European Economic Governance And Its Impact On The Collective
Bargaining System: The Italian Case
ISSN 2173-6812
VOL. 34, (2016)
pp. 25-34
Labour Issues.
Iberoamerican Journal of Industrial Relations
Palabras clave
Decentralization; Collective bargaining;
Union representation.
The new economic governance has pursued
a radical decentralisation of collective bargain-
ing. The European system of economic policies
represents a new model that can be described
as new European interventionism and marks a
paradigm change in the EU’s approach to col-
lective bargaining to direct political interven-
tion in national bargaining outcomes and pro-
cedures. The European economic governance
pressure was very clearly on Italy, where the
industrial relations system is strongly under
pressure, since the “secret” letter sent from the
ECB to Italy on August 5th, 2011, which imme-
diately inuenced both Italian legislator and so-
cial parties. This paper focuses on the trends
of the Italian rm-level bargaining system from
the perspective of the subjects who negotiate
and the agreements’ effectiveness. In relation
to the subjects, in Italy this pressure resulted in
the adoption of the majority principle. From an-
other point of view, in Italy, until the end of last
century, the national-level collective agreement
seemed to be ‘inviolable’, inserted as it was in
a context of absolute centrality. If this was the
traditional approach, in recent years the Ital-
ian system has experienced a shift away from
the model, where the legal support has been
combined with a ‘deconstruction’ of collective
regulation. Here we will briey consider these
more recent dynamics, in particular by the in-
tervention made by the Italian legislator with the
so-called economic manoeuvre of August 2011
(Legislative Decree No. 138/2011, converted by
Law No. 148/2011), which, in a framework of
progressive fragmentation of labour relations,
changed traditional attitudes.
Fecha recePción:
Fecha revisión:
Fecha acePtación:
Fecha Publicación:
* The paper is the result of a shared reection, although paragraphs n. 1 and 2 were written by
Maria Dolores Ferrara and paragraph n. 3 and 4 by Roberta Nunin.
** Maria Dolores Ferrara, Researcher in Labour Law at University of Trieste (Italy)
*** Roberta Nunin, Associate professor in Labour Law at University of Trieste (Italy)
[2173-6812 (2016) 34, 25-34]
1. The new European economic governance and the collective
bargaining models.
The European system of economic governance represents a new model of European poli-
cies and, at same time, a paradigm change in the EU’s approach to collective bargaining as
a result of the “European Semester” mechanism. Every year the EU issues policy recom-
mendations for all EU Member States on the basis of a detailed economic analysis. These
prescriptions must then be transposed into national reform programmes, whose effectiveness
will again be assessed by the EU. As a consequence, in numerous European States the most
relevant changes have concerned collective bargaining following the recommendations of the
European institutions (Schulten, Muller, 2015: 331). In particular, the new economic govern-
ance has pursued a radical decentralisation of collective bargaining, representing a new model
of European policies that can be described as new European interventionism. This archetype
was based on the same strategy of a radical decentralisation of collective bargaining in all
cases, even if in many countries this model of collective bargaining is irrespective of specic
national traditions and structures of industrial relations. In the case of Italy, it is possible to
observe an evolution of these recommendations. At beginning, the EU limited the intervention
prescribing recommendations about the “content” of the rm-level collective agreements. In the
2011, in fact, the EU Council recommended that Italy took action to “ensure that wage growth
better reects productivity developments as well as local and rm conditions, including clauses
that could allow rm level bargaining to proceed in this direction”
. Recently, the intervention
concerns also the institutional aspects. In 2015 recommendations, the Council endorses that
Italy takes action “to promote, in consultation with the social partners and in accordance with
1. See EU Council Recommendation of 12 July 2011 on the National Reform Programme 2011
of Italy and delivering a Council opinion on the updated Stability Programme of Italy, 2011-2014
(2011/C 215/02).
national practices, an effective framework for second-level contractual bargaining”
. It is clear
that this intervention concerns the necessity to x the procedures of the second-level collec-
tive bargaining, not only the content of these agreements. In particular, this paper focuses on
the trends of the Italian rm-level bargaining system from the perspective of the subjects who
negotiates and the agreements’ effectiveness.
2. The Italian rm-level bargaining system: the subjects.
The European economic governance pressure was very clearly on Italy, where the
industrial relations system is strongly under pressure, since the “secret” letter sent from
the ECB to Italy on August 5th, 2011, which immediately inuenced both Italian legislator
and social parties. In relation to the subjects, in Italy this pressure resulted in the adoption
of the majority principle. In the private sector the criteria for measuring the union repre-
sentation are not set by legislative rules, but are based on the associative spread and the
organizational diffusion of each trade union.
The lack of any legal provision for collective bargaining has become a major charac-
teristic of Italian industrial relations, as the pressure to implement Article 39 of the Italian
Constitution has declined. As is known, the second part of this article provides for the
registration of trade unions and employers’ association, and the consequent recognition of
their legal personality as a prerequisite to allowing them the power to conclude collective
agreements binding on all employees.
Free from legal schemes and regulations, collective bargaining has been able to adapt
more easily to the radical changes in economic and technological conditions which happened
in the post war period. In particular, the non-implementation of the procedure of the Article
39, developed exclusively on national bargaining and chiey concerned with the extension
of collective agreements, has facilitated the decentralisation of bargaining (Treu, 2014: 195).
Nevertheless, this collective laissez-faire has been a factor of instability and of unpre-
dictability in industrial relations. The “de facto” representative system began to enter into
crisis from 2010, due to the disagreement over Union unity and the underwriting of sepa-
rate collective agreements. The well-known story of the dispute between Fiat Chrysler Au-
tomobiles and the metalworkers’ Union Fiom was the symbol of this crisis. The existence
of separate agreements for the main Italian industrial group (Fiat), not signed by Fiom and
as the previous (unitary and more favourable to workers) was still in force (Ales, 2011),
caused signicant problems and could represent a more generalized tendency. Without
the consent of Fiom, the company introduced downward derogations on pauses, working
2. See EU Council Recommendation of 12 July 2015 on the 2015 National Reform Programme 2011
of Italy and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Stability Programme of Italy, (2015/C 272/16).
time shifts and overtime, as well as limitations to the rights to strike. New companies were
virtually created, where all workers had to apply for the job. In order to denitively exclude
Fiom from all its plants, Fiat even left the national employers’ association and signed a
rst-level agreement apart from the national metal worker’s agreement. For re-establishing
co-operative relations, the social partners gradually started to recover the unity at least
in relations to the rules framework. Then, to avoid a legislative intervention, in 2011 and
in 2013 the trade unions signed two important agreements where set relevant provisions
concerning the realization of a regulated industrial relations system, establishing, among
the other things, a system for measuring trade unions representativeness. It was neces-
sary to prevent a further legislative initiative. In fact, as discussed in the following paragra-
ph, the article 8 of the law n. 148 of 2011 was already the immediate answer of the Italian
government to the European Central Bank letter. Regarding the subjects, the article 8 has
relevant critical issues. The important regulatory competence, which will be examined in
the following pages, is attributed to trade unions generically described as “most represen-
tatives at national or local level” or “their representatives at enterprise level”. This ambigui-
ty was the most important reason that induced Italian trade unions to continue their efforts
in the direction of a better self-regulation.
Subsequently, these agreements converged in a single contract. In 2014 the major
representative Italian Confederation Union and the employers’ Association of the manu-
facturing sector signed an important agreement on union representation (T.U.-Testo Unico
sulla Rappresentanza, Conndustria-CGIL, CISL, UIL of 10 January 2014) (Carinci, 2014;
Del Punta, 2014; Di Stasi, 2014; Barbieri, 2014; Garilli, 2015; Ferraro, 2014; Giorgi, 2015).
In this contract the social parties adopt the majority principle. At national level, the repre-
sentativeness now is measured through a double system, calculating a mix number of
members and votes obtained in the works councils (RSU) elections. The trade unions are
admitted to the national negotiation tables if they have a representation level within the ca-
tegory, namely the relevant workforce, of not less than 5%. Then, the collective bargaining
subscribed by not less than 50% plus one of the relevant workfare is binding for all, also for
the dissenting workers and organizations. Anyhow, workers have the right to be consulted
in useful time on the draft agreement and their vote has to be kept in consideration by their
unions before to sign. Then the sanctions could be given to those dissenting organizations
that do not adequate to the will of the majority and they will be decided into the sectorial
agreements and will consist in economic penalties or in a strong restriction of access to
the unions’ facilities.
With regard to the rm-level agreements, the contract subscribed to by the majority
members of RSU, which are an employee elective representative body, is effective and
binding for all the workers and for the Unions as expression of the Confederations which
signed the Testo Unico. If in the company there aren’t RSUs, but there are RSA, which are
an employee non-elective representative body, the contract is binding if it is adopted by the
RSA established within the unions that have the majority of the members. In this case, for
the purpose of guaranteeing the democracy principle, the contract signed by RSA should
be submitted to a conrmative referendum of employees and the agreement is rejected
by the vote of a simple majority of workers. It is important to underline that these rules are
not law and they are not binding on all trade unions or all employees. Moreover, within the
trade Unions and employer associations that signed the agreement of 2014 the concrete
application of these rules is slow, considering that this system has the limit to cover only
the industrial sector at the moment. However, this model is crucial because the Italian
majority representative Confederations endorse it and, at same time, it is the paradigm
for the legislator too as it is possible to deduce from the draft bills on the issue of union
representativeness currently being discussed in Parliament. It is clear that the numerical
measurement (trough the electoral data or the number of members) is certainly an instru-
ment for photographing the unions’ consensus. Anyway, there are critical issues in relation
to institutional, technical and practical aspects.
From an institutional point of view, generally speaking, the majority principle, without
any sort of corrections, does not take into account the value of dissenting opinion as ex-
pression of the union freedom afrmed by the art. 39 of the Italian Constitution, a value
that was also strongly afrmed in a recent important sentence by the Italian Constitutional
Court in the case of Fiom versus Fiat (sent. n. 231/2013) (De Luca Tamajo, 2014). Accor-
ding to the Court, the principle that only trade unions which had signed a collective agree-
ment applied in the enterprise could benet of the important rights (assembly, referendum,
billposting etc…) (article 19 of the law n. 300/1970), it cannot be any more adopted, due to
the unions tendency of doing separate agreements. It could happen that the participative,
but dissenting, trade unions could lose their rights if they do not accept the contractual
conditions and do not sign the agreement. To avoid this effect, in the opinion of the Italian
Constitutional Court any trade union participating to the negotiation table should benets
of the mentioned facilities.
Besides, from a techno-legal perspective the adoption of this archetype could encoun-
ter various difculties. On the one hand, the individuation of the “category” within is ne-
cessary to verify the majority could be very complex, given that that there is an increase
expansion of collective rules even if there is no coherence between the concrete company
activity and the traditional eld of the productivity category. In other words, it is necessary
that the interest group is uniform so that the numerical measurement operates in a correct
way (Bavaro, 2014: 19). On the other hand, the second-level of collective bargaining is not
compulsory: social partners can negotiate at that level but are not obliged to. In practice,
depending on the existence of works councils and on the power relations in each rm or
plant whether signicant negotiations may take place. Second-level agreements are al-
[2173-6812 (2016) 34, 25-34]
most absent among small enterprises. According a specic analysis (Leonardi, 2014: 72),
recently decentralized bargaining covered approximately 54% of workforces in enterprises
with more than 20 workers. These rms accounted for over 70% of employees in manufac-
turing industry, and almost 60% in the area of non-nancial sector. In the small and medium
enterprises the coverage is esteemed to be far below that threshold. In this regard, it is not
possible to ignore that the Italian productivity system is based on the small and medium
enterprises, where often there are not work councils and the decentralized bargaining
could be done by trade unions without any numerical and certied measurement of their
representativeness, through the employer recognition as negotiating partners. In addition
the same rules of the T.U. could represent an obstacle to diffusion of work councils, and
in particular of the RSU, because the passage from the RSA to the RSU (important for
the election measurement) could only happen with the unanimous consensus of the trade
unions belonging to the confederations that signed the T.U., thus limiting the spread of an
instrument (RSU) crucial for the union representativeness measurement.
Finally, from a practical point of view, this system requires a specic coordination and
collaboration between employers and various institutions in order to collect the data about
the election results and the number of members that, to our knowledge, in Italy are still a
long way off.
3. Recent trends in Italian collective bargaining
policies and practice.
In recent years the subject of collective bargaining has been hampered in Italy by an
important legislative intervention that has signicantly altered the traditional relationship
between the ‘weight’ of national collective labour contracts and decentralised bargaining,
as well as, in parallel, the attitude of the rules concerning non-derogability/derogability in
the basic relationship between collective agreements and legislation.
In Italy, until the end of last century, the national-level collective agreement seemed to
be ‘inviolable’, inserted as it was in a context of absolute centrality, as well as assured an
undisputed domain of the negotiating system, with the recognised prerogative to regulate
the different categories of association, as a sign of positive and spontaneous dynamics,
and this in tribute to the principle of ‘mutual recognition’ typical of the theory of inter-trade
union rules. If this was the traditional approach, in recent years the Italian system has ex-
perienced a shift away from the model, where the legal support has been combined with a
‘deconstruction’ of collective regulation.
Here we will briey consider these more recent dynamics, in particular by the interven-
tion made by the Italian legislator with the so-called economic manoeuvre of August 2011
(see Legislative Decree No. 138/2011, converted with amendments by Law No. 148/2011),
which, in a framework of progressive destabilisation and fragmentation of labour relations,
changed traditional attitudes, highlighting a substantial distrust in its persistent regulatory
power. Article 8 of Law No. 148, in fact, entitled “Support for proximity collective bargai-
ningwas qualied by early commentators as a regulation with a potentially «disruptive»
(Pessi, 2011: 537) and destabilising capacity with respect to the Italian employment law
system. It contributed (and is contributing) to the emergence of a new negotiation system,
at decentralised level, much more structured and much more varied than it was until very
recently, with a clear reversal of the game rules in relations between collective labour
agreements, broken down into different levels of competence (process accompanied by a
progressive weakening of legal safeguards).
This article provides that: «1. Collective labour agreements signed at company or te-
rritorial level, or by workers’ associations comparatively more representative on national
or territorial level or by their trade union representatives operating in the company (…)
can carry out specic agreements with efcacy in respect of all workers interested on the
condition that they are signed on the basis of a majority criterion concerning the above-
mentioned trade union representatives, aimed at increasing employment, the quality of the
work contracts, the adoption of forms of worker participation, the emergence of irregular
work, increments in competitiveness and wage levels, company crisis and employment
management, investments and the launch of new activities.
2. The specic agreements referred to in paragraph 1 may affect the regulation of mat-
ters concerning the organisation of work and production with reference to: (a) audio-visual
equipment and the introduction of new technologies; (b) workers tasks, the classication
and grading of staff; and (c) xed-term contracts, reduced, modular or exible hours con-
tracts, with solidarity in procurement and in cases of recourse to an employment agen-
cy; (d) the discipline of working hours; (e) the recruitment method and discipline of the
employment relationship including coordinated and ongoing collaborations on a project
and VAT numbers, the transformation and conversion of employment contracts, and the
consequences of withdrawing from the employment relationship, exception is made for
discriminatory dismissal, dismissal of a female worker coinciding with marriage, dismissal
at the beginning of the pregnancy period until the end of the periods of being prohibited
from working, as well as until the child is one year old, dismissal caused by a request or
the taking of parental leave and for the child’s illness by the male or female worker and
dismissal in the event of adoption or custody.
2-bis. Without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution, as well as the constra-
ints imposed by Community legislation and international labour conventions, the specic
agreements referred to in paragraph 1 also work by way of derogation from the legal pro-
visions governing matters covered in paragraph 2 and the related regulations contained in
national collective work contracts. (…)» (our translation).
By briey skimming through the text of the regulation, a legislative option is immediately
obvious (also accepted with very critical evaluations of a substantial part of Italian emplo-
yment law doctrine: see, e.g., Carinci 2012; Perulli, Speziale 2011; Veneziani 2012; Bar-
bieri, 2012; Ferraro, 2012; Alleva, 2012; Garilli, 2012; Scarpelli, 2012; Lassandari, 2012,
Gottardi, 2012; Carabelli, 2012) for possible exibility of the regulations governing the
individual work relationship carried out by granting the social partners - under certain con-
ditions - (extensive) powers of derogation, even worse, with the instrument of proximity
bargaining, compared with many proles regulated not only by collective bargaining at
national level, but also by the same legislature.
With this in mind, the perplexities of those who emphasise the ambiguity of a system
that, while leaving art. 39 of the Constitution unimplemented, at the point of subjective
efcacy of the collective agreement, it nishes by now ensuring a derogatory effectiveness
to proximity contracts by means of an ordinary law, can be understood. Certainly, for sti-
pulations to be enabled in derogation of which it has been said, the trade unions must still
be “comparatively more nationally or territorially representative”. Therefore, the expression
originally used in art. 8, where it talks about collective agreements signed “by” (and not
by (plural)”) comparatively more representative associations, without a shadow of a doubt
legitimising the ‘activation’ of the system of exceptions shown above «also at the prero-
gative of a single association» (Romeo, 2014, 881), must now be corrected in the light of
art. 7 of Law No. 99/2013 (conversion of Legislative Decree No. 76/2013) that, by invoking
the power of company-level agreements to structure exceptions to national bargaining,
species the need for the former to be concluded “by workers’ and employers’ trade unions
comparatively more representative on a national level”.
The legislator’s option for a change of collective bargaining at company level suffers
from an emergency logic attributable in the rst place to the desire to stop the haemorrhag-
ing of the employed caused by the crisis, betting on the bargaining instrument in deroga-
tion as a possible means of containing redundancies to cut staff. Moreover, as underlined
by a scholar (Sciarra, 2006), one cannot help but notice how the push toward the decen-
tralisation of bargaining has affected many European industrial relations systems for some
time now: even Italy, with choices recent made, it becomes part of this mainstream. In spite
of this, we share the concerns of those who recently observed how, if, on the one hand, the
uniforming push to standardise globalisation processes ends up shaping negotiating struc-
tures in the direction of an ever-greater decentralisation that respond to market needs, on
the other hand, in the presence of a prolonged crisis, it reveals the risk that a gradual ero-
sion of collective bargaining systems involves (Guarriello, 2012: 355-356).
The question remains of what have the consequences been to date of art. 8 of Law 148,
in the light of a repeatedly afrmed maximum opposition to the trade union organisations to
take advantage of the regulation’s expectations. The lack of an ofcial and complete data-
base of second-level bargaining is not an insignicant obstacle for those who wish to tackle
this subject. However, some elements for a rst evaluation may also be taken from the quali-
quantitative analysis by the CISL (Italian Confederation of Trade Unions) using data from
the Observatory of Second-Level Bargaining (OCSEL). In an initial report (Cisl, 2014) for the
years 2009-2012 (so largely attributable to a period prior to the entry into force of art. 8) it
should be noted that, out of 2402 agreements surveyed (89% of which were company-level
agreements, 10% territorial agreements and 1% sectoral), only 5% are attributable to the
category of agreements with exemptions, regarding exemption matters in a higher percent-
age the organisation of work (71%) and, to follow, working hours (65%), salary (62%) and job
classication (13%). An analysis of the data carried out by the CISL also shows a signicant
slowdown in the period of all innovative contractual practices regarding – for example – wel-
fare, participation, training, organisational innovation and equal opportunities, and looking at
the last topic a scholar has recently pointed out the permanent difculties in Italy of consoli-
dating a stable bargaining model, capable of integrating the legislative policies on the subject
of equal opportunities (Ferrara, 2014: 519).
As has been noticed recently - and as emerges from informal discussions with those
who operate within the framework of industrial relations (trade unionists, labour consultants,
employment law lawyers, representatives of employers’ associations) - the feeling that you
get is that «exceptions are being made, but they are not mentioned» (Imberti, 2014) and that
the bargaining decentralised at the time of the crisis has in a signicant number of cases
taken parallel paths than those provided for in art. 8 to arrive at basically the same results,
i.e. departing not only from the Italian national collective labour contracts, but also from
some relevant legislation (Imberti, 2014: 256), while news has emerged of a few company
contracts concluded explicitly departing from art. 8 (Bavaro, 2012: 159), all, however, relating
to companies of signicant size. It can be lexically more fascinating to talk about “pathways
to stabilisation” or “expansive solidarity” contracts rather than “agreements with exceptions”.
Certainly, the lack of a reference to art. 8 tries to ‘undermine’ the symbolic value, attributable
to the signicant extent of possible exceptions as mentioned above. However, the fact that
this «karst» (Imberti, 2014: 268) decentralised bargaining continues to be largely reduced to
an “exception to the rule”, which is useful to deal with the specic case (company), but not
likely to rise to the rank of a general rule, does not detract from - indeed it accentuates - the
feeling that Italy is now in an obvious process of ‘rebalancing’ the equilibria of collective bar-
gaining, with the company negotiation level denitively given a role of new leadership, which
is more pragmatic and stripped of ideology, but from the results it is still uncertain and with
the risks associated with the emergence of a sort of «trade union localism» (Scarpelli, 2011).
4. Towards new interactions among social partners? - Decentralised bargaining also in-
volves a (possible) level of territorial bargaining, with different models of interaction among
social parties, local Governments and/or other agents operating on a specic territory
(Regalia, 2015; Scarponi, 2015; Zoppoli, 2015), that could play a signicant role in the fu-
[2173-6812 (2016) 34, 25-34]
ture particularly for smaller and medium-size enterprises: in fact, in a territorial logic, these
kinds of negotiations should strive to intercept and support the productive interests of the
territorial community in the name of an broader and shared economic and social growth
plan (Vergari, 2014) from which smaller sized actors could certainly benet. Just think, in
this regard, about the interesting experiences in Italy of artisan ‘bilateralism’ bilateralità
artigiana»), in its regional dislocation, albeit with sharp territorial differences that see a
use for the instrument (and even the presence of bilateral institutions) dotted around, with
a strong prevalence of experience in the central/northern area of Italy [on this topic see
Nogler (a cura di), 2014]. More generally, the scope of these territorial bargaining activities
could allow not only the proles of organisational exibility to be increased – with respect
to which, however, with the choices made recently by the Italian legislator with the adop-
tion of the so-called Jobs Act (2015) many regulatory constraints have now been denitely
loosened (see Nunin 2016) – but also, in an approach more attentive to the needs of work-
ers, to build a possible ‘additional basket’ of welfare tools for use at company level (for
example, with the offer of services to families and to people, healthcare support, help with
the costs of educating children, family life-work balance, public transport support, etc.), as
well as to encourage investment in training, as a rule not only inadequate, but completely
absent (with the exception of training on workplace safety, statutorily required) in the ‘cir-
cuit’ of small employers, although in this area the need to enhance the technological level
is often felt to maintain competitiveness.
Of course, these are interventions that also call into question a regulatory support
activity, for example the work of regional legislator, called on to devise instruments that
promote the system of contributing to these welfare interventions and support the con-
clusion at company level of agreements such as, for example, those dedicated to imple-
menting the care services offered to workers, an indispensable tool for balancing work
and family life. Under the prole above, an important ground for second-level bargaining
– unfortunately rarely undertaken these days – is the link between gender policies and
those of corporate welfare; as recently observed, this theme calls into question a new
breakdown of the relationship between individual interests and collective interests, in
the sense that the universalism of the protection afforded by the trade union movement
should be entrusted with the defence of minimum rights for all, while the allocation of
further benets can be obtained through the intervention of decentralised bargaining,
without fearing an excessive customisation of the measures in the case of gender poli-
cies becoming inevitable if you want to meet the personal needs of male and female
workers (Ferrara, 2014: 536).
By the end, the lines of a possible future development of territorial bargaining not only
appear multiple but also potentially innovative and cannot necessarily be broken down
into just an approach of exibility geared toward reducing safeguards. However, there are
many obstacles still to overcome, that could be related to poor knowledge of opportunities
that can be achieved in practice, and the consequent rigidity of a certain entrepreneurial
class to make itself available for trade union discussions: in this sense, as has been ob-
served (Vergari, 2014) and as some Italian experiences show us (e.g., the innovative
so-called “contrattazione sociale” for sustaining the territorial economy in the autonomous
Province of Trento, in north-eastern Italy) [Mattei, 2015; Mattei (a cura di), 2014)], it is only
the desirable resumption of social consultation practices disseminated at territorial level
that could provide support and useful solutions to accompany decentralised contractual
initiatives, through agreements ‘on the rules’, in which to outline, for example, priority ar-
eas and boundaries of the (next) negotiating action.
4. Bibliography.
Ales, Edoardo (2011): “Dal caso Fiat al caso Italia. Il diritto del lavoro di prossimità, le
sue scaturigini e i suoi limiti costituzionali”, Working Papers C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo
D’Antona”, n. 134, at
Alleva, Piergiovanni (2012): “Titolarità e usurpazione di poteri dispositivi e derogatori”, Ri-
vista Giuridica del Lavoro e della Previdenza sociale, n. 3, I, pp. 481-484.
Barbieri, Marco (2012): “Il rapporto tra l’art. 8 e l’Accordo interconfederale del 28 giugno
2011”, Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro e della Previdenza sociale, n. 3, I, pp. 461-470.
Barbieri, Marco (2014): “Il Testo Unico alla prova delle norme giuridiche”, Giornale di diritto
del lavoro e di relazioni industriali, n. 143, pp. 577-590.
Bavaro, Vincenzo (2012): Azienda, contratto e sindacato, Bari, Cacucci.
Bavaro, Vincenzo (2014): “Il principio maggioritario nelle relazioni industriali”, Lavoro e
Mercato, n.1, pp. 3-22.
Carabelli, Umberto (2012): “I proli di incostituzionalità dell’art. 8 con riferimento all’efcacia
erga omnes dei contratti collettivi da esso previsti”, Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro e della
Previdenza sociale, n. 3, I, pp. 539-560.
Carinci, Franco (2012): “Al capezzale del sistema contrattuale: il giudice, il sindacato, il
legislatore”, in Carinci Franco (a cura di), Contrattazione in deroga, Milano, Ipsoa, 1.
Carinci, Franco (2014): “Il lungo cammino per Santiago della rappresentatività sindacale
(dal titolo III dello Statuto dei lavoratori al Testo Unico sulla rappresentanza 10 gennaio
2014)”, Diritto delle Relazioni Industriali, n. 2, pp. 309-366.
Cisl (2014): “Le Relazioni Industriali nel tempo della Crisi. OCSEL data on second-level
bargaining in the years 2009-2012”, at
De Luca Tamajo, Raffaele (2014): “La sentenza n. 231/2013 della Corte costituzionale
sullo sfondo della crisi del sistema sindacale anomico”, Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro e
della Previdenza sociale, 2014, n. 1, pp. 45-51.
Del Punta, Riccardo (2014): “Note sparse sul Testo Unico sulla rappresentanza”, Diritto
delle Relazioni Industriali, n. 3, pp. 673-686.
Di Stasi, Antonio (2014): “Il Testo Unico sulla rappresentanza del 10 gennaio 2014 stipu-
lato da Conndustria e Cgil, Cisl e Uil. Una riessione critica”, Rivista Giuridica del
Lavoro e della Previdenza sociale, n. 3, pp. 631-640.
Ferrara, Maria Dolores (2014): “Il gender mainstreaming nei contratti collettivi: tendenze
della contrattazione di genere”, Diritti Lavori Mercati, pp. 519-537.
Ferraro, Giuseppe (2012): “Proli costituzionali della disponibilità del sistema di tutele del
diritto del lavoro subordinato”, Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro e della Previdenza sociale,
n. 3, I, pp. 471-480.
Ferraro, Giuseppe (2014): “Sul rinnovato “sistema” di relazioni industriali”, Argomenti di
Diritto del Lavoro, n. 3, pp. 549-565.
Garilli, Alessandro (2012): “Finalizzazione e oggetto degli accordi di prossimità”, Rivista
Giuridica del Lavoro e della Previdenza sociale, n. 3, I, pp. 485-492.
Garilli, Alessandro (2015): “Crisi e prospettive della rappresentatività sindacale: il dialogo tra
Corte costituzionale e accordi sindacali”, Argomenti di Diritto del Lavoro, n. 1, pp. 38-52.
Giorgi, Elena (2015): “Il t.u. sulla rappresentanza del 10 gennaio 2014: i primi esiti giuris-
prudenziali”, Rivista Italiana di Diritto del Lavoro, n. 1, pp. 381-402.
Gottardi, Donata (2012): “Deroga della legge e rispetto della normativa comunitaria”, Ri-
vista Giuridica del Lavoro e della Previdenza sociale, n. 3, I, pp. 521-528.
Guarriello, Fausta (2012): “I diritti di contrattazione collettiva in un’economia globalizzata”,
Giornale di Diritto del lavoro e Relazioni industriali, n. 2, pp. 341-359.
Imberti, Lucio (2014): “A proposito dell’articolo 8 della legge n. 148/2011: le deroghe si
fanno ma non si dicono”, Giornale di Diritto del lavoro e Relazioni industriali, n. 2, pp.
Lassandari, Andrea (2012): “Il limite del rispetto della Costituzione”, Rivista Giuridica del
Lavoro e della Previdenza sociale, n. 3, I, pp. 503-520.
Leonardi, Salvo (2014): “The new EU Governance and Industrial Relations in Italy”, Ro-
cha, Fernando (editor), The new EU economic governance and its impact on the na-
tional collective bargaining systems, Madrid, Fundación 1° de Majo, pp. 66-90.
Mattei, Alberto (2015): “«Laboratorio trentino»: strumenti per il lavoro e il welfare a livello
territoriale”, Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro e della Previdenza sociale, n. 1, I, pp. 127-
Mattei, Alberto (a cura di) (2014): Il diritto del lavoro tra decentramento e ricentralizzazione.
Il modello trentino nello spazio giuridico europeo, Napoli, Editoriale scientica italiana.
Nacamulli, Roaul C.D. (2014): “Modelli organizzativi essibili ad alta perfomance e sin-
dacati: i contratti di produttività di seconda generazione”, Diritti Lavori Mercati, n. 2,
pp. 437-470.
Nogler, Luca (a cura di) (2014): Gli enti bilaterali nell’artigianato tra neo-centralismo ed
esigenze di sviluppo, Milano, Franco Angeli Ed.
Nunin, Roberta (2016): “Game over o rilancio? La contrattazione della essibilità dopo il
Jobs Act”, in
Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro e della Previdenza sociale, n. 2, I, pp. 373-
[2173-6812 (2016) 34, 25-34]
Perulli, Adalberto Speziale, Valerio (2011): “L’articolo 8 della legge 14 settembre 2011,
n. 148 e la “rivoluzione di Agosto” del Diritto del lavoro”, Working Papers C.S.D.L.E.
“Massimo D’Antona”, at
Pessi, Roberto (2011): “Indisponibilità del tipo e disponibilità regolativa dell’autonomia co-
llettiva. Sull’art. 8 della manovra bis”, Rivista Italiana di Diritto del Lavoro, n. 4, I, pp.
Regalia, Ida (2015): “Oltre la contrattazione di secondo livello. Note sulla concertazione a
livello locale”, Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro e della Previdenza sociale, n. 1, I, pp. 97-
Romeo, Carmelo (2014): “Il processo di “aziendalizzazione” della contrattazione collettiva:
tra prossimità e crisi di rappresentatività sindacale”, Argomenti di Diritto del Lavoro,
n.4-5, pp. 857 - 883.
Scarpelli, Franco (2011): “Rappresentatività e contrattazione tra l’accordo unitario di giug-
no e le discutibili ingerenze del legislatore”, Working Papers C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo
D’Antona”, n. IT- 127/2011, at
Scarpelli, Franco (2012): “Il rapporto tra la legge e la contrattazione collettiva di prossimità
nell’art. 8 del d.l. n. 138/2014”, Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro e della Previdenza sociale,
n. 3, I, pp. 493-501.
Scarponi, Stefania (2015): “Il rapporto tra legge e contrattazione collettiva a livello azien-
dale o territoriale”, Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro e della Previdenza sociale, n. 1, I, pp.
Sciarra, Silvana (2006): “L’evoluzione della contrattazione collettiva. Appunti per una com-
parazione nei Paesi dell’Unione Europea”, Rivista Italiana di Diritto del Lavoro, IV, pp.
Shulter, Thorsten and Müller, Torsten (2015): “European economic governance and its in-
tervention in national wage development and collective bargaining”, Lehndorff, Steffen
(editor), Divisive integration. The triumph of failed ideas in Europe – revisited, Brus-
sels, ETUI, pp. 331-363.
Treu, Tiziano (2014): Labour Law in Italy, Wolters Kluwer Law & Business.
Veneziani, Bruno (2012): “Introduzione”, Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro e della Previdenza
sociale, n. 3, I, pp. 453-460.
Vergari, Sergio (2014): “La contrattazione sociale in Trentino”, Working papers C.S.D.L.E.
“Massimo D’Antona”, n. IT-232/2014, at
Zoppoli, Lorenzo (2015): “Istituzioni e negoziazioni territoriali: un’analisi della strumenta-
zione giuridica”, Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro e della Previdenza sociale, n. 1, I, pp.

Licencia de Creative Commons
Este obra está bajo una licencia de Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0 Internacional.


I.S.S.N.: 2173-6812
Entidad editora: Universidad de Huelva. Servicio de Publicaciones
Licencia de uso: Creative Commons 4.0