.705D2-706A4. Besides *ἡδονή*, the remaining core words of I.556, i.e. *φρόνησις* and *κακόν*, are traceable back to the above Platonic passages. Further, the idea occurs, in a way particularly close to the passage from Plato’s *Euthydemus* quoted above, in fr. 2-4 (according to Düring’s numbering in his *Aristotle’s Protrepticus*, 46-8) from Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*, too: “[...] νομίζειν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἐν τῷ πολλὰ κεκτηθῆσαι γίνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ πῶς τὴν ψυχὴν διακεῖσθαι [...]. [...] Ψυχὴν ἐὰν ἢ πεπαιδευμένη, τὴν τοιαύτην καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπον εὐδαιμόνα προσαγορευτέον ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἢ λαμπρῶς κεχορηγημένος, αὐτὸς μηδενὸς ἄξιος ὢν. [...] Τοῖς γὰρ διακεμιμένοις τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κακῶς οὐτε πλοῦτος οὐτ’ ἰσχυρὸς οὐτε κάλλος τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ ὅσω περ ἂν αὐτὰ μᾶλλον αἰ διαθέσεις καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν ὑπάρξωσι, τοσοῦτῳ μείζω καὶ πλείω τὸν κεκτημένον βλάπτουσιν, ἐὰν ἂνευ φρονήσεως παραγένωνται· τὸ γὰρ ‘μὴ παιδὶ μάχαιραν’ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ, τὸ μὴ τοῖς φαύλοις τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἐγχειρίζειν” (Hutchinson and Johnson, *Aristotle. Protrepticus*, 6-7). As seen (§ 2.2.2), Cleanthes had exploited this work.

⁸⁵ See the recent survey by F. Javier Campos-Daroca, “Epicurus and the Epicureans on Socrates and the Socratics”, in C. Moore, ed., *Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Socrates*, Leiden 2019, 237-65.

⁸⁶ See Campos-Daroca, “Epicurus”, 246-8; T. Dorandi, “Colotes de Lampsaque”, in R. Goulet, ed., *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, III, Paris 1994, 448-50, at 449.

⁸⁷ See E. Kechagia, *Plutarch Against Colotes. A Lesson in History of Philosophy*, Oxford 2011, 55-65.

Colotes regarded Socrates' method detrimental for ethical issues, too; for instance, the fact that *Lysis* "ultimately leaves the reader in *aporia* with respect to a crucial ethical matter", i.e. friendship, was presumably a good reason for Colotes to criticize Socrates' way of investigation into the matter in the dialogue⁸⁸. In general, for Colotes, Socrates' "sophistical" and "importune" way of investigation of all ethical matters was inconclusive and thereby could but lead one's life to nowhere⁸⁹.

Anti-Epicurean seems to be Cleanthes' rehabilitation of Socrates' law-abide prescription, too. Epicurus, in a letter of his, addressing the question "εἰ πράξει τινὰ ὁ σοφὸς ὃν οἱ νόμοι ἀπαγορεύουσιν, εἰδὼς ὅτι λήσει" ("whether the sage who knows that he will not be found out will do certain things that the laws forbid"), put in principle the "wise man" above the restrictions of civic law: "Μὴ νόμοις καὶ δόξαις δουλεύοντα ζῆν [...]" ; "not to live in servitude to laws and men's opinions [...]"⁹⁰. Epicurus' reply marked sharp contrast to Socrates' firm decision not to escape from prison and die according to his city's verdict.

(ii) Apart from aiming at restoring Socrates' image as a respectable philosophical figure, Cleanthes depreciatingly traced back the Epicurean doctrine of "pleasure" as the "end" of life to the indecent morality of Sophists of the Callicles- and Thrasymachus-type as known via Plato's works.

Besides these specific aspects of Cleanthes' Socrates-inspired moral doctrines, it is evident that Socrates' ethics, however one may reconstruct it, was far away from the Epicureans' ethical teachings.

3.2. NOLI MALEDICERE (SVF I.561)

Yet another case of reception of Socrates' ethics is I.561, which reads:

Κακῶς ἀκούειν [1] {1} *κρεῖσσον* {2} ἢ *λέγειν κακῶς* [3] {3}.

It is better for one to be mentioned in a way insulting for himself than to insult others.

M. Isnardi Parente has plausibly noted that this is "ricalcato probabilmente sul socratico μάλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν (*Cri.* 49b segg., e altrove)"⁹¹. More accurately, this Socratic maxim occurs in *Gorgias*:

⁸⁸ Kechagia, *Plutarch*, 62.

⁸⁹ Kechagia, *Plutarch*, 109; 111-15; 125-6.

⁹⁰ Plu. *Mor.* 34.1127D5-7 (B. Einarson, P.H. De Lacy, *Plutarch. Moralia. Volume XIV: That Epicurus Actually Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible. Reply to Colotes in Defence of the Other Philosophers. Is "Live Unknown" a Wise Precept? On Music*, Cambridge, MA-London 1967, 164). Cf. G. Arrighetti, *Epicuro. Opere*, Torino 1973², 164 (fr. 11.1).

⁹¹ Isnardi Parente, *Stoici*, 229 n. 108. Cf. Festa, *I frammenti*, 88; Alesse, *La Stoa*, 161.

(i) Pl. *Grg.* 469C2; 473A5; 475C8-9:

[...] ἐλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι {1} ἢ ἀδικεῖν {3}. [...] Τὸ ἀδικεῖν {3} τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι {1} κάκιον {2 *e contrario*} εἶναι. [...] Τὸ ἀδικεῖν {3} κάκιον {2 *e contrario*} ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι {1}.

[...] I would choose to suffer wrong than do it. [...] wrongdoing is worse than being wronged. [...] Doing wrong is fouler than suffering it⁹².

Indeed, in the section from *Crito* pointed out by Isnardi Parente, one can find the source of the meaning as well as part of the diction of what Cleanthes says:

(ii) Pl. *Cri.* 50E10-51A1:

[...] Οὔτε κακῶς ἀκούοντα [1] ἀντιλέγειν [3] {3} [...].

[...] Nor answering them back if you were reviled [...]⁹³.

And it can hardly be coincidental that this moral exhortation belongs to the section which, as already shown (§ 2.1), is the main source of Cleanthes' I.559.

Further, as the exclusive diction similarity suggests, Cleanthes quite probably combined the above Platonic passage with the following version of one of the moral maxims attributed to Pittacus:

(iii) Pittacus, fr. 7:

Φίλον μὴ λέγειν κακῶς [3], ἀλλὰ μηδὲ ἐχθρόν.

Speak no ill of a friend, nor even of an enemy⁹⁴.

⁹² Tr. Lamb, *Plato. III*, 335; 347; 357 (slightly modified). Cf. *op. cit.* 509B1-2 and C6-7. See also 474B3-5: “[...] τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ διδόναι δίκην τοῦ διδόναι”, which this Cleanthean fragment is akin to: “Πόλις μὲν εἰ ἔστιν οἰκητήριον κατασκευάσμα, εἰς ὃ καταφεύγοντας ἔστι δίκην δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν, οὐκ ἀστεῖον δὴ πόλις ἔστιν; Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἡ πόλις οἰκητήριον. Ἀστεῖον ἄρ' ἔστιν ἡ πόλις” (*SVF* I.587, 132.19-23). Cf. *SVF* III.328 (81.3-9).

⁹³ Tr. Fowler (*Plato in Twelve Volumes. I*, 177), slightly modified. Cf. Pl. *Grg.* 482D83-E5 (Callicles speaking): “[...] σοὶ συνεχώρησεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον εἶναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι [...]. Σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικά καὶ δημηγορικά, φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν διόκειν, ἃ φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν καλὰ, νόμῳ δέ. Ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐναντι' ἀλλήλοισ ἐστίν, ἢ τε φύσει καὶ ὁ νόμος [...]”.

⁹⁴ *Apud* D.L. 1.78 (Marcovich, *Diogenis*, 54.6-7; Dorandi, *Diogenes Laertius*, 114); tr. R.D. Hicks, *Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, I, Cambridge, MA-London 1925, 79. On the versions of the dictum, see M. Tziatzi-Papagianni, *Die Sprüche der sieben Weisen. Zwei byzantinische Sammlungen*, Stuttgart-Leipzig 1994, 213 (No 7).

As for “κρεῖσσον”, it can be accounted for in terms of its being the exact contrary to *κάκιον* (both grammatically and as regards its content) in the passages from Plato’s *Gorgias* just quoted, where Socrates argued that wrongdoing is worse than being treated unjustly.

Socrates was well aware that what he argued for went against how most people thought⁹⁵. Cleanthes, as his borrowing from a passage from Plato’s *Crito* shown above suggests (§ 2.1), was aware of this, too. Further, it was quite natural for Cleanthes to think so, as he believed that (true) philosophers do say things that sound strange (see above, § 2.1), which is in tune with what Socrates, both as a thinker and as Plato’s *persona*, time and again held about the opinions of the *vulgus*.

3.3. CONCLUSION

From the above the following picture emerges. In I.558, Cleanthes, in the context of his argument that what happiness consists in is not “pleasure” but “virtue”, used Xenophon’s report of Socrates’ discussion with Hippias of Elis on the moral status of law-abiding attitude as his basic source⁹⁶. Then, Cleanthes, taking—not implausibly—Xenophon’s “πολλάκις” (“time and again”) in its literal meaning, integrated into his own account several doctrinal and diction elements from almost all of the passages from the *corpus Platonicum* where Socrates is reported to have propounded this argument. In so doing, Cleanthes consciously took sides with Socrates against the relativist Sophistic description of justice as human invention and subscribed to Socrates’ idea that respecting civic law is a moral precept divine in origin, i.e. superior to this or that individual’s morality. Presumably, Cleanthes, by arguing that observing the law is morally imperative, did not argue that laws are right in all of their aspects and details — which, after all, would be highly questionable in view of the obvious defects and the very variety of the innumerable law prescriptions and prohibitions even within a single city or state. Rather, what he had in mind was that, as a rule, transgressing legislation is triggered by excessive wishes or anger, i.e. by passions, which arise from the widely accepted but nevertheless erred, un-philosophical beliefs about the nature of good and happiness. As for which passages — besides the basic one, i.e. that from Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*— he relied upon in order to produce his praiseful reference to what Socrates held on the issue, out of the nine relevant ones in the *corpus Platonicum* he picked up diction elements from those occurring in *Republic*, Bk. 2 and *Alcibiades I* as well as in *Laws*, Bks. 2 and 10. As for passages (v) and (vi), as seen, the Ps.-Platonic one was based on the genuine one; so, Cleanthes could take them as in fact saying one and the same thing. Further, passages (v), (vi)

⁹⁵ Pl. *Cri.* 49B3: “[...] εἴτε φασιν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴτε μή [...]”; 49C4: “[...] ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ φασιν [...]”;
49B10-11: “Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται [...]”.

⁹⁶ Given that Zeno of Citium, upon reaching Piraeus before arriving at Athens, had been impressed by Bk. 2 of the *Memorabilia* (see *SVF* I.1, 3.20-2; cf., *inter alia*, M. Erler, “Stoic Oikeiosis and Xenophon’s Socrates”, in T. Scaltsas, A.S. Mason, eds., *Zeno of Citium and Its Legacy: The Philosophy of Zeno*, Larnaca 2002, 242–57, at 241-2), it is plausible to assume that Cleanthes was exhorted by his mentor to read this work (or parts of, or excerpts from, it).

and (viii) have actually nothing to add to the items exploited by Cleanthes; so, he simply did not integrate anything from them to his own few lines on the issue. As for I.561, it is, yet once more, a calque from Socrates' argument against insulting (taken as a sort of wrongdoing) in Plato's *Crito* and *Gorgias*, probably embellished with some wording from a similar moral precept by Pittacus.

4. AGAINST LICENTIOUSNESS AND COWARDICE, THE OFFSPRING OF AVARICE (SVF I.562)

The Cleanthean fragments examined in § 2 and 3 are Socratic in provenance; I.562 is not. Nevertheless, it is relevant to them, not simply because it belongs to the set of passages classified by H. von Arnim as referring to the Stoic "indifferent things" (see above, § 2.2), but mainly because, as will be shown, it relates to the concept of *καλόν* from I.559, which has already been discussed (see above, § 2.1). It reads:

[...] "πόρναις τε δοῦναι σῶμά τ' εἰς νόσους πεσόν / δαπάναις ἐπιτρίψαι".

[...] "For giving to prostitutes, and when one's body's ill / To finish it off by spending"⁹⁷.

4.1. THE TEXTUAL BACKGROUND

This, according to Plutarch, who preserved it, is a *paradiorthosis* on E. *El.* 427-9:

[...] Σκοπῶ τὰ χρήμαθ' ὡς ἔχει μέγα σθένος / ξένοις τε δοῦναι σῶμά τ' ἔς νόσους πεσόν / δαπάναισι σῶσαι [...].

[...] I behold that money has great power, for giving to guests, for giving to save a body fallen into illness⁹⁸.

Cleanthes replaces just a couple of words⁹⁹. Firstly, he ironically substitutes "πόρναις" for "φίλοις" (one of its subalternatives)¹⁰⁰. It is not impossible that

⁹⁷ Tr. F.C. Babbitt, *Plutarch. Moralia. With an English Translation. Volume I: The Education of Children. How the Young Man Should Study Poetry. On Listening to Lectures. How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend. How a Man May Become Aware of His Progress in Virtue*, Cambridge, MA-London 1927, 175, slightly modified.

⁹⁸ M.J. Cropp, *Euripides. Electra*, Oxford 1988, 32-5 (translation modified). Incidentally, it is probable that Cleanthes had read, in full or in part or via some anthology, Sophocles' *Electra*, too; for, it is only on its v. 1385 (P.J. Finglass, *Sophocles. Electra*, Cambridge 2010, 81) that, in the entire *TLG*, the rare word *δυσέριστος*, applied in Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus* (see passage *supra*, § 2.1) to the passionate glory-seekers, is found.

⁹⁹ He probably did so by simply crossing them out on his copy of Euripides' work (or passage) and writing down his own replacements in the margins; see N. Georgantzoglou, "Εν βίβλοις γράφων (D.Chr. 7.102): Dio's 'extempore' Art and Cleanthes' παραδιορθώσεις", *Mnemosyne* 56, 2003, 728-32.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. E., *El.* 360-1: "[...] παρὰ φίλου φίλοι μολόντες ἀνδρός [...]" (Cropp, *Euripides. Electra*, 28).

in the copy with the Euripidean tragedy (or with the Euripidean passage) which he used, the variant ξένοις occurred. However, because πόρνη is the meaning of the base version of φίλος (in feminine), it is quite probable that his copy read “φίλοις”, which presumably triggered his tart humour. This is, for instance, at least at first sight, how the extremely beautiful young woman Theodote answered Socrates’ question about how she earned her livelihood, as reported by Xenophon: “‘Εάν τις’, ἔφη, ‘φίλος μοι γενόμενος εὖ ποιεῖν ἐθέλη, οὗτός μοι βίος ἐστί’” (“If one becomes my boyfriend”, she replied, “and wants to be generous, that’s my livelihood”)¹⁰¹.

Still, the relevant chapter from Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* cannot account for the content of I.562 — not so much because Theodote does not offer herself to anybody as a typical prostitute¹⁰², for she selects her friends, but mainly because Socrates is presented as trying to help Theodote become a better (whatever this may mean) hunter of “friends”¹⁰³, not prevent her rich and enslaved to lust visitors from becoming her “friends”. In the extant literature prior to Cleanthes, the phrase πόρνη διδόναι occurs only once, in one of Alcaeus’ fragments:

Πόρνη δ’ ὃ κέ τις δίδωμι / ___ῖσα κὰ[ς] πολίαις κῦμ’ ἄλλ[ο]ς ἐσβ[ά] λην. / .]πε[.]ε.ις τοῦτ’ οὐκ οἶδεν, ἐ.οι π[.]θην /]σπ[...]αισιν ὀμίλλει, τάδε γίνε[τ]α[ι] / δεύε[ι] μά[λ’] αὐτω πὼ χρήματος [ἄνερο]ν / ___α] ἴσχος κα[ῖ] κα[κ]ό[τα]τ’ ὠλομέν[αν] / πόλλαν. [.....]’[.]των, ψεύδη δε[.....]σαι / .]αι[.]λέ[.....] κάκων ἐσχατ[.....].[] / []νδεμ[.]η ψύχαν ἀκατ[] / ..]αίει δάκ[ρυσιν]· ἅ δ’ οὐ[.]εσο[] / .]αῖ[.]η[...]. δ’ ἄλλοσ[...]. [/ ὅ]τις δεπ[.....]ερα, γ.[/ .]ρει κυμ[.....] ψῦχρ[ο]ν [/ .]ωρέοντ[.....]μμε...

What one gives to a prostitute might as well be thrown into the waves of the grey sea. (If anyone) does not know this, (it is in my power) to persuade him: if a man keeps company with prostitutes, these things happen to him: he must inevitably after the business itself (suffer) disgrace and much accursed misery ... deceives ... the extreme of misery ... soul ... (weeps?) with tears; but she (?) ... to weep (?)... another (man?) ... whoever ... the cold wave (of Hades carries?)¹⁰⁴.

¹⁰¹ X., *Mem.* 3.11.4 (Bandini and Dorion, *Xenophon. Memorabilia. Tome II, 1e partie: Livres II-III*, 101.15-17; E.C. Marchant (tr.) and O.J. Todd (tr.), J. Henderson (rev.), *Xenophon. Memorabilia. Oeconomicus. Symposium. Apology*. Cambridge, MA-London 2013², 259 (translation modified); cf. Socrates’ reformulation of her reply: “[...] φίλων ἀγέλην κεκτηῖσθαι [...]” (*op. cit.* 3.11.5; Bandini and Dorion, *op. cit.*, 101.19).

¹⁰² See Strauss, *Xenophon’s Socrates*, 87.

¹⁰³ Strauss, *Xenophon’s Socrates*, 85-9.

¹⁰⁴ Alc., fr. 117b, ll. 26-39 (E.-V. Voigt, *Sappho et Alcaeus. Fragmenta*, Amsterdam 1971, 224; D.A. Campbell, *Greek Lyric. I: Sappho and Alcaeus*, Cambridge, MA-London 1990², 289-91).

Despite the badly fragmentary state of the text, it is clear that the poet's point is that spending for having sex does not contribute to happiness but results in misery, or, perhaps, is simply part of a miserable life. And, in the last lines, there is probably a reference to death. Likewise, the latter half of Cleanthes' *paradiorthosis* refers to one's death: Cleanthes replaces *σώζειν* (i.e. to intervene so as to restore something damaged or injured to its previous, integer state) with its opposite, *ἐπιτρίβειν* (i.e. to intervene so as to dispatch something damaged or injured)¹⁰⁵.

Secondly, *ἐπιτρίβειν*, which Cleanthes chose among a variety of words with roughly the same meaning, might be meant to be an allusive contradistinction to *τρίβειν* (i.e. to have continuous bodily contact with somebody by means of repeated movements), which is implicitly present in “πόρναις [...] δοῦναι”, being the service offered by them to their clients¹⁰⁶. *Ἐπιτρίβειν* marks the end of life, which comes after the impossibility for one to feel the pleasure of *τρίβειν* (or *ἀνατρίβειν*) a prostitute or *τρίβεσθαι* by her anymore¹⁰⁷.

¹⁰⁵ The earliest extant occurrence of these verbs opposed to each other is in Menander (342/341-c. 290 BC), who antedates Cleanthes: “Καθ’ ἓνα τούτων οἱ θεοὶ ἕκαστον ἐπιτρίβουσιν ἢ σώζουσι; [...] Οὗτος [...] ἐπέτριψεν [...], ἕτερον δ’ ἔσωσεν” (*Epitrepontes* 1090-6; “Do the gods assign each one of these destruction or salvation individually? [...] It brings us down [...], but it's the salvation of another”; S. Ireland, *Menander: The Shield (Aspis) and The Arbitration (Epitrepontes)*, Oxford 2010, 198-9). On *ἐπιτρίβειν* as meaning fatally worsening one's disease, see, e.g., App., *BC* 5.6.59: “[...] ἐς τὴν νόσον ἐμπεισθῆναι, νομιζομένη δὲ καὶ τὴν νόσον ἐκούσα ἐπιτρίψαι [...]” (“she [...] fell sick, and it was thought that she had willingly let herself become victim of her disease [...]”); tr. H. White, *Appian's Roman History. In Four Volumes. With an English Translation. IV: Civil Wars. Books III, Part II-V*, Cambridge, MA-London 1913, 477). The word is used metaphorically, too; see, e.g., Clem. Al., *Protr.* 10.99.1: “Ἐπιτέτριπται δὲ ὑπὸ κενῆς δόξης ἢ συνήθεια [...]” (“Now the evil of current beliefs has got worse by vainglory into the bargain [...]” (Marcovich, *Clementis*, 147.2-3; text according to what most manuscripts read, unnecessarily emended to ‘ἐπιτέθραπται’).

¹⁰⁶ See, e.g., Ar., *V*. 739-40 and 1342-4: “[...] πόρνην, ἥτις τὸ πέος τρίψει / καὶ τὴν ὄσφυν”; “[...] τῆ χειρὶ τοῦδι λαβομένη τοῦ σχοινίου (sc. the phallus). / Ἐχου· φυλάττου δ’, ὡς σαπρὸν τὸ σχοινίον· ὁμως γε μέντοι τριβόμενον οὐκ ἀχθεταί” (D.M. MacDowell, *Aristophanes' Wasps*, Oxford 1971, 83; 113); Zeno of Citium, fr. I.256: “[...] ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ (sc. Zeno) φησιν εἰς τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἰοκάστην καὶ τὸν Οἰδίποδα, ὅτι οὐκ ἦν δεινὸν τρίβειν τὴν μητέρα. Καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀσθενοῦσαν ἕτερον τι μέρος τοῦ σώματος τρίψας ταῖς χερσὶν ὠφέλει, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν· εἰ δὲ ἕτερα μέρη τρίψας εὐφραίνειν, ὀδυνωμένην παύσας, καὶ παιδῆς ἐκ τῆς μητρὸς γενναίους ἐποίησεν, αἰσχρόν;”. — S.E., *M.* 11.191: “Καὶ γε ὁ μὲν Ζήνων, τὰ περὶ τῆς Ἰοκάστης καὶ Οἰδίποδος θεῖς ἱστορούμενα, φησὶν ὅτι οὐκ ἦν δεινὸν τρίψαι τὴν μητέρα. Καί, εἰ μὲν ἀσθενοῦσαν τὸ σῶμα ταῖς χερσὶ τρίψας ὠφέλει, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν· εἰ δὲ ἕτερόν τι μέρος τρίψας ἐφ’ ᾧ εὐφρανόμενὴν παύσας καὶ παιδῆς ἐκ τῆς μητρὸς γενναίους ποιήσας, τί ἦν αἰσχρόν;” — *P.* 3.205: “[...] ὁ Κιτιεὺς Ζήνων φησὶ μὴ ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ μόριον τῆς μητρὸς τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μορίῳ τρίψαι, καθάπερ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι μέρος τοῦ σώματος αὐτῆς τῆ χειρὶ τρίψαι φαῦλον ἂν εἴποι τις εἶναι” (*SVF* I, 60.6-20); Ar., *Ach.* 1147-9: “[...] τῷ δὲ καθεύδειν / μετὰ παιδίσκης ὄρασιότατης, / ἀνατρίβόμενον γε τὸ δαῖνα” (S. Douglas Olson, *Aristophanes' Acharnians*, Oxford 2004, 57; cf. 347 *ad loc.*); Ps.-Hr., *De Semine, Nat. Puer, Morb.* 1.2 and 4.1: “Τριβόμενον δὲ τοῦ αἰδοίου [...] Τῆσι δὲ γυναιξὶ φημι ἐν τῇ μίξει τριβόμενον τοῦ αἰδοίου...” (R. Joly, *Hippocrate. Tome XI: De la génération – De la nature de l'enfant – Des maladies IV – Du foetus de huit mois*, Paris 1970, 44; 46).

¹⁰⁷ Cleanthes regarded pleasure as contributing nothing to happiness (“Κλεάνθης μὲν μήτε κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν ἡδονὴν) εἶναι μήτ’ ἀξίαν ἔχειν αὐτὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καθάπερ δὲ τὸ κάλλυντρον κατὰ φύσιν μὴ εἶναι” (*SVF* I.574, 130.18-20; cf., *inter alia*, R. Brouwer, “Why Human Beings Become Bad.

4.2. CLEANTHES' POINT

Based on the sources of I.562, one can deduce the point of Cleanthes' adaptation of the Euripidean verses from *Electra* as follows. In vv. 421-32, the *persona* of the peasant arranges the issue of providing his rich visitors with food for one day. Echoing Theognis' 1.719-28¹⁰⁸, he says that the satisfaction from filling in one's belly is the same for rich and poor, and this is something he is able to secure for the sake of his unexpected visitors. On the other hand, echoing some of Solon's words addressed to Croesus as reported by Herodotus, he admits that, should he be rich, he would enjoy both the advantage of entertaining when being healthy and of restoring his health when falling into sickness, both of which he finds great¹⁰⁹.

Cleanthes, on his part, adopting Zeno of Citium's classification of riches as morally "indifferent" (namely as something whose possession leads necessarily neither to happiness nor to misery)¹¹⁰, sweeps away all the previous positive assessments of wealth, including the moderate ones, and attacks the one from Euripides' *Electra*. To Cleanthes, thinking, like the *persona* of the peasant and unlike Zeno's doctrine that wealth is morally "indifferent", that *χρήματα* (money and material goods) is of great value is an index of one's suffering from two principal vices, namely, licentiousness (the vice of the appetitive power of our soul) and cowardice (the vice of the irascible power of our soul). Excessive wealth goes as a rule hand-in-hand with lasciviness, as money is easily spent for the sake of bodily pleasures when one is healthy and capable of tasting them, thinking thereby that this is what happiness consists in. Furthermore, in the long run, perpetually using money in this unwise way (i.e. in a way that increases one's pleasant bodily feelings) effeminates, i.e. reduces one's natural resistance to pain. In that case, when illnesses occur (which is not up to one to avoid), the pain caused by them is taken as evil—unlike Zeno's doctrine that this is "indifferent", too¹¹¹—, and misery establishes itself in the human soul. One, Cleanthes implicitly goes on, having come into such a deplorable situation, becomes so unhappy that, by having recourse to money again (which, in tune

The Early Stoic Doctrine of Double Perversion", *Πηγή/Fons* 5, 2020, 61-82, at 72-3). Cf. *supra*, § 3.1.

¹⁰⁸ Young *post* Diehl, *Theognis*, 45; see Cropp, *Euripides. Electra*, 127. Even the positive assessment of riches in *Electra* 427 is clearly a quite close adaptation of the Theognidean verses which precede vv. 719-28:

Thgn. I.717-18	E. <i>El.</i> 427
Ἀλλὰ χρὴ πάντας γνώμην {1} ταύτην καταθέσθαι, / ὥς [3] πλοῦτος {2} πλείστην {5} πᾶσιν {5} ἔχει [4] δύναμιν {6} (D. Young <i>post</i> E. Diehl, <i>ibid.</i>).	“Σκοπῶ {1} τὰ χρήμαθ’ {2} ὥς [3] ἔχει [4] μέγα {5} σθένος {6}”.

¹⁰⁹ Hdt. 1.32.6, ll. 456-63 (N.G. Wilson, *Herodoti Historiae. Tomus prior libros I-IV continens*, Oxford 2015, 20; parallel noted by Cropp, *ibid.*).

¹¹⁰ *SVF* I.190 (47.19-24).

¹¹¹ *SVF* I.190 (47.25).

with his wrong mental habit, is the only thing one deems useful), makes the only available option: he pays in order to rid himself of misery by means of getting rid of his very life, which is the last service that wealth —till the last moment wrongly construed by him as a great good— can render him.

This looks like implicitly accepting some sort of loose connection between the principal vices, somehow mirroring the doctrine of the *concatenatio virtutum principalium*. Just as he who has got one virtue (e.g., *σωφροσύνη/temperantia*) possesses them all¹¹², so he who has got one vice —in the case of I.562, *ἀκολασία/intemperantia*, whose presence in one’s soul is infallibly indicated by avarice, i.e. one’s considering wealth as good, pursuing it and putting it in the service of one’s passions— is in principle vulnerable to all¹¹³. This idea looks like an expansion of the doctrine of *γενικὰ πάθη* (see above, § 2.2.3, n. 53) and fits with Cleanthes’ well-known moral rigorism, which does not leave room for anything between virtue and vice¹¹⁴. Clearly, Cleanthes does not say that having one vice implies possessing them all; as seen (§ 2.1), he says that each of the vicious men has a propensity for a concrete vice. Still, as it is the presence or absence of *φρόνησις* that stands in the root of having or lacking all virtues and makes one *σώφρων* or not, lacking *φρόνησις* implies potentially having any vice, the appearance of this or that “general passion” and this or that of the specific vices falling under each of the general passions presumably depending on circumstances external to the soul itself, such as health or sickness and wealth or poverty, as implied in I.562.

4.3. CONCLUSION

The point of Cleanthes’ ironic *paradiorthosis* clearly fits with his and Socrates’ consideration of “virtue” as necessary and sufficient cause of happiness, with riches and the pleasure they provide placed outside the sphere of happiness. His *paradiorthosis* was probably made with recurrence to some verses from Alcaeus; this fits with the fact that Cleanthes, like Zeno and Chrysippus, but also like Plato, considered poetic literature partly converging to, and partly diverging from,

¹¹² This doctrine is explicitly held by Chrysippus (*SVF* II.349, 121.7; III.275, 67.44-5). As known, the idea appears already in Plato’s *Protagoras* 392E2-4 (see, e.g., G. Vlastos, “The Unity of Virtues in the *Protagoras*”; Study No 10 in G. Vlastos, *Platonic Studies*, Princeton 1973, 221-69).

¹¹³ Could Cleanthes have been inspired by Plato’s view that extreme riches are incompatible with moral integrity in the context of his identification of one’s being happy (*εὐδαιμόνιον*) with one’s being morally integer (*ἀγαθός*) in *Lg.* 5.742E4-743C6? *Non liquet*. In this long passage, Plato’s “τοὺς κεκτημένους ἐν ὀλίγοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων πλείστου νομίματα ἄξια κτήματα, ἃ καὶ κακός τις κεκτηῖτ’ ἄν” clearly echoes the full Theognidean distich partly quoted above (§ 2.1) (“*Χρήματα μὲν δαίμων καὶ παγκάκῳ ἀνδρὶ δίδωσιν, / Κύρην· ἀρετῆς δ’ ὀλίγοις ἀνδράσι μοῖρ’ ἔπεται*”), which engrafts the passage onto Cleanthes’ possible sources of inspiration. Still, a mere *paradiorthosis* does not suffice to substantiate dependence on Plato’s passage, which, after all, offers a very concrete explanation of the incompatibility of riches possession with moral goodness, which differs from the theoretical reconstruction of Cleanthes’ disregarding wealth offered here as an account for I.562.

¹¹⁴ *SVF* I.566 (129.17-18).

truth¹¹⁵. For Cleanthes, discerning between what is right and what is wrong in the morality expressed by poets is possible only by means of philosophizing, as I.559 and I.560 exhorted people to do. On the other hand, the very confection of a *paradiorthosis* of a verse as well as the very production of poetic items by Cleanthes himself shows that he was quite at ease with putting poetic speech in the service of the task of expressing and disseminating truth and morality. In this sense, Cleanthes' pieces of poetry can be seen as instances of *paradiorthosis* of Greek poetry in general; he put the verse form in the service of the right doctrinal content¹¹⁶, by replacing the errors on the divine, man, morality etc. contained in Greek poetry with (philosophical) truth. This is, for instance, what he did in his *Hymn to Zeus*, which, as has been revealed to a large extent by scholarship, is full of allusions to the wording and ideas from previous poetic works.

5. FURTHER CONCLUSIONS

5.1. CLEANTHES AND SOCRATES

It has been repeatedly remarked that the ethics of the early Stoics were consonant to the “Geist des Sokrates”¹¹⁷. As shown here, as far as Cleanthes is concerned, this is more true and certain than established so far: Cleanthes, both in his single explicit appeal to Socrates' authority and in the several cases of implicitly adopting Socrates' ideas, was directly based on the *littera Socratis*, so to speak, namely on certain texts by Xenophon and Plato, which he meticulously used as sources for producing certain of his own texts of ethics.

5.2. CLEANTHES' LITERARY SOURCES: FLORILEGES?

Cleanthes arrived at Athens probably in 281/280 BC¹¹⁸. From the philological point of view, his meticulous reception of the diction of specific passages from the *corpus Platonium* suggests that, by the mid-3rd century BC, which is his *floruit*, Plato's (c. 429-347 BC) works had already been considered ‘classics’; and it would not be implausible to think that these instances were not the only ones among the Stoics and, perhaps, among the authors of other philosophical sects. After all, confecting anthologies goes back to the 5th century AD; Hippias is reported to have produced the earliest testified Greek anthology, entitled *Συναγωγή*, and, as has been demonstrated¹¹⁹, this work was quite probably one of Chrysippus' sources regarding

¹¹⁵ See, e.g., Pl. *Lg.* 7.801B10-C1: “[...] τὸ τῶν ποιητῶν γένος οὐ πᾶν ἰκανόν ἐστι γινώσκειν σφόδρα τὰ τε ἀγαθὰ καὶ μὴ [...]”.

¹¹⁶ See, e.g., Tieleman, *Galen and Chrysippus*, 220.

¹¹⁷ M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung*, Göttingen 1992² (1949¹), 120.

¹¹⁸ C. Guérard and F. Queyrel, “Cléanthe d’Assos” (No 138), in R. Goulet, ed., *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, Paris 1994, II, 409.

¹¹⁹ See J. Mansfeld, “Aristotle and Others on Thales, or the Beginnings of Natural Philosophy (With Some Remarks on Xenophanes)”, *Mnemosyne* 38, 1985, 109-29, at 126; G.E. de Gante Dávila, *Ἰππίας ὁ πολυμαθής: Estudio sobre el sofista Hipias de Ilide*, Universidad Panamericana, Facultad de Filosofía, Ciudad de México 2018, 83-92 (Tesis para obtener el grado de Maestro en Filosofía Antigua).

Greek poetry. Likewise, a well-known passage from Plato's *Laws* reports the existence of collections of maxims thematically arranged, used for educational purposes¹²⁰. Assuming that Cleanthes used such collections is rather necessary for accounting cases such as his I.559 (see above, § 2.1). Drawing some vocabulary almost exclusively from *Crito* (45C3-48D6; 49C11-D2) and slightly enriching it with only a couple of words occurring in a thematically similar passage from *Laches* (184D5-E9) can more plausibly be explained by assuming that Cleanthes met with the latter figuring close—even next—to the former in some anthology rather than that he picked up this couple of words from *Laches* after reading through the *corpus Platonicum* and locating the passage. Assuming that Cleanthes took pains in making such a pre-work for producing all of his Plato-based texts and bringing together passages from the *corpus Platonicum* some of which have not so far been noticed as parallels (or as sources for each other) by modern scholarship is tantamount to say that he confected a private, so to speak, anthology standing at the backstage of every single case of this type, which looks, however one may trust the report about Cleanthes' proverbial laboriousness¹²¹, rather absurd.

Be that as it may, from the above detailed examination of the Cleanthean passages it is clear that texts, especially Atticizing texts, were literally written on the basis of Attic texts and that their content can be safely discerned only after detecting their text sources as accurately and certainly as possible¹²².

¹²⁰ Pl., *Lg.* 7.810E6-811A5: “[...] ποιηταὶ τε ἡμῖν εἰσὶν τινες ἐπῶν [...] πάμπολλοι [...], [...], ἐν οἷς φασι δεῖν οἱ πολλὰκις μυριοὶ τοῦς ὀρθῶς παιδευομένους τῶν νέων τρέφειν καὶ διακορεῖς ποιεῖν, πολυηκόους τ’ ἐν ταῖς ἀναγνώσεσιν ποιούντας καὶ πολυμαθεῖς, ὅλους ποιητὰς ἐκμανθάνοντας· οἱ δὲ ἐκ πάντων κεφάλαια ἐκλέξαντες καὶ τινὰς ὅλας ῥήσεις εἰς ταῦτόν συναγαγόντες, ἐκμανθάνειν φασι δεῖν εἰς μνήμην τιθεμένους, εἰ μέλλει τις ἀγαθὸς ἡμῖν καὶ σοφὸς ἐκ πολυπειρίας καὶ πολυμαθίας γενέσθαι”. See the discussion of this passage, along with many others, by D. Constan (“Excerpting as a Reading Practice”, in G. Reydam-Schils, ed., *Thinking Through Excerpts: Studies on Stobaeus*, Turnhout 2011, 9-22).

¹²¹ “Διεβοήθη δὲ ἐπὶ φιλοπονίᾳ [...]” (*SVF* I.463, 103.7).

¹²² Did any of the sources of Cleanthes' fragments detected above find their way to any florilege confected, perhaps for educational purposes, by Cleanthes himself? I am referring to his lost work entitled *Περὶ χρεῶν* (*SVF* I.481; 107.38). D.M. Searby, in his recent list of ancient (Hellenistic in their majority) writings in whose titles the word *χρεία* occurs, includes Cleanthes' writing, although he remarks that “the title attributed to Cleanthes was surely not a collection of *chreiai* but a treatise about *chreiai* in one of the senses of the word” (“The Fossilized Meaning of *Chreia* as Anecdote”, *Mnemosyne* 72, 2019, 197-228, at 205-6). The title, taken in its actual form, definitely means so. However, it may have been the case that the title that came down to the unknown source of Diogenes Laertius' list of Cleanthes' writings was a conflation of the extremely common for treatise titles formula *περὶ* + *gen.* with the equally common in work titles genitive followed by the number of books a writing was divided to, which, in the case of Cleanthes' collection of *χρεῖαι*, was one (like, e.g., Demetrius of Phaleron's *Χρεῶν α'*; F. Wehrli, *Demetrios von Phaleron*, Basel 1968², 22.3, fr. 74, item 45) and, as a consequence, some time in the long run of the tradition from Cleanthes to Laertius was excised. With regard to work titles, nominative and *περὶ* + *gen.* were sometimes alternatives and at any rate equivalent; see, e.g., Cleanthes' (and others') *Περὶ νόμων* (*SVF* I.481; 107.22), whose reference can hardly be taken as different from, say, the nominative in Plato's (and others') *Νόμοι*. And Chrysippus' *Περὶ τῶν ἐτυμολογικῶν πρὸς Διοκλέα α' β' γ' δ' ε' ζ' ζ'* does not refer to a subject matter different from what his *Ἐτυμολογικῶν πρὸς Διοκλέα α' β' γ' δ'* (*SVF* II.13; 9.13-14) treats of.

APPENDIX: AN ECHO OF SVF I.559 IN EUSEBIUS OF CAESAREA

To my knowledge, so far it has passed unnoticed that Clement, in his *Stromata*, alludes to I.559 at the opening paragraph of the chapter next to the one where the fragment is preserved (see *supra*, § 2.1):

Τὸ γὰρ συνετὸν [b] ἢ {c} τοι τὸ δίκαιον [d] ὁ πολὺς [e] οὗτος ὄχλος
 {e} [sc. the Hellenes] οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν ἂν ἡσθῆ,
 δοκιμάζει. Ἦδοιτο δ' ἂν οὐχ ἑτέροις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ὁμοίοις αὐτοῦ·
 [...] οὐ ζύνεσιν [f1-2] ἔχον [g] οὐδὲ φιλοθεάμονος ψυχῆς ὄψιν {a}
 ἀθαμβῆ τε καὶ ὀζυδερκῆ [...].

For intelligence or rectitude this great crowd estimates not by truth, but by what they are delighted with. And they will not be pleased with other things, but with what is like themselves; [...] not having understanding, or the undazzled and keen vision of the contemplative soul¹²³.

These lines are an explanation of Clement's previous line: "[...] ἐγχειρῶμεν αὐτοῖς [sc. τοῖς Ἑλλησιν], ὡς ἀκούειν πεφύκασι" ("[...] let us [sc. the Christians] treat them [sc. the Hellenes] as they are capable of hearing"). Let it be noted that Clement, unlike Cleanthes, who exhorts people to investigate into the truth on their own, appeals to the ignorance of the people in order to justify the cryptic or allusive or allegorical expression of the real truth to the masses, which is used both in the Jewish, pagan and Christian tradition. For Clement, it is not that one has more chances to convince the average man by using what one's addressee is already familiar with; rather, one has no chance to pass on him the truth in its genuine form at all, and this entails that one should only address the multitude in oblique ways.

Did the lines somehow reflect the part from Cleanthes' poem omitted by Clement as well? *Non liquet*. A specific element echoed, however, is easily discernible in the four verses which Clement does quote, namely that most individuals let themselves be subjected to established opinions ("ὁ πολὺς οὗτος ὄχλος"; "τοῖς ὁμοίοις αὐτοῦ"), whereas he who aspires for wisdom ought fearlessly, i.e. despite the fact that he will most probably displease and even irritate people, differentiating himself by judging things on his own (cf. "[...] ἑτέροις [...]")¹²⁴.

Of course, even if conceded that this is what happened with the title of Cleanthes' writing, no tangible evidence suggests that we should answer the above question in the positive.

¹²³ Clem. Al., *Strom.* 5.4.19.1-2 (Stählin et al., *Clemens*, 338.29-23; de Boulluec, *Clément. Stromate V*, 56.5-7; I change "ἦτοι", which means "namely" and makes no sense here, to "ἢ τοι", which means "or" and "and... etc."); tr. Ph. Schaff (ausp.), *The Ante-Nicene*, 949, slightly modified.

¹²⁴ This study is a fruit of my participation in the online seminar for the production of an annotated Modern Greek translation of Cleanthes' extant fragments, organized and conducted by Dr. Maria Protopapas-Marneli, Director of the Research Centre for Greek Philosophy, The Academy of Athens (2020/21-2021/22). I am grateful to the organizer and the numerous participants for helping and inspiring me throughout my exploration. My gratitude to Dr. Charalambos Dendrinos (Director, The Hellenic Institute, Royal Holloway, University of London), too, for patiently improving my English.